Organizational Study of the Saint Paul Police Department

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ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY 2019
SAINT PAUL POLICE DEPARTMENT
EXECUTIVE BRIEF

December 2019

OVERVIEW

Study Background and Methodology

The Saint Paul City Council requested Chief of Police Todd Axtell to conduct an organizational study to examine processes and staffing levels at the Saint Paul Police Department in 2018. Chief Axtell commissioned this study in January 2019.

The organizational study data collection methods examined department statistics, human resource data, qualitative analysis of records management system information, qualitative interviews, and observation of unit operations. Study findings are divided into three (3) categories: Data/Observations, Risk Management Considerations, & Recommendations.

Study Scope

The scope of this project includes identifying major themes and phenomena impacting workloads and service levels to the residents, businesses, and visitors of Saint Paul. The study examines unit processes, business practices, work culture, employee wellness, staffing levels, policy development, and procedural outcomes. This study addresses recent data about the Saint Paul Police Department to contextualize the current environment for delivering law enforcement services by examining a six-year period between 2013-2018, with data points in 2019 where available.

Key Themes

- Saint Paul is a community growing in population and development.
- The community is challenged with some of the highest poverty rates in the state for adults and youth.
- Department employees are dedicated and strive to advocate for victims and provide a safe community environment.
- The department is organized for delivering service in crime intervention, investigation, prevention, and social disorder issues.
- Elements of the organization act as a bridge to long-term governmental and non-profit entities working in prevention, diversion, and community wellness.
- Many areas of the department possess staffing levels that meet the service needs of the community.

- Changing procedures and staffing additions to Patrol Services will greatly increase service levels for the highest priority calls in our community.
- Increases in video and digital data have created more complex and solvable investigations than ever before, requiring restructuring of some investigative units with an investment in more staff to meet the growing demand for their expertise.
- The expansion in community, statutory, and agency expectations and requirements for law enforcement training and education require restructuring of curriculum, additional staff, resources, and partnerships to innovate the pre-service, in-service, and continuing education of police officers.

Overview of the City of Saint Paul

- Saint Paul is a growing community which had a population of 286,840 in 2000 and is projected to have 320,000 people living in the city by 2020; its highest population since 1970.
- Saint Paul has an increasing number of households; 112,109 in the year 2000 and almost 125,000 today.
- Over half (50.5%) of city housing units are rental properties, creating new challenges regarding the dynamics of community.
- The largest new development of planned housing, office, and retail in generations will bring an increase of over 3,800 new housing units and 8,000-10,000 residents to Saint Paul in Highland Park with another large development planned on the East Side.
- Saint Paul experiences people living in poverty at 20.4% which is almost double the state average of 10.5%.
- The community has large areas of concentrated poverty and people of color in Minnesota experience poverty at 3-4 times the rate of the majority population; demonstrating race-equity gaps in the community.
- 33% of children in Saint Paul live in poverty.
- Saint Paul is in the most diverse region of our state and people of color are over half the city's population; overall Minnesota has only 20% people of color.

OUTLINE OF DEPARTMENT RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary of Investigative Unit Recommendations

- Re-focus Homicide Unit investigations; only handling death investigations and moving Robbery/Kidnapping into its own unit.
- Create a Violent Crime Against Persons Unit (VCAP) to alleviate approximately 50% of the types of cases assigned to Homicide investigators. Some egregious crimes assigned to the Homicide Unit cannot be properly addressed due to the frequency of homicide investigations.
- Expand the Gang/Gun Unit afternoon shift with staff from investigative units this study recommends being consolidated.
- Create an Initial Shooting Response Team within Gangs/Guns Unit to be quick-response investigators to all shooting scenes.
- Establish a Criminal Intelligence Unit staffed primarily by civilian analysts that synthesizes existing information into usable data for reducing and preventing violent crime and targeting serious property crime offenders.
- Expand the size of the Sex Crimes Unit to build the appropriate capacity for these very complex cases and create a Child Abuse Unit to handle the burgeoning number of abuse cases referred from Ramsey County Child Protection.

- Add investigative positions to help with the volume of burglaries, auto theft cases, and other property crimes.
- Close the Special Investigations Unit and FORCE Unit and merge staff into other investigative units where additional staff is needed.
- Work to establish automation in existing electronic systems to quickly inform victims about cases without solvability factors.
- Structure investigative processes that rely less on case management model and focus more on known offenders.
- Establish a decision matrix for each investigative unit to uniformly handle cases and build system consistency in case determination.

Summary of Patrol Operations Recommendations

- Make policy/procedure changes to the dispatching and deployment of Patrol Officers during periods of high demand; increase baseline patrol staffing by 6.5% for Patrol Operations to ensure timely response to Priority 2 Calls for Service.
- Fully staff the existing Patrol Operations scheduling model to reduce organizational stress for meeting mandatory minimum staffing levels.
- Add to the existing Code Enforcement Police Officers across Patrol Operations to address problem properties that impact neighborhood quality of life.
- Increase FTO and Training Unit staffing to operate two (2) academies per year to reduce the "peaks and valleys" in general staffing experienced annually.

Summary of Community Engagement Recommendations

- Continue to build a solid infrastructure to support the LECPA program, which is a model for recruiting community connected people serving in public safety.
- Sustain structured community outreach events and programing such as Safe Summer Nights and Shop with a Cop.
- Add staffing to Traffic Investigations, Community Partnerships, and Special Operations to improve service levels to the community.

Summary of Support Services Recommendations

- Increase the ratio of non-sworn staff in the Crime Lab to improve staff longevity and build long-term institutional expertise.
- Seek accreditation for Property Room operations.
- Continue to work towards full NIBIN and Rapid DNA lab capabilities to reduce gun violence.
- Expand training opportunities for supervisors and investigators through annual training curricula.
- Contract with a work-space architect to maximize the footprints of current buildings and prepare a proposal for much needed additional space.

Summary of General Staffing Level Recommendations

Add 2-6% to the baseline staffing level of the entire department, through an annual Structural Staffing Reserve (SSR) calculation, so that the agency has proper staffing available 24 hours per day to provide long-term sustainable service to the community.

Summary of Staffing Recommendations

- Transfer 1 Senior Commander, 1 Commander, 19 Sergeants, 14 Officers, and 2 Civilian Analysts to other units as part of an organizational realignment of investigative functions.
- Add 33 Investigative Sergeants to meet the challenging workloads facing investigations on behalf of victims.
- Add 33 Officers to Patrol Operations to reduce Priority 2 call waiting times and increase service levels in our most impacted neighborhoods.
- Add 3 Officers to investigative units to provide enhanced service in victim advocacy and offender accountability
- Add 3 Officers and 1 Sergeant to the Training Unit staff to meet growing law enforcement training standards and community expectations.
- Add 4 Command level positions and 1 Sergeant to effectively manage the service expectations of our community.
- Add 25.5 civilian positions for managing and supporting a high level of service to our community.

Study Author

The author of this study is Commander Jack Serier of the Saint Paul Police Department. Jack has been a law enforcement officer for 29 years, served as Sheriff of Ramsey County, and holds a doctoral degree in Leadership, Policy, & Administration from the University of Saint Thomas.

Section 1.0 – Preface & Introduction

Preface

The following is a four-part organizational study of the Saint Paul Police Department (SPPD). This study is intended to identify major themes and phenomena impacting workloads and service levels to the residents, businesses, and visitors of Saint Paul. The study examines unit processes, business practices, work culture, employee wellness, staffing levels, policy development, and procedural outcomes. This study addresses recent data from the Saint Paul Police Department to contextualize the current environment for delivering law enforcement services by examining a six-year period between 2013-2018, with data points in 2019 where available.

This study has been designed as a stand-alone document. It does not compare the Saint Paul Police Department to other policing organizations. This study is designed to provide recent historical patterns of SPPD workloads, staffing, mathematical analysis, and in-depth qualitative interviewing to draw conclusions about what is needed to bring the community to an equitable level of law enforcement service.[i] This study is also designed to be a document that can be updated on an annual basis. The following information is from SPPD data and can be added-to on a monthly or annual basis to provide continuous benchmarks about performance and workloads, becoming a Department-wide dashboard.

The City of Saint Paul is a growing and vibrant community. It also faces many challenges to due racial and economic inequities and recent increases in violence. However, there are many opportunities available to Saint Paul and this study was done to provide a roadmap for improvement to one of its major governmental functions. This study does not provide analysis as an "either/or" proposition, but rather as part of a larger social and governmental structure to support the future of this city.

Introduction

Throughout the years, the Saint Paul Police Department has had different organizational configurations. At the beginning of 2019, the SPPD was organized into three major divisions of operation managed by an Assistant Chief of Police reporting to the Chief of Police. The organizational structure appeared as follows:

In April 2019, the SPPD reorganized into four divisions. This was done to reduce the managerial span of control and better reflect the organization's diverse operations. This reorganization was done without any added budgetary costs. The new organizational structure is:

It is with the above organizational changes that this study is being completed and documents this new Department structure through the methodology explained in the next section.

The Purpose, Scope, Methodology, and Components of this study:

Purpose: Analyze current demands for service, business practices, staffing levels, process improvements, risk management factors, and deficiencies and/or redundancies in services to the community present at the time of the study.

Scope: This study will analyze many different functions of the agency including current organizational structure, times of work, workloads, unit overlaps, unit deficiencies, workload problems, identify strengths, identify weaknesses, and address current concerns of the staff and the community about phenomena that have already been identified as problems and determine root causes.

Methodology: Both quantitative and qualitative measurements will be used to conduct this study through an inductive methodology. An inductive method does not include a hypothesis to be either validated or disproved; rather data will be drawn out of statements, surveys, and existing statistical data to make observations, identify generalized principles, and create recommendations.

Components: The proposed approach to completing this study is modular. The Saint Paul Police Department is a large organization with many different business lines. Approaching this study in a modular framework will allow certain "front burner issues" to be analyzed more quickly. It will also allow the SPPD to utilize parts of the study prior to the completion of the whole study.

The organizational study modules:

- Patrol Operations Division
- Major Crimes Division
- Support Services Division
- Community Engagement Division

Module	Resources Required	Timeline to Full Completion
Patrol Operations Division	Interviews of key staff, surveys, analysis of CAD data, analysis of reports, review of staffing levels, analysis of scheduling, review of workload study	4-5 months
Major Crimes Division	Interviews of key staff, surveys, analysis of CAD data, analysis of reports, review of staffing levels, analysis of scheduling, analysis of case management, review of workload.	3-4 months
Support Services & Administration Division	Interviews of key staff, surveys, review of staffing levels, analysis of scheduling, review of workload.	2-3 months
Community Engagement Division	Interviews of key staff, analysis of reports, review of staffing levels, analysis of scheduling, review of workload.	2-3 months

Section 1.1 - Overview of the City of Saint Paul

The following section will cover:

- Statistics regarding the demographics of the City of Saint Paul.
- Housing facts about the city.
- Trends about economic conditions.
- Trends in future growth in the community.

Saint Paul is home to 304,442 residents as of 2016 and is projected to climb to 316,000 residents by 2020 as calculated by the Metropolitan Council [1]. The general population increase began after 1980, after the population of the city dropped to 270,230.

The City of Saint Paul has a land area of 56 square miles and is the capital city of the State of Minnesota. Settled on the banks of the Mississippi River, and boasts over 4,000 acres of parks, 100 miles of trails, 14 Colleges and Universities, world class fine arts, historic architecture, vibrant neighborhoods, multimodal transportation and a robust business community [1].

The following section provides historical and current information about housing, demographics, and employment in Saint Paul. This information is important to contextualize the environment of city government today.

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Overview: Population

A. Population History in Saint Paul (1):

Figure 1.1

Saint Paul Population, Long Term Trend 1970 to 2016, and Forecasted

Source: Metropolitan Council population dataset. Numbers prior to 2016 are from the Decennial Census. 2016 data is a draft Metropolitan Council estimate. Future numbers are Metropolitan Council forecasts. Data compiled for this table on July 17th, 2017.

Figure 1.12

Increasing population.

The Metropolitan Council projects Saint Paul will grow by 44,160 residents, or about 21,000 households, by 2030. Regional growth will represent a balance of seniors, middle-aged, young adults, and children, as well as a diversity of incomes. Because of this, Saint Paul continues to embrace its decades-old commitment to an all-incomes housing strategy. New market rate housing development and the protection and enhancement of existing neighborhoods are absolutely necessary to maintain and enhance the tax base so vital to the City's ability to fund essential services and infrastructure.

METROPOLITAN COUNCIL GROWTH TARGETS

	2000 (actual)	2010	2020	2030
Population	286,840	305,000	320,000	331,000
Households	112,109	120,000	127,000	133,000
Employment	184,589	196,600	210,000	220,600

Overview: Housing

B. **Housing History in Saint Paul** (17)

Figure 1.13

While the population of Saint Paul dipped before growing back to near its 1970 level, the number of households in Saint Paul has pretty consistently increased. The Council's 2020 forecast suggests that in the next few years we will need to house an additional 8,044 households in the City.

Saint Paul Households, Long Term Trend 1970 to 2016, and Forecasted

Year	Households
1970	104,126
1980	106,223
1990	110,249
2000	112,109
2010	111,001
2016	112,571
2020 forecast	124,700
2030 forecast	131,400
2040 forecast	137,400

Source: Metropolitan Council population dataset. Numbers prior to 2016 are from the Decennial Census. 2016 data is a draft Metropolitan Council estimate. Future numbers are Metropolitan Council forecasts. Data compiled for this table on July 17th, 2017.

The City of Saint Paul has approximately 119,625 housing units as reported in the ACS 5-year estimates, 2012-2016 (2). Over the last 25 years, housing vacancy rates in Saint Paul have been relatively low. Vacancy rates in owner-occupied housing have been stable, ranging from a low of 0.7% to a high of 2.7% during the recession of the mid-2000s. The rental market has showed some variability, and in 1990 and 2010, rental vacancy rates peaked at 7.7% and 7.2% respectively. Currently vacancy rates are trending downward with 1.5% for owner occupied units and 3.7% for rental units. Rental markets are typically considered stable at 5% vacancy, and with low available housing supply and increased housing demand, there is upward pressure on rents. Tenure of units is nearly equally divided between owner- and renter-occupied units, with a slightly higher percentage of renter-occupied units--0.5% or 1,081 units. This is the first time in modern city history that the number of renter occupied units has surpassed the number of owner-occupied units. From 1990 to present, there has been a 2% increase in the number of

households with a 9% decrease in the number of households being owner-occupants and a 14% increase in the number of renter households. This change can be attributed, in part, to an increased number of single-family houses that have become rentals as well as the construction of more multifamily rental housing within the city (2).

C. **Housing Unit Census 2012-2016** (2)

Figure 1.14

Table 1: Housing Units, Occupancy, and Tenure

	Units	
	Number	**Percent**
Total Units	119,625	--
Occupied/Vacant[1]		
Occupied	112,571	94.1%
Vacant	7,054	5.9%
Tenure of Occupied Units		
Owner-occupied	55,745	49.5%
Renter-occupied	56,826	50.5%

Source: American Communities Survey 5-year Estimates, 2012-2016

D. **Vacancy Rate History 1990-2016** (17)

Figure 1.15

Chart 1: Percent Owner and Rental Vacancy Rates (1990 - 2016)

E.   **Owner and Renter Households 1990-2016** (17)

Figure 1.16

Chart 2: Number of Households
Total, Owner and Renter (1990 - 2016)

Total Households — Owner Households — Renter Households

Figure 1.17

An October 2018 rendering shows Ryan Cos. plans for the former Ford Twin Cities auto plant in Highland Park, which calls for 3,800 units of housing units along with retail and green space. (Courtesy of the the Ryan Cos.)

New major development projects are in the planning stages. A large development is planned on the East Side on the site of the Hillcrest Golf Course and the largest new development of planned housing, office, and retail in generations will bring an increase of over 3,800 new housing units and 8,000-10,000 residents to Saint Paul in Highland Park (25).

Overview: Employment

    F.   **Employment Population in City of Saint Paul (3)**

        Figure 1.18

Total Jobs in Saint Paul, Long-term Trend 1970 to 2016, and forecasted

Source: 1970 to 2010 employment from Metropolitan Council's Community Profiles Employment Database; 2016 employment based on year-end 2016 counts from Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development; forecasted employment data for 2020 through 2040 from the Metropolitan Council's 2040 adopted forecasts as of Jan. 1st, 2017. Data compiled for this chart on July 3rd, 2017.

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Overview: Demographics and Economic Disparities

G. **Demographic Composition of the City of Saint Paul** (3)

The demographics of Saint Paul make it one of the most diverse communities in Minnesota.

Figure 1.19

Racial and Ethnic Composition of Saint Paul Residents

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2017 American Community Survey 1 Year Data (2)

The City of Saint Paul has grown steadily in recent years. Most of this growth came from increases in Asian American, African American, Hispanic/Latino, and multiracial populations. The proportion of the population identifying as two or more races saw the greatest relative growth at 30.5% over the five-year period; the Asian American population had the second-most relative growth at 19.1%, and the highest increase in actual numbers, adding nearly 8,000 new residents. The American Indian and Alaskan Native population shrank by approximately 200 people, or 10.0%, and the white population decreased by 1,000, or about 0.6% (3).

H. Poverty Information in Saint Paul 2008 & 2013 (3)

I. Figure 1.19 (1)

Statewide Poverty Rate is for children under 18 years of age is **10%**; while in **Saint Paul 33%** of those under 18 years old experience poverty (5)(6).

Changes in poverty rates by race and ethnicity

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, 2006 - 2010 (midpoint 2008) and 2011-2015 (midpoint 2013), Table S1703. Data compiled for this chart on July 3rd, 2017

Figure 1.12 (3)

Poverty by age

In 2015, seniors age 65 and above saw the lowest poverty rate at 13.7%. Children under age 18 experienced the highest poverty rate at 33.3%, which translates to 23,409 children living in poverty in Saint Paul.

Poverty rates by age

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates 2011-2015 (midpoint 2013), Table S1703. Data compiled for this chart on July 3rd, 2017

Figure 1.19(2)

The overall poverty concentration in the City of Saint Paul continues to be a challenge for the community, especially when juxtaposed to the greater region where the density of poverty is not nearly as great as in Saint Paul and the other urban core city of Minneapolis. U.S. Census data places the general poverty rate at 20.4% (3).

Figure 1.19(3) (7)

Map 2.C Percentage of individuals below 185% of federal poverty threshold by census tract, 2007-2011

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey 5-Year data, 2007-2011.

Concentrated poverty remained a problem in the central cities even during the 1990s when overall poverty rates were declining. The number of people living in areas of concentrated poverty in the central cities increased slightly from 218,609 in 1990 to 220,164 in 2000. In contrast, other than a census tract in Fort Snelling, there were no suburban census tracts that qualified as areas of concentrated poverty in 2000. 2 Areas of concentrated poverty expanded quite dramatically between 2000 and 2010, impacting far more residents in both the cities and the suburbs. The sudden jump in the number of suburban people living in areas of concentrated poverty was striking. The number soared from fewer than 500 in 2000 to 49,528 in 2010. The number of Minneapolis and Saint Paul residents living in areas of concentrated poverty increased even more, from 220,164 in 2000 to 287,320 in 2010 [3].

General Poverty Levels by Density in the City of Saint Paul

Figure 1.19 (4) [4]

J.   Homelessness in Saint Paul

Figure 1.19(5)

Total Number of People Experiencing Homelessness, by Household Type and Living Situation [20]

	In shelters	Not in shelters	Total
People in families	829	38	867
People not in families	771	289	1,060
Total number of people experiencing homelessness	**1,600**	**327**	**1,927**

Note. "People in families" includes adults or youth *with* accompanying children. "People NOT in families" includes singles and couples who do not have children accompanying them.

Review of Section 1.1

Data/Observations:

In analyzing the data from the City of Saint Paul, these and other publicly accessible statistics describe the social dynamics our police officers are working with each day as recruiters, advocates, counselors, and guardians dedicated to public service. The following is a synopsis of Section 1.0:

- Saint Paul is in the region of our state that is most diverse; where people of color are about half our city population, overall Minnesota has only 20% people of color.
- People of color in Minnesota experience poverty at 3-4 times the rate of white people.
- Saint Paul experiences people living in poverty at 18.7%, which is almost double the state average of 10.5%.
- 33% of those in poverty in Saint Paul are children.
- Saint Paul is a growing community, where in 2000 we had 286,840 people living in the city and projected to have 320,00 by next year (an almost 12% increase in population).
- Saint Paul is a city with a growing number of households; 112,109 in the year 2000, and now have 124,700 today.
- 50.5% of Saint Paul's housing units are rental properties creates new challenges about the dynamics of community.
- The Saint Paul Police Department has increased the diversity for people of color and women in employment in the agency in the last three years.
- The Saint Paul Police Department is serving a community with a larger impoverished population than other local areas and regions of Minnesota; especially acute is the disproportionate number of children living in poverty in Saint Paul as compared to the state as a whole.

Risk Management Considerations:

- The Saint Paul Police Department has a gap between the diversity of the Department and the community it serves. This has the potential deleterious effect of creating a real or perceived gap in understanding between communities of color and the SPPD serving them, especially in times of community crisis.
- Recruitment and community outreach that is slow will widen the disparity gaps with communities of color that become more difficult to recoup from if not aggressively addressed.
- Growth in rental housing creates the concern of guardianship over properties between owners, the SPPD, and other regulatory entities.

Recommendations:

- The Saint Paul Police Department must continue to adapt to a community growing in population, diversity, and number of households. Level of service must be monitored closely and growth in organizational competencies and numeric strength will be a continuing source of concern for the SPPD.
- Recruitment and community outreach are being addressed at the SPPD and more will be addressed in the Youth Outreach and Programming information in the Community Engagement Division section of this study.
- Ensure that adequate programming is continuing with Crime Free Multi-Housing to address guardianship of rental properties.
- Continue to have specialized Police Officers working on "problem properties" in conjunction with the Department of Safety and Inspections and other city regulatory bodies that can affect change from outside the enforcement scope of law enforcement.

Section 1.2 – Office of the Chief

The following section will cover:

- **Organization of the Office of the Chief**
- **Review of Inspections Unit**
- **Review of the Public Information Officer Unit.**
- **Description of the Internal Affairs Unit**
- **Description of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Police**

The Chief's Office has the following organizational structure shown in Figure 1.2 and Table 1.2 shows the history of personnel assigned the unit from 2013-2019.

Figure 1.21 – Organizational Chart of the Office of the Chief

Table 1.21 - Office of the Chief Personnel 2013-2019

Personnel Type	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Chief of Police	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Assistant Chief	3	3	3	1	1	1	1
Senior Commander	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Commander	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Sergeant	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Civilian PIO	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Officers	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Office Manager	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Office Assistant	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Total Staff	**18**	**18**	**18**	**16**	**16**	**16**	**16**

Section 1.21 - Chief of Police

The Chief of Police functions as the chief executive officer of the Saint Paul Police Department and is appointed to a six (6) year term by city charter. Chief of Police is assisted by an Office Manager and an Office Assistant.

Section 1.22 - Inspections Unit

The Inspections Unit within the Chief's Office is managed by the Executive Officer to the Chief of Police (Senior Commander) and supervises the Chief Inspector (Sergeant) and is staffed by four (4) Officers; three (3) assigned to the Office of the Chief and one (1) assigned as the personal security to the Mayor of Saint Paul.

The goal of the Inspections Unit is to be an oversight and compliance function of the SPPD that directly reports to the Chief of Police.

Data/Observations:

- The following are major areas of oversight and compliance done by the Inspections Unit:
  - Accounting for all money that is taken in by the SPPD.

- All money brought in through the Property Room is accounted for, determined if it must stay in property due to evidentiary value, and all other funds are deposited in a bank by Inspections.
- Property Room money vault quarterly audit.
- Review of the chain of custody of money for past year.
- Audits of buy-funds money for investigative units.
- Narcotics Evidence: audit custody chains for all drugs seized by the SPPD and do quarterly destruction through a certified incinerator.
- Gun Evidence: audit custody chains for all gun seizures by the SPPD and regular destruction of guns at off-site metal reduction plant. No seized guns are re-sold by the SPPD.
- Internal auditing of SPPD equipment.
- Managing over 800 parking placards for all city agencies issued by the SPPD.
- Write daily Mayor's and City Council reports on SPPD activity.
- Write daily report to the Chief distributed to all senior administrators.
- Schedule all special events (Allianz Field, CHS Field, Xcel Center, Twin Cities Marathon, etc.) with overtime details.
- Track all off-duty employment and audits of off-duty locations.
- Manage all on-site parking operations for the SPPD.
- Perform unit inspections across the agency.
- Receives all employee court subpoenas and monitors compliance with court appearance.

Risk Management Considerations:

- Oversight of organizational functions is critical to the legitimacy of the Chief and the SPPD. Recruiting and retaining excellent staff committed to a culture of accountability is essential for any employee working in this unit.
- Continual process improvement should be constantly encouraged within this unit and to other units within the agency from Inspections staff.
- The accountability chains for money and evidence that is audited by the Inspections Unit touches some of the highest liability areas of the SPPD.

Recommendations:

- Continue with the current level of Inspections staff.
- Consider having the Inspections staff provide training sessions and templates for unit commanders to pre-inspect their units to make sure that they are complying with all areas that may be examined for a unit inspection.

Section 1.23 - Public Information Officer

Public Information Officers (PIO) consist of one (1) Police Sergeant and one civilian Communication Specialist. They are a direct report to the Chief of Police with nominal reporting responsibilities to the Assistant Chief of Police. The current configuration of staff began approximately ten (10) years ago with different personnel in each position.

Data/Observations:

- The following are major responsibilities of the Public Information Officers for the SPPD:
  - Data Practices
  - Crisis communications
  - Social media management
  - Proactive media management
  - Next Door communication
  - Facebook management
  - Publications
    - Annual Report
    - Short form reports
  - Internal communication
  - Talking points for command staff
  - Video production
- Each PIO brings different strengths from either private sector knowledge or law enforcement experience.
- The unit deals with a 24-hour news cycle and both PIO's are subject to 24-hour call out for breaking news issues from criminal acts to public safety messaging.
- Average daily media workload is thirty to forty (30-40) requests.

Risk Management Considerations:

- Public messaging needs to be done accurately and timely due to the nature of public safety.
- Public information officers must continue to provide their quick response to news media requests to provide accurate information for transparency; otherwise, slow response may cause distorted narratives to appear as valid information.
- Lack of timely fulfillment of data practices requests can be a source of litigation for a public agency.
- Inconsistent management of all media platforms maintained by the SPPD can lead to a lack of public trust of a public agency.

Recommendations:

- Continue to maintain the mix of civilian and sworn PIO's.
- Work on increasing the level of video-based information sharing; seen as a modern "best practice" in social media connection with an audience.
- Add one (1) civilian PIO who participates in a "three-deep" principle for staffing the 24/7 nature of these positions; and to build the competency and ability to deliver on current and emerging communication platforms.

Section 1.24 – Internal Affairs

The Internal Affairs Unit is led by one (1) Commander who supervises two (2) Investigative Sergeants and one (1) Office Assistant. The Internal Affairs Commander is a direct report to the Senior Commander/Executive Officer to the Chief of Police. A brief confidential overview was done of this unit. Staffing of this unit is sufficient at this time and no further analysis will be covered in this document due to the confidential nature of the unit work.

Section 1.25 - Assistant Chief of Police

The Assistant Chief of Police serves as the chief operating officer of the SPPD. The Assistant Chief has direct reporting from one (1) Executive Officer (Sergeant), one (1) Office Assistant, and four (4) Deputy Chiefs. Staffing of this unit is sufficient at this time.

Section 1.26 - Police Accounting Unit

The Police Accounting Unit has:

- The organizational structure shown in Figure 1.26;
- A current personnel table is shown in Table 1.26;

The Accounting Supervisor reports to the Assistant Chief of Police. This unit performs the accounting of a budget of over $100 million.

Figure 1.26 – Police Accounting Unit

Table 1.26

Personnel Type	2019
Accountant IV	1
Accountant I	1
Account Clerk II	1
Total Staff	**3**

This unit has sufficient staffing and not reviewed further for this study.

Section 2.0 Patrol District Operations

The following section will cover:

- **Patrol District staffing levels**
- **Part I Crimes in Saint Paul**
- **Calls for Service for data Patrol Operations**
- **Queue-Time data for Calls for Service**
- **Response Time data for Calls for Service**
- **Volume and nature of Calls for Service for Patrol Operations**
- **Risk Management & Recommendations**

The Saint Paul Police Department has three Patrol Districts that operate in parallel to one another to provide service to three distinct areas within the City of Saint Paul. Each patrol district has the following basic structure:

Figure 2.01   Patrol District Organizational Chart

Table 2.01 – Patrol District Personnel Levels 2019

Personnel Type	Western	Central	Eastern
Senior Commander	1	1	1
Patrol Commander	1	2	1
Investigative Commander	1	1	1
Administrative Sergeants	1	1	1
Patrol Sergeants	9	11	9
Investigative Sergeants	3	2	2
Patrol Officers	82	91	85
Code Enforcement Officers	2	2	2
Office Assistant	1	1	1
Total Staff	**101**	**112**	**103**

The 3 districts have the naming conventions of Eastern District, Central District, and Western District and are depicted on the below grid maps:

Western District

Central District

Eastern District

One of the core functions that has been identified in this study is Patrol Operations. This service runs on a 24-hour clock, 7 days per week and is comprised of just under half the sworn strength of the SPPD. The number of sworn personnel in the SPPD has grown in authorized strength over the last 22 years from 569 sworn staff in 1997 to the current number of 635 in 2019. This is a 11.6% increase in authorized staff or 66 sworn staff over this 22-year period. While this historical number has some relevance, this study focuses on more recent historic information that dates from 2013 to 2019.

Not all information in this study will cover 2013-2019; some parts will exclude 2013 data due to concerns about data accuracy and 2019 will be excluded in some cases due to the year being in-progress.

Below in section 2.1 is a snapshot of call and crime data that Patrol Operations provides services for on an annualized basis from 2014-2018.

2.1 2014-2018 Citywide Calls for Service and Crime Data (3) Charts [11]

Tables 2.1 – 2.13 show a general snapshot of the types of calls, crimes and neighborhood statistics that Patrol Operations serves in the City of Saint Paul.

Table 2.1

2014 - 2018 Top 20 Most Common Calls					
Call Type	**2014**	**2015**	**2016**	**2017**	**2018**
DISORDERLY PERSONS	11941	13299	14972	16623	17948
SUSP ACTIVITY	8986	10244	10733	11867	10538
TRAFFIC ACCIDENT	9938	9458	9778	9793	9707
THEFT	9489	8748	8467	8938	8899
ALARMS	6720	6760	6843	6833	6954
911 HANGUP	4327	5926	6171	6160	6473
MISC-RCS	4460	4921	5396	6038	6276
DISTURB CALLS	7334	6329	5676	5458	4425
OTHER VIOLATION	4119	4610	4940	4867	3910
ASSIST FIRE AMB	2402	3257	3796	3818	3900
ASSIST CALLS	4242	4333	4471	4609	3890
INVESTIGATE	5089	8204	9840	10831	3737
AUTO THEFT	2774	2565	2802	2965	3141
CRIMINAL DAMAGE	3040	2878	2938	2925	2895
DANG CONDITIONS	2298	2751	3528	4236	2826
DOMESTICS	3113	2870	2468	2486	2452
FIGHTS	4107	4444	4143	3532	2432
HARASSMENT	2531	2611	2468	2412	2318
BURGLARY	2851	2454	2545	2421	2226
FRAUD	2073	1949	2258	2243	2191

Table 2.12

2014 - 2018 Part I Offenses
Totals reflect counts of victims.

PART 1	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	% CHANGE '14 / '18	% CHANGE '17 / '18
Homicide *	11	16	19	22	15	36.4%	-31.8%
Rape	181	204	184	217	277	53.0%	27.6%
Robbery	654	714	700	697	560	-14.4%	-19.7%
Aggravated Assault	1,128	1,181	1,067	1,060	1,089	-3.5%	2.7%
Burglary	2,330	2,125	2,278	2,274	1,909	-18.1%	-16.1%
Commercial	367	335	436	369	400	9.0%	8.4%
Residential	1,963	1,790	1,842	1,905	1,509	-23.1%	-20.8%
Theft	6,045	5,997	5,659	6,577	5,877	-2.8%	-10.6%
Motor Vehicle Theft	2,008	1,748	1,874	2,084	2,296	14.3%	10.2%
Arson	119	120	109	143	110	-7.6%	-23.1%
Crimes Against Persons **	1,320	1,401	1,270	1,299	1,381	4.6%	6.3%
Crimes Against Property ***	11,156	10,704	10,620	11,775	10,752	-3.6%	-8.7%
Total Part 1	12,476	12,105	11,890	13,074	12,133	-2.7%	-7.2%

* Homicide totals do not include justifiable incidents: 2 in 2014, 4 in 2015, 2 in 2016, 2 in 2017, 2 in 2018
** Includes Homicide, Rape, Aggravated Assault.
*** Includes Robbery, Burglary, Theft, Motor Vehicle Theft, Arson.

This Area Intentionally Left Blank

Table 2.13

2018 Saint Paul Neighborhood Statistics

Neighborhood	Pop.	% of Total Pop	Calls for Service	Calls per 1000	Part 1	Part 1 per 1000
1) Battle Creek	20,453	7.2%	10,524	515	599	29.3
2) Greater East Side	27,206	9.5%	16,817	618	853	31.4
3) West Side	14,959	5.2%	10,858	726	482	32.2
4) Dayton's Bluff	16,434	5.8%	18,935	1,152	802	48.8
5) Payne-Phalen	30,700	10.8%	28,232	920	1,395	45.4
6) North End	25,447	8.9%	24,096	947	966	38.0
7) Thomas-Dale	15,041	5.3%	17,422	1,158	734	48.8
8) Summit-University	17,002	6.0%	15,081	887	808	47.5
9) West Seventh	11,083	3.9%	10,324	932	568	51.2
10) Como	11,913	4.2%	4,258	357	476	40.0
11) Hamline-Midway	11,496	4.0%	12,573	1,094	649	56.5
12) St. Anthony	7,674	2.7%	4,263	556	342	44.6
13) Union Park	18,405	6.5%	16,436	893	1,326	72.0
14) Mac-Groveland	19,546	6.9%	6,260	320	499	25.5
15) Highland	24,078	8.4%	8,797	365	566	23.5
16) Summit Hill	6,574	2.3%	3,513	534	328	49.9
17) Downtown	7,057	2.5%	29,461	4,175	740	104.9
Other / Unknown	---	---	0	---	0	---
Total	**285,068**	**100.0%**	**237,850**	**834**	**12,133**	**42.6**

Neighborhood	Quality of Life Calls	Q of L per 1000	Crime v. Person	CaPers per 1000	Crimes v. Property	CaProp per 1000
1) Battle Creek	1,897	92.7	74	3.6	525	25.7
2) Greater East Side	2,639	97.0	125	4.6	728	26.8
3) West Side	1,852	123.8	54	3.6	428	28.6
4) Dayton's Bluff	2,885	175.6	134	8.2	668	40.6
5) Payne-Phalen	4,978	162.1	234	7.6	1,161	37.8
6) North End	3,368	132.4	164	6.4	802	31.5
7) Thomas-Dale	3,042	202.2	137	9.1	597	39.7
8) Summit-University	2,948	173.4	110	6.5	698	41.1
9) West Seventh	1,474	133.0	55	5.0	513	46.3
10) Como	996	83.6	17	1.4	459	38.5
11) Hamline-Midway	2,027	176.3	54	4.7	595	51.8
12) St. Anthony	621	80.9	11	1.4	331	43.1
13) Union Park	2,948	160.2	58	3.2	1,268	68.9
14) Mac-Groveland	681	34.8	11	0.6	488	25.0
15) Highland	1,061	44.1	31	1.3	535	22.2
16) Summit Hill	433	65.9	8	1.2	320	48.7
17) Downtown	5,991	848.9	104	14.7	636	90.1
Other / Unknown	0	---	0	---	0	---
Total	**39,841**	**139.8**	**1,381**	**4.84**	**10,752**	**37.72**

2.2 Patrol District Operations – Sworn Staff Census

Table 2.21 is a chart that shows authorized versus actual strength of the SPPD from 2013-2019. Authorized strength has grown by 4.1% or by twenty-five (25) sworn officers during this six (6)-year period.

Entire Sworn Personnel Census of Saint Paul Police Department from 2013-2019

Table 2.21

Year	Authorized Strength	Actual Strength
2013	610	612
2014	615	614
2015	615	614
2016	615	620
2017	620	624
2018	626	625
2019	635	622**

Authorized and actual strength numbers are end of year calculations from Human Resources; **2019 statistic is taken from a mid-year census.

Patrol Division Staff by Patrol District from 2013-2019 at Bid

Table 2.22 shows the history of the number of Patrol Officers assigned to Patrol Operations by patrol district at the time of "bid" in January of each year. These Patrol Officers are part of the overall census of staff listed in Table 2.21.

Table 2.22

Year	Eastern District	Central District	Downtown Beat	Western District	Total Patrol Staff	% Staff Allocated to Patrol
2013	69	67	13	79	228	37%
2014	85	73	12	84	254	41%
2015	83	70	18	82	253	41%
2016	90	71	17	91	269	43%
2017	85	66	18	85	254	41%
2018	83	66	23	84	256	41%
2019	85	68	23	82	258	41%

*Table 2.22 census numbers contain only **full-duty Police Officer rank employees** able to work in patrol operations; not included are any light duty, leave of absence, or otherwise assigned to the districts but detailed to another assignment. Data for DTB may not be fully accurate for 2013-2015. Full data for these years is difficult to determine from existing SPPD information. All percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number.

Patrol Division Staff by Patrol District from 2013-2019 at End of Year

Table 2.23 shows the history of the number of Patrol Officers assigned to Patrol Operations by patrol district at the end of the last pay period (December) of each year.

Table 2.23

Year	Eastern District	Central District	Downtown Beat	Western District	Total Patrol Staff	% Staff Allocated to Patrol
2013	76	75	12	83	246	40%
2014	79	68	12	82	241	39%
2015	84	67	18	80	249	41%
2016	84	71	13	82	250	40%
2017	85	65	18	84	252	40%
2018	87	68	23	79	257	41%
2019	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

*Table 2.23 census numbers contain only **full-duty Police Officer rank employees** able to work in patrol operations; not included are any light duty, leave of absence, or otherwise assigned to the districts but detailed to another assignment. Data for DTB may not be fully accurate for 2013-2015. Full data for these years is difficult to determine from existing SPPD information. All percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number.

Patrol Division Comparison of Patrol Districts from Bid to End of Year 2013-2019

Table 2.24 shows the history of the number of Patrol Officers assigned to Patrol Operations by patrol district at the "bid" in January and the number of Patrol Officers assigned in the last pay period (December) of each year and then provides a percentage change in staffing that occurred. This does not preclude other fluctuations in staffing numbers that happened between January and December each year due to retirements, resignations, or people returning from an on-leave status.

Table 2.24

Year	Eastern District			Central District			Downtown Beat			Western District			Total Patrol Staff		
2013	Bid	End	% (+/-) Change	Bid	End	% (+/-) Change	Bid	End	% (+/-) Change	Bid	End	% (+/-) Change	Bid	End	% (+/-) Change
	69	76	+10.14%	67	75	+11.94%	13	12	-7.69%	79	83	+5.06%	228	246	+7.89%
2014	Bid	End	% (+/-) Change	Bid	End	% (+/-) Change	Bid	End	% (+/-) Change	Bid	End	% (+/-) Change	Bid	End	% (+/-) Change
	85	79	-7.06%	73	68	-6.85%	12	12	0.0%	84	82	-2.38%	254	241	-5.12%
2015	Bid	End	% (+/-) Change	Bid	End	% (+/-) Change	Bid	End	% (+/-) Change	Bid	End	% (+/-) Change	Bid	End	% (+/-) Change
	83	84	+1.2%	70	67	-4.29%	18	18	0.0%	82	80	-2.44%	253	249	-1.58%
2016	Bid	End	% (+/-) Change	Bid	End	% (+/-) Change	Bid	End	% (+/-) Change	Bid	End	% (+/-) Change	Bid	End	% (+/-) Change
	90	84	-6.67%	71	71	0.0%	17	13	-23.53%	91	82	-9.89%	269	250	-7.06%
2017	Bid	End	% (+/-) Change	Bid	End	% (+/-) Change	Bid	End	% (+/-) Change	Bid	End	% (+/-) Change	Bid	End	% (+/-) Change
	85	85	0.0%	66	65	-1.52%	18	18	0.0%	85	84	-1.18%	254	252	-0.79%
2018	Bid	End	% (+/-) Change	Bid	End	% (+/-) Change	Bid	End	% (+/-) Change	Bid	End	% (+/-) Change	Bid	End	% (+/-) Change
	83	87	+4.82%	66	68	+3.03	23	23	0.0%	84	79	-5.95%	256	257	+0.39%
2019	Bid	End	% (+/-) Change	Bid	End	% (+/-) Change	Bid	End	% (+/-) Change	Bid	End	% (+/-) Change	Bid	End	% (+/-) Change
	85	NA	NA	68	NA	NA	23	NA	NA	82	NA	NA	258	NA	NA

Current Uniformed Service Police Officers in the Community

In addition to the above section listing Patrol Districts, there are support units within SPPD that have a uniformed service presence in the city. These units provide services requested by the community and most activities performed by these units are self-initiated and/or not documented in Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) data. Uniformed Officers in these units, most often, respond to Calls for Service as secondary units on a regular basis and this is reflected within the data in Table 2.49(2) *Total Number of Officers Responding to Calls for Service by Priority Type 2016-2018.*

Table 2.25 lists 2019 data about these units (Canine, FORCE, COAST, ACOP, SRO, and Traffic) and aggregates this data with the Patrol Districts to show the number of Police Officer rank sworn staff in uniformed services in the community.

Table 2.25   2019 Uniformed Police Officer Rank Staff in Patrol Districts/Support Units

Division	Unit	Officers 2019	Section # of Study
Patrol Operations	East Patrol	85	Section 2.0
Patrol Operations	Central Patrol	68	Section 2.0
Patrol Operations	West Patrol	82	Section 2.0
Patrol Operations	DTB	23	Section 2.0
Patrol Operations	Canine	18	Section 5.5
Patrol Operations	FORCE	9	Section 5.3
Community Engagement	COAST	7	Section 10.5
Community Engagement	ACOP	9	Section 10.2
Community Engagement	SRO	8	Section 10.2
Community Engagement	Traffic	10	Section 10.4
Total Officers in Uniformed Services		319	
All Police Officer Rank in Department	Dept. Wide	399	
% of Department at Police Officer Rank in Uniformed Services	**Dept. Wide**	**80%**	

Below is the Data/Observations summary for staffing levels for sworn officers from 2013 to the beginning of 2019; and the breakdown of staffing for the Police Officer rank in the patrol districts from 2013 to the beginning of 2019.

Data/Observations – Section 2.2

- Total sworn staff increased by 2.12% between 2013-2018.
- Patrol staffing increased by 4.47% between 2013-2018 using end of year census.
- With the growth in SPPD staff, the number of patrol officers has consistently remained around 41% of the entire sworn staff level of the SPPD.
- The number of Officers working in the Patrol Division was lowest in 2013 at 37% of sworn officers and moved to around 41% for most years through 2018.
- Downtown Beat (DTB) accounted for 30% of the increase in sworn staff assigned to Patrol Operations; but does not have a significant effect on the Patrol Division's regular work due to different work schedule and different type of work done by DTB. Therefore, it is not a significant investment towards regular patrol operations.
- 80% of the total number of sworn staff at the Police Officer rank work in uniformed services for the SPPD.

Section 2.3 Patrol District Operations – Calls for Service Data

Table 2.31 shows 911 Calls for Service between 2013-2018; and Table 2.33 shows all Calls for Service (including 911 Calls) from 2013-2018. The 911 Calls and all-Calls for Service (CFS) statistics are particularly important to any police agency due to the nature of these classifications of service to the community. These represent incidents where police officers are directed to provide service at a location by the dispatch center, and per policy, have no control over the intake and assignment of the work.

When people call the dispatch center, and a Call for Service (CFS) is generated, an Officer will be dispatched and sent to respond to the CFS. No officer discretion is available as to their deployment for these events. This is an agreed upon protocol between the Ramsey County Emergency Communication Center and SPPD.

Tables 2.31 – 2.49(7) are analyzed in the Data/Observations, Risk Management Considerations, and Recommendations at the end of Section 2.4.

911 Calls for Service 2013-2018 (23) (24)(30)

Table 2.31

911 Calls: Includes only those calls that come in via 911 and are not non-emergency or cancelled calls.

Patrol District	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Eastern	19,154	20,489	23,142	24,764	24,847	23,813
Central	14,040	16,183	19,722	20,610	21,429	21,695
Western	19,631	20,746	23,370	25,097	24,928	25,321
Citywide	**53,825**	**57,418**	**66,234**	**70,471**	**71,746**	**70,829**

*2013-2015 data may be in error by less than 1%.

Figure 2.31

Organizational Study of the Saint Paul Police Department - 2019

911 Calls for Service: Increases Between 2013-2018

Table 2.32

Patrol District	Number of Increased in 911 Calls (2013-2018)	% Increase in 911 Calls
Eastern	+ 4,167	+ 24.32%
Central	+ 7,655	+ 54.52%
Western	+ 4,182	+ 29.98%
Citywide	+ 17,004	+ 31.59%

All Calls for Service by District (including 911 Calls) 2013-2018 [23] [24]

Table 2.33

Total Calls: Includes all calls that are not cancelled, including investigative and proactive calls. Includes Officer generated calls, 911 calls, and non-emergency calls. Totals do not include police officer off-duty employment calls.

Patrol District	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Eastern	79,670	79,784	78,404	74,409	80,509	79,696
Central	77,322	71,750	77,702	77,370	89,641	91,760
Western	85,846	84,675	88,661	88,264	99,807	95,739
Total	**242,838**	**236,209**	**244,767**	**240,043**	**269,957**	**267,195**

*2013-2015 data may be in error by less than 1%.

Figure 2.33

SPPD All Calls for Service 2013-2018

Calls for Service Increases Between 2013-2018 (22) (23) (24)

Table 2.34

Patrol District	Number of Increased in all Calls for Service (including 911 Calls) (2013-2018)	% Increase in 911 Calls
Eastern	+ 26	+ 00.03%
Central	+ 14,438	+ 18.67%
Western	+ 9,893	+ 8.47%
Citywide	+ 24,357	+ 10.03%

Section 2.4 - Patrol District Operations: Queue Time & Response Data, Calls for Service Data, and Averages for Calls for Service

The following data describes information about how long people must wait on average for the SPPD to begin to respond to a call for service (Queue Time), the travel time to a call for service (Response Time), the gross volume of calls, and averages pertaining to calls for service. This information can help illuminate the level of activity experienced by officers and provide insight as to the level of service the SPPD is able to provide at different staffing levels.

Note: 2013-2015 Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) data was eliminated from Section 2.4 due to inconsistencies found in CAD data. In 2015, a new CAD system was implemented and full-years of accurate/searchable time and call category data are available for 2016-2018 and found in the data tables of Section 2.4.

First, is a listing of the **Priority Classifications** for all Calls for Service; they are placed into five (5) separate classifications of priority to be dispatched:

Priority 1: (Queue Time = Immediate dispatch) Officer down, injured, or needs immediate assistance in a critical situation.

Priority 2: (Queue Time = within 30 seconds) Any crime in progress; Activity which indicates a crime is about to be committed or has just been committed where suspects are in the area; Any matter which the caller reasonably indicates is of an urgent matter; Intrusion or robbery alarm; Any matter involving serious personal injury or imminent threat of serious injury; Emergency assistance required by the fire SPPD (not DOAs); Physical domestics.

Priority 2A: (Queue Time = Officer Driven) Any crime in progress initiated by the officer

Priority 3: (Queue Time = 15 minutes) Domestics, neighbor trouble, etc., where no threat of personal safety exists; Suspicious people, vehicles, window peepers, prowlers, trespassers, exposers, etc.; Traffic crashes, no personal injury; Assist the fire SPPD with a DOA; Fights, mutual affrays, without weapons; Assist any agency not amounting to priority 1 or priority 2; Report of a citizen holding a suspect not amounting to a priority 1 or 2, does not include shoplifters.

Priority 4: (Queue Time = 60 minutes) Offense reports where no suspect is present and no personal threat exists; Assist citizen in non-emergency matter; Shoplifters being held by store security personnel; Drunks, emotionally disturbed persons, disorderly persons, not threatening physical harm.

Priority 5: (Queue Time = 75 minutes) Miscellaneous request for service, Barking dogs, Loud party, Loud radios, etc., Parking complaints.

Focus on Priority 2 Calls

Average Queue Times 2016-2018

Table 2.41 (30)

Average Queue Time: Times reflect averages for each call priority type, by year and by Police District. Queue time is calculated based on time from when a call is received by the 911 center to when a squad is sent. Includes 911 calls, non-emergency calls, and alarm response calls. Excludes all Officer generated calls.

Queue Times	2016	2017	2018
West			
Priority 2	0:02:25	0:02:47	0:02:40
Priority 3	0:12:43	0:11:58	0:10:25
Priority 4	0:24:46	0:22:35	0:20:09
Priority 5	0:46:37	0:52:12	0:38:24
Priority 2A	0:05:25	0:08:12	0:03:01
Central			
Priority 2	0:02:34	0:02:54	0:02:27
Priority 3	0:13:52	0:13:36	0:11:27
Priority 4	0:22:43	0:23:25	0:20:12
Priority 5	0:40:20	0:45:31	0:37:47
Priority 2A	0:02:00	0:02:22	0:02:38
East			
Priority 2	0:02:26	0:03:12	0:02:32
Priority 3	0:13:28	0:13:24	0:10:56
Priority 4	0:27:36	0:28:47	0:22:48
Priority 5	0:56:38	1:01:10	0:41:59
Priority 2A	0:03:09	0:01:44	0:02:42
City Total			
Priority 2	0:02:28	0:02:57	0:02:33
Priority 3	0:13:21	0:12:59	0:10:56
Priority 4	0:25:02	0:24:56	0:21:03
Priority 5	0:47:52	0:52:58	0:39:23
Priority 2A	0:03:31	0:04:06	0:02:47

Average Response Time by Priority Type 2016-2018

Table 2.42 (30)

Average Response Time: Times reflect averages for each call priority type, by year and by Police District. Response time is calculated based on time the initial squad was sent to the time a squad arrives on scene. This total does not reflect any time a caller spends in the 911 queue. Includes 911 calls, non-emergency calls, and alarm response calls. Excludes all Officer generated calls.

Response Times	2016	2017	2018
West			
Priority 2	0:06:48	0:05:52	0:05:53
Priority 3	0:08:35	0:07:56	0:08:23
Priority 4	0:09:52	0:09:27	0:09:54
Priority 5	0:15:36	0:16:09	0:15:22
Priority 2A	0:03:33	0:05:35	0:03:07
Central			
Priority 2	0:06:35	0:05:45	0:06:06
Priority 3	0:08:10	0:07:34	0:08:20
Priority 4	0:09:19	0:08:45	0:09:25
Priority 5	0:13:03	0:14:36	0:15:03
Priority 2A	0:02:01	0:01:16	0:01:58
East			
Priority 2	0:05:42	0:05:12	0:05:25
Priority 3	0:07:03	0:06:51	0:07:23
Priority 4	0:08:47	0:08:16	0:08:59
Priority 5	0:14:07	0:14:30	0:13:28
Priority 2A	0:02:57	0:00:54	0:00:33
City Total			
Priority 2	0:06:22	0:05:36	0:05:48
Priority 3	0:07:56	0:07:27	0:08:02
Priority 4	0:09:19	0:08:49	0:09:26
Priority 5	0:14:15	0:15:05	0:14:37
Priority 2A	0:02:50	0:02:35	0:01:53

Average Combined Queue and Response Time 2016-2018

Table 2.43 (30)

Average Combined Queue & Response Time: Times reflect averages for each call priority type, by year and by Police District. Combined queue and response time is calculated based on time from when a call is received by the 911 center to when a squad arrives on scene. Includes 911 calls, non-emergency calls, and alarm response calls. Excludes all Officer generated calls.

Queue & Response Times	2016	2017	2018
West			
Priority 2	0:09:13	0:08:39	0:08:33
Priority 3	0:21:19	0:19:54	0:18:48
Priority 4	0:34:38	0:32:03	0:30:03
Priority 5	1:02:13	1:08:21	0:53:46
Priority 2A	0:08:57	0:13:47	0:06:08
Central			
Priority 2	0:09:09	0:08:39	0:08:33
Priority 3	0:22:02	0:21:10	0:19:47
Priority 4	0:32:02	0:32:10	0:29:37
Priority 5	0:53:23	1:00:07	0:52:50
Priority 2A	0:04:01	0:03:38	0:04:37
East			
Priority 2	0:08:08	0:08:24	0:07:57
Priority 3	0:20:32	0:20:15	0:18:19
Priority 4	0:36:22	0:37:03	0:31:47
Priority 5	1:10:45	1:15:40	0:55:27
Priority 2A	0:06:06	0:02:38	0:03:14
City Total			
Priority 2	0:08:50	0:08:34	0:08:21
Priority 3	0:21:17	0:20:26	0:18:58
Priority 4	0:34:21	0:33:45	0:30:29
Priority 5	1:02:07	1:08:03	0:54:01
Priority 2A	0:06:21	0:06:41	0:04:40

Total Calls Per Day 2016-2018 (total # of calls for a day of the week for the year by patrol district)

Table 2.44 (30)

Total Calls per Day: Includes all calls that are not cancelled, including investigative and proactive calls. Includes Officer generated calls, 911 calls, and non-emergency calls. Total does not include police officer off-duty employment calls. Reflects all calls for a given weekday over the course of the year.

Calls per Day	2016	2017	2018
WEST			
SUNDAY	10607	12398	10963
MONDAY	12610	13664	13725
TUESDAY	13360	15030	14698
WEDNESDAY	13597	15454	14628
THURSDAY	12889	15245	15007
FRIDAY	13033	14734	14072
SATURDAY	12168	13282	12646
CENTRAL			
SUNDAY	8835	10169	10083
MONDAY	11178	12075	13086
TUESDAY	11694	13668	13738
WEDNESDAY	12241	14870	15229
THURSDAY	11614	13767	14097
FRIDAY	11375	13290	13685
SATURDAY	10433	11802	11842
EAST			
SUNDAY	9405	9957	9793
MONDAY	10860	11466	11513
TUESDAY	10876	12060	12098
WEDNESDAY	11011	11921	12195
THURSDAY	10712	11926	11825
FRIDAY	11018	11995	11916
SATURDAY	10527	11184	10356
CITY			
SUNDAY	28847	32524	30839
MONDAY	34648	37205	38324
TUESDAY	35930	40758	40534
WEDNESDAY	36849	42245	42052
THURSDAY	35215	40938	40929
FRIDAY	35426	40019	39673
SATURDAY	33128	36268	34844

Total 911 Calls Per Day 2016-2018 (total # of 911 calls for a day of the week for the year by patrol district)

Table 2.45 (30)

911 Calls per Day: Includes only those calls that come in via 911 and are not non-emergency or cancelled calls. Reflects all 911 calls for a given weekday over the course of the year.

911 calls per day	2016	2017	2018
WEST			
SUNDAY	3515	3484	3502
MONDAY	3523	3382	3547
TUESDAY	3460	3437	3479
WEDNESDAY	3490	3480	3570
THURSDAY	3454	3466	3643
FRIDAY	3823	3756	3756
SATURDAY	3832	3923	3824
CENTRAL			
SUNDAY	2954	3035	3051
MONDAY	2923	2861	3107
TUESDAY	2786	3005	2958
WEDNESDAY	2829	3026	3039
THURSDAY	2792	3021	3068
FRIDAY	3066	3177	3178
SATURDAY	3260	3304	3294
EAST			
SUNDAY	3727	3615	3548
MONDAY	3508	3461	3350
TUESDAY	3363	3409	3185
WEDNESDAY	3343	3340	3351
THURSDAY	3360	3270	3252
FRIDAY	3550	3768	3391
SATURDAY	3913	3984	3736
CITY			
SUNDAY	10196	10134	10101
MONDAY	9954	9704	10004
TUESDAY	9609	9851	9622
WEDNESDAY	9662	9846	9960
THURSDAY	9606	9757	9963
FRIDAY	10439	10701	10325
SATURDAY	11005	11211	10854

Average 911 Calls Per Year Per Patrol Officer 2016-2018

Table 2.46 (30)

Average 911 Calls per year per Patrol Officer: Includes only those calls that come in via 911 and are not non-emergency or cancelled calls. *Note – this is not a reflection of all calls that an Officer may respond to each year, but rather a measurement of total Patrol Officers assigned per District and the 911 call volume within that District

Avg 911 Calls per Patrol Officer	2016	2017	2018
WEST	275.8	293.3	301.4
CENTRAL	231.6	258.2	243.8
EAST	275.2	292.3	286.9
City	**261.0**	**281.4**	**276.7**

Average Calls Per Year Per Patrol Officer 2016-2018

Table 2.47 (30)

Average Calls per year per Patrol Officer: Includes all calls that are not cancelled, including investigative and proactive calls. Totals do not include police officer off-duty employment calls. *Note – this is not a reflection of all calls that an Officer may respond to each year, but rather a measurement of total Patrol Officers assigned per District and the call volume within that District.

Avg Calls per Officer	2016	2017	2018
WEST	969.6	1174.2	1139.8
CENTRAL	869.3	1080.0	1031.0
EAST	826.8	947.2	960.2
Citywide	**889.0**	**1067.0**	**1043.7**

Officer Generated/Self-Initiated Calls for Service 2016-2018

Table 2.48 (1) (30)

Officer Generated Calls: Includes all Officer generated calls that are not cancelled.

Officer Generated Calls	2016	2017	2018
West	32522	43278	38518
Central	33329	43087	46900
East	24723	29140	31249
Total	**90574**	**115505**	**116667**

Percentage of Officer Generated/Self-Initiated Calls for Service 2016-2018

Table 2.48 (2) (30)

Percentage of Officer Generated Calls: Includes all calls initiated by Officers that are not cancelled compared to the total calls.

% Officer Generated Call of Total Calls	2016	2017	2018
West	36.8%	43.4%	40.2%
Central	43.1%	48.1%	51.1%
East	33.2%	36.2%	39.2%
Total	**37.7%**	**42.8%**	**43.7%**

Total Number of Calls by Priority Type 2014-2018

Table 2.49 (30)

Total Calls by Priority: Includes all calls that are not cancelled, including investigative and proactive calls. Includes Officer generated calls, 911 calls, and non-emergency calls. Totals do not include Officer off-duty employment calls.

Total Calls	2016	2017	2018
West			
Priority 2	7198	4908	4943
Priority 3	19006	21658	21033
Priority 4	28643	29354	29104
Priority 5	17717	26675	26594
Priority 2A	15668	17261	14096
Central			
Priority 2	6044	5241	4930
Priority 3	15078	17208	16483
Priority 4	24348	26447	25579
Priority 5	15118	23464	31297
Priority 2A	16745	17327	13527
East			
Priority 2	6337	5003	4743
Priority 3	17553	19933	18001
Priority 4	24739	25361	23678
Priority 5	11223	14435	14597
Priority 2A	14569	15815	18751
All City			
Priority 2	19579	15152	14616
Priority 3	51637	58799	55517
Priority 4	77730	81162	78361
Priority 5	44058	64574	72488
Priority 2A	46982	50403	46374

Average Officer Minutes Per Priority Call Type 2014-2018

Table 2.49(1a) **(30)**

Average officer minutes per Priority type: Includes all calls that are not cancelled from time arrived to time cleared. Includes all officers arriving, not just the first officers to arrive on scene. Time on scene is measured from time arrived to time cleared. Excludes off-duty calls. Time is given in minutes.

Average Officer Time on Scene by Priority			
District, Priority	**2016**	**2017**	**2018**
West			
West, 2	46.7	45.5	46.7
West, 3	32.6	29.2	29.2
West, 4	37.0	34.2	32.7
West, 5	39.5	25.1	27.6
West, 2A	16.9	16.9	18.4
Central			
Central, 2	52.3	47.1	47.7
Central, 3	37.0	31.9	32.8
Central, 4	37.0	34.6	36.7
Central, 5	36.2	31.5	32.2
Central, 2A	19.6	19.7	21.1
East			
East, 2	45.0	54.0	52.3
East, 3	31.7	28.4	31.5
East, 4	32.9	34.3	33.7
East, 5	27.9	26.5	25.9
East, 2A	24.1	22.4	21.6
City			
City Average, 2	48.0	48.9	48.9
City Average, 3	33.8	29.8	31.1
City Average, 4	35.6	34.4	34.4
City Average, 5	34.5	27.7	28.6
City Average, 2A	20.2	19.6	20.4

Average Time Spent Per Call for All Calls for Service (CFS) 2016-2018 (24)

Table 2.49(1b)

Includes all calls that are not cancelled, including investigative and proactive calls. Totals do not include police officer off-duty employment calls.

Avg Time Spent Per CFS (in minutes)	2016	2017	2018
WEST	36.71	27.68	29.14
CENTRAL	33.14	30.48	32.43
EAST	30.42	30.26	30.09
Citywide	**33.42**	**29.4**	**30.52**

Total Number of Officers Responding to Calls for Service by Priority Type 2016-2018

Table 2.49(2) (30)

Total Officers responding by Priority type: Includes all calls that are not cancelled. Excludes off-duty calls. Includes all officers arriving, not just the first officers to arrive on scene.

Total Officers Responding by Priority			
District, Priority	**2016**	**2017**	**2018**
West, 2	23137	18621	18397
West, 3	43900	52725	51655
West, 4	50048	51270	51028
West, 5	24702	36880	37172
West, 2A	22710	26953	23243
Central, 2	19763	17871	16798
Central, 3	35976	41793	40646
Central, 4	44143	47788	48056
Central, 5	19762	31986	43116
Central, 2A	25320	26502	23280
East, 2	22873	20621	19636
East, 3	42850	49489	46726
East, 4	46962	46976	46349
East, 5	16928	21583	21980
East, 2A	27597	29777	38364
City All, 2	65773	57113	54831
City All, 3	122726	144007	139027
City All, 4	141153	146034	145433
City All, 5	61392	90449	102268
City All, 2A	75627	83232	84887
City Sum Total	**466671**	**520835**	**526446**

Community Engagement In-Service Visits by Patrol Districts – All Officers in Events in CAD 2016-2018

Table 2.49(3a) (30)

Includes all non-cancelled calls that are coded specifically as Community Engagement. Includes all officers arriving, not just the first officers to arrive on scene.

Total Officers on Scene Community Engagement Only			
District	2016	2017	2018
West	344	1520	1117
Central	535	743	928
East	531	1035	973
City Total	**1410**	**3298**	**3018**

Community Engagement In-Service Visits by Patrol Districts – Number of Events Only in CAD 2016-2018

Table 2.49(3b) (30)

Community Engagement: Includes all non-cancelled calls that are Community Engagement.

Community Engagement Only	2016	2017	2018
West	216	1020	760
Central	405	491	533
East	302	577	637
Total	**923**	**2088**	**1930**

Average Community Engagement Time On-Scene 2015-2018

Table 2.49(4) (30)

Includes all non-cancelled calls that are coded specifically as Community Engagement. Includes all officers arriving, not just the first officers to arrive on scene. Time on scene is measured from time arrived to time cleared. Time is given in minutes.

Average Officer Time on Scene Community Engagement Only			
District	2016	2017	2018
West	109.7	70.8	83.8
Central	66.7	73.0	69.1
East	53.1	48.3	57.3
City Average	**76.5**	**64.1**	**70.1**

Total Officer Proactive Police Visits – All Officers at Events in CAD 2016-2018

Table 2.49(5) (30)

Table 2.49 (5) Includes all non-cancelled calls that are coded specifically as Proactive Police Visit. Includes all officers arriving, not just the first officers to arrive on scene. Table 2.49(5a) includes

Proactive Police Visits: Includes all non-cancelled calls that are Proactive Police Visits.

Total Officers on Scene PPV Only			
District	2016	2017	2018
West	12747	22730	14096
Central	9547	17638	20619
East	6602	9780	8842
City Total	**28896**	**50148**	**43557**

Total Proactive Police Visits – Number of Events Only in CAD

Table 2.49(5a) (30)

PPV Only	2016	2017	2018
West	9300	16541	10270
Central	7613	13145	15417
East	4291	6431	5705
Total	**21204**	**36117**	**31392**

Average Time Spent On-Scene for Proactive Police Visits 2014-2018

Table 2.49(6) (30)

Includes all non-cancelled calls that are coded specifically as Proactive Police Visit. Includes all officers arriving, not just the first officers to arrive on scene. Time on scene is measured from time arrived to time cleared. Time is given in minutes.

Average Officer Time On-Scene PPV Only			
District	2016	2017	2018
West	20.6	46.1	20.2
Central	22.9	31.3	13.5
East	20.5	17.3	17.0
City Avg.	**21.7**	**34.4**	**16.0**

Average Calls for Service Per Patrol Officer 2013-2018

Table 2.49(7)

Excludes canceled calls & off-duty employment. Includes Investigations & proactive calls. **Number of officers is only for full-duty police officer able to work in patrol operations; not included are any light duty, leave of absence, or otherwise assigned to the districts but detailed to another assignment.

Patrol District Calls for Service	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Eastern	79,670	79,784	78,404	74,375	80,509	79, 676
Central	77,322	71,750	77,702	77,314	89,640	91,744
Western	85,846	84,675	88,661	88,237	99,806	95,725
Total	**242,838**	**236,209**	**244,767**	**239,926**	**269,955**	**267,145**
Total Number of Patrol Officers	**228**	**254**	**253**	**269**	**254**	**256**
Average Number of Calls for Service Per Patrol Officer	**1065**	**929**	**967**	**891**	**1062**	**1043**

Data/Observations:

- There is a 31.59% increase in 911 Calls for Service between 2013-2018; with the greatest increase from 2013-2015. Each of these calls had police officers (often two or more) respond to the scene.
- Between 2013-2018, there was a 10.03% increase in all Calls for Service for the entire city.
- Largest increase in Patrol District 911 Calls for Service was 54.52% in the Central District.
- Largest increase in Patrol District Total Calls for Service was 18.67% in the Central District.

- The average Priority 2 Queue-Time ranges between 2:28-2:57 minutes for Patrol Operations (Table 2.41). This average Queue-Time was much higher than what is allowed per policy (less than 30 second Queue-Time). This issue and solutions are explored in Section 3.
- Average Response times to Calls for Service for the entire city remained within a stable range of variation from 2016-2018.
- The average 911 Calls Per Year Per Patrol Officer (Table 2.46) increased 6.1% from 2016-2018.
- The average number of Calls Per Year Per Officer increased 18.69% between 2016-2017; and increased 16.09% overall between 2016-2018.
- Officer Generated/Self-Initiated Activity Per Officer increased 28.81% between 2016-2018.
- Average time on-scene at a Call for Service has remained near 30 minutes from 2016-2018.
- Total calls per day are consistently at higher volumes on Fridays and Saturdays from 2013-2018.
- The average number of calls per officer per year is trending upward, over 1000 calls per year from 2016-2018.

Risk Management Considerations:

- The higher frequency of 911 calls indicates something about dynamics occurring within the city that is affecting residents of Saint Paul, whether that is the proliferation of cell phones in society that makes it easier to call 911 or other reasons, this is an area for further study.

- 911 calls often require officers to break from other activities where they are providing service (negatively affecting the service they were providing) and quickly respond to incidents which require emergency driving and placing officers into hazardous situations at a higher frequency.

Recommendations:

- Citywide calls for service have increased 10.03%. Average time at a call has remained near 30 minutes. Thus, indicating a trend where more time is being taken up with calls for service in a day of work.
- More resources are needed in patrol operations to handle the volume (time and number of calls) of work to provide a consistent level of service.
- A study of total officers on-scene at Calls for Service is likely needed. Table 2.49(2) reflects data about the number of officers responding to a call for service and more investigation is needed to see if those numbers are appropriate.
- A study of the reasons behind the higher number of incoming 911 calls to determine the dynamics causing these increases.
- Comment: The increases in DTB staffing were appropriate in scope due to their historically low levels of staffing.

Section 3.0 - Staffing Levels for Patrol Operations Model

The following section will cover:

- **Staffing levels for Patrol Districts**
- **Attrition rates/staff losses for Patrol Operations**
- **Human resource data used in calculating staff losses**
- **Proposal to mitigate long-term staff losses**
- **Evaluation and solution for Priority 2 timed-out Calls for Service**

Section 3.1 – Sworn Staffing Levels

The Saint Paul Police Department's Patrol Operations work a rotating schedule consisting of 10-hour days in the following time frames:

Tour I   2200-0800 (Midnights)

Tour II   0700-1700 (Days)

Tour III 1600-2000 (Afternoons)

There are some minor variations to these schedules, but these are the primary shift configurations for the agency.

The staffing model provides for the following staffing levels by Tour (for East and West Districts):

Tour Staffing Numbers (East and West Districts) (*This is a scheduling model – not current staffing numbers)

Table 3.1

Tour	Officers Assigned to Patrol Tours	Maximum Officers Assigned Per Tour	Minimum Officers Required Per Tour	Officer Loss Factor Per Tour	% Officer Loss Factor Per Tour
Tour I	21	12	8	4	33.33%
Tour II	33	19	13	6	31.58%
Tour III	37	21	13	8	38.10%
Total Staff	**91**	**52**	**34**	**18**	**34.62%**

*Total Staff Numbers reflect a 24-Hour Period **Loss factor % is calculated by dividing Officer Loss Factor Per Tour divided by Maximum Officers Assigned Per Tour

Tour Staffing Numbers (Central District) **(*This is a scheduling model – not current staffing numbers)**

Table 3.12

Tour	Officers Assigned to Patrol Tours	Maximum Officers Assigned Per Tour	Minimum Officers Required Per Tour	Officer Loss Factor Per Tour	% Officer Loss Factor Per Tour
Tour I	21	12	8	4	33.33%
Tour II	25	14	10	4	28.57%
Tour III	30	17	11	6	35.29%
Total Staff	**76**	**43**	**29**	**14**	**32.56%**

*Total Staff Numbers reflect a 24-Hour Period

This staffing model allows for a 32-38% daily loss factor for all uses of time. This includes sick time, vacation, military leave, training, etc.

Below in Table 3.13 are the actual staffing numbers for the January 2019 bid for the patrol districts; at the far-right side of the table is the model staffing percentages.

Tour Staffing Numbers (East, West, and Central District)

Table 3.13

These are actual district numbers applied to the staffing model as of the bid in January 2019.

Districts at Bid 2019	Officers Assigned to Patrol Tours 2019 Bid	Maximum Officers Assigned Per 24-Hour Day 2019 Bid	Minimum Officers Required Per 24-Hour Day 2019 Bid	Officers Loss Factor Per 24-Hour Day 2019 Bid	Officer Loss Factor Per 24 hour Day as a % 2019 Bid	Model Schedule Allowable Loss Factor Per 24-Hour Day
Eastern	85	52	34	18	-21.17%	-34.62%
Central	68	43	29	14	-20.5%	-32.56%
West	82	52	34	18	-21.95%	-34.62%
Citywide	235	147	97	50	-19.37%	-34.01%

*DTB is not included in this 235 officer staffing total due to a different scheduling model used.

Calculating Standard Human Resource Loss Factors

Below is a chart for the year 2018 showing the average time-off the schedule under different types of Human Resource categories for patrol officers. Many categories are contractually obligated, and others are elected by the Department for the professional development and skills of the officers. The data in the right-side column showing the "average time used" is data from Police Human Resources for all 26 pay periods in 2018.

2018 Average Police Officer Time Off the Schedule in Patrol Operations

Table 3.14

Calculated as average time per police officer. These statistics do not include long term light duty positions.

Time Category	Number of Hours
Bereavement	2.54
Comp Time Used	27.11
Leave No Pay	3.42
Paid Parental Leave	7.44
Military Leave-No Pay	18.79
Military Leave with Pay	8.05
Holiday Time	89.47
Injured on Duty	4.97
Sick Child	5.05
Sick Family	11.48
Sick Self	46.94
Vacation	173.37
Workers Comp	6.09
In-Service Training	40
Bomb & SWAT Training	12.88
Total Time	**457.6**

The calculation shows that in a 2,080 hour work year, the average officer is only working 1,622.4 hours in patrol operations. This constitutes a 22% loss factor of time for an average officer in the patrol schedule.

Table 3.15 demonstrates that the 2019 Bid number of 235 officers has placed each patrol district unable to meet the 22% average officer loss factor per day.

2019 Bid Loss Factors Per District Versus Daily Human Resource Average of 22%

Table 3.15

Tour	Average Human Resource Data Officer Loss Factor	Officer Loss Factor 2019 Bid (from Table 3.3)	Remainder Percent for Daily Officer Loss Factor	Number of Officers (FTE's) In Remainder Daily Loss Factor
Eastern	-22%	-21.17%	-0.83%	-0.70
Central	-22%	-20.5%	-1.50%	-1.23
Western	-22%	-21.95%	-0.05%	-0.04
Total Staff	-22%	-21.27%	-0.73%	-1.72

*This table reflects Human Resource Average Loss Factor against Loss Factors Computed in Table 3.3

Data/Observations:

- Using Table 3.15, the SPPD cannot currently meet the loss factor needs of our scheduling model.
- The loss factor does not happen evenly throughout the year. The 22% loss factor is an average. Staff will call in sick in groups due to sickness going through a community or family.
- Training does not typically occur during weekends. Therefore, spikes in time-off needed during 333certain weekdays create pressure beyond any of the factors presented here.
- Police Officers who train for academies, train at in-service, or provide other specialized training are not factored into this equation and no accurate record is kept at this time. However, the Training Unit staff has told me that especially during recruit officer academies, there is a significant "ask" to the districts for police officer trainers.
- When you factor into this equation that on average each district has 2-6 officers out of work on long-term injury or disability, the loss factors begin to become even more pronounced.
- The SPPD's 25-year-old model for Patrol Officer scheduling has good features and is popular with officers when staffed properly.
- The demands of police officer time, training, special duties, etc. have changed since the institution of this model of staffing due more Calls for Service, training requirements, need for community engagement, employee leave laws, etc.

Risk Management Considerations:

- With the current staffing model, loss factor margins are between 12.5 - 14.6% for a patrol shift at full-staffing when human resource loss factors are included. These margins are near 0% - 2% due to current staffing levels.
- With current actual staffing, the loss factor in the scheduling model does not work well.
- In periods of reduced staffing, the ability to give days-off to Patrol Officers seeking time-off decreases and negatively affects the morale of officers.
- During periods of attrition, sudden loss factors (i.e., injured on duty, major illness) exacerbate staffing problems.
- Low overall staffing levels, or often working at minimum staffing, creates officer safety concerns amongst staff and extends queue times for service to the public.

Recommendations:

- Keep staffing levels in patrol district operations at full strength.
- Do not count light duty staff as part of the staffing complement.
- If light duty assignments are to be absorbed by the patrol districts, then higher levels of staff should be employed (see following section 3.2 for Structural Staffing Reserve).
- The current scheduling system needs 258 officers assigned to West, Central, and East District patrol operations (excluding DTB) to meet its own loss factor requirements.
- Staffing above 258 officers is likely needed to fulfill the requirements of the current scheduling model to meet training and collateral duty obligations the SPPD needs to fulfill for its own benefit.
- The scheduling model currently in use may have to be modified, or change altogether, to better meet the needs of the SPPD and its employees.

Section 3.2 – Proposal to Mitigate Long-Term Loss Factors in Personnel

Earlier in Section 3 this study addressed the personnel loss factors affecting the strength of Patrol Operations. Loss factors presented in this study found average time loss from the schedule at 22% for Patrol Officers. Intentionally excluded from the 22% loss factor number was the number of Patrol Officers who are on light-duty or other long-term work leave. This was done to prevent skewing the loss factors for Officers currently assigned and working in Patrol Operations.

Looking at the most recent statistics for long-term loss factor of sworn officers across the SPPD (August 2019), 38 sworn staff members on the SPPD roster were not present in the SPPD in a working capacity as of August 2019 for reasons classified by Human Resources (e.g.; personal leave, parental leave, medical leave, military deployment, etc.)

The employee roster at the time of this statistical snapshot was 608 sworn staff. Using this number, the following personnel loss calculation applies:

608 – 38 = 570 Sworn Staff

6.25 % Loss Factor

If the SPPD were at full-strength for hiring, at 630 sworn staff, the loss factor would be:

630 * 6.25% = 39.375 (39) Sworn Staff

The 6.25% loss factor, or 38 sworn staff members, has a trickle-down effect throughout the organization. Thus, leaving many units short of staff. These are not evenly portioned throughout the agency but are placed where the loss can be least consequential for a given period. The loss is somewhat chronic in Patrol Operations due to its size but moves around in investigative units as well depending on where someone is assigned at the time of their "on-leave" or "long-term sick" status. These long-term personnel losses place stress on operations and personnel.

Law enforcement operates 24/7 with certain expectations for service and responsiveness; personnel losses place a great strain on remaining staff.   The most effective remedy to this problem would be to create a new sworn staff level calculation based on long-term loss factors. This study proposes to name this the Structural Staff Reserve (SSR) above authorized strength.

This can be calculated each year by examining the average number of sworn staff on long-term leave throughout the year (38 sworn in 2019) and then adding that number above the authorized strength of the SPPD to make up the difference in sworn staff on long-term leave.

Below is a mathematical representation of Structural Margin Above Authorized Strength (Structured Margin) with some values provided:

Authorized Strength	630
Average Actual Hired	608
Average # on Long-Term Leave	38
Average Active Working Strength	570

SSR Equation:

(Average Actual Hired Strength) – (Average Actual Working Strength) = Average # on Long-Term Leave

608 – 570 = 38

The average of 38 employees on long-term leave in 2019 would become the Structural Staff Reserve (SSR) added to the number of sworn staff the SPPD would be able to hire in 2020, as shown below:

Authorized Strength: 630

SSR: 38

Total Authorized Sworn: 668

Historically, the SPPD has not kept monthly running averages for Structural Staff Loss factors. In 2019, the Assistant Chief of Police began tracking this formally and in future years, a monthly loss factor should be available for data analysis. Table 3.21 shows the real staffing levels being tracked by SPPD and the gap between the number of staff on payroll versus the number deployable as full-duty working sworn staff.

Table 3.21

Sworn Staffing Information

Sworn Staffing Information

Month	On Payroll	Deployable	Authorized	Timed out (late) calls by month
Jul-18	616	583	626	1727
Aug-18	616	583	626	1985
Sep-18	608	571	626	1584
Oct-18	605	561	626	1496
Nov-18	601	561	626	1125
Dec-18	628	591	626	1075
Jan-19	626	592	635	1057
Feb-19	625	585	635	1091
Mar-19	621	591	635	1134
Apr-19	618	585	635	1225
May-19	614	587	635	1583
Jun-19	612	581	635	1718
Jul-19	609	573	635	1721
Aug-19	608	571	635	1825

On Payroll   Deployable   Authorized

Source: SPPD Human Resources Database

The Structural Staffing Reserve (SSR) should change from year to year given the number of sworn staff who are on long-term leave; thus, creating a yearly re-calculation of the SSR to manage long-term vacancies. This upward departure based on long-term loss would place the organization in the position of fully staffing its workforce model, ability to manage existing workloads, and increasing its service to the community.

Section 3.3 - Evaluating Solutions to Priority 2 through Priority 5 Timed Out Calls (Queue Times)

The SPPD has significant delays in responding to high priority Calls for Service (CFS) that occur when all Patrol Officers are committed to previous Calls for Service.

The allowable delay or Queue-Time for a Call for Service (CFS) is dependent on the type of CFS. The more urgent the CFS, the less time the CFS is supposed wait "In-Queue" to be dispatched to an Officer for response.

Queue-Time is defined by the following workflow:

1. Calls for Service (CFS) begin as phone calls to the dispatch center.
2. Calls are entered by dispatch center staff into Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD)
3. Calls are placed into a pending call "Queue."
4. Calls are then dispatched to an Officer for response. The Queue-Time is the time between when a call is received and when it is dispatched.

Figure 3.31 - Workflow for Intake and Dispatching Calls for Service (CFS)

Call to Dispatch	Call Entered into CAD	Queue-Time Waiting Period	Dispatched to Officer for Response

Priorities of Calls

Calls for Service are categorized into five (5) separate classifications of priority to be dispatched:

- **Priority 1: (Queue Time = Immediate dispatch)** Officer down, injured, or needs immediate assistance in a critical situation.

- **Priority 2: (Queue Time = within 30 seconds)** Any crime in progress; Activity which indicates a crime is about to be committed or has just been committed where suspects are in the area; Any matter which the caller reasonably indicates is of an urgent matter; Intrusion or robbery alarm; Any matter involving serious personal injury or imminent threat of serious injury; Emergency assistance required by the fire department (not DOAs); physical domestics.

- **Priority 2A: (Queue Time = Officer Driven)** Any crime in progress initiated by the officer

- **Priority 3: (Queue Time = 15 minutes)** Domestics, neighbor trouble, etc., where no threat of personal safety exists; Suspicious people, vehicles, window peepers, prowlers, trespassers, exposers, etc.; traffic crashes, no personal injury; Assist the fire department with a DOA; fights, mutual affrays, without weapons; assist any agency not amounting to priority 1 or priority 2; Report of a citizen holding a suspect not amounting to a priority 1 or 2, does not include shoplifters.

- **Priority 4: (Queue Time = 60 minutes)** Offense reports where no suspect is present and no personal threat exists; Assist citizen in non-emergency matter; Shoplifters being held by store security personnel; drunks, emotionally disturbed persons, disorderly persons, not threatening physical harm.

- **Priority 5: (Queue Time = 75 minutes)** miscellaneous request for service, barking dogs, loud party, loud radios, etc., parking complaints.

Focus on Priority 2 Calls

The data of most concern for the SPPD is the delayed response for Priority 2 calls for service. As stated above, these calls are *"Any crime in progress; Activity which indicates a crime is about to be committed or has just been committed where suspects are in the area…"* As a result, these are of extreme importance to the SPPD for prompt dispatching to an officer(s) to respond.

The Queue-Time before dispatch is extremely short by policy for Priority 2 calls. It is expected that within 30 seconds of the CFS being entered in CAD (put into the Queue), it will be dispatched to an Officer.

Lack of timely Priority 2 response is a growing problem for Patrol Operations as previously presented in Table 2.41 showing Queue Times for 2013-2018. The below Table 3.62 shows the growth in "timed out" (In-Queue for more than 30 seconds) Priority 2 calls between 2013-2018:

Table 3.31   Growth of "Timed Out" Priority 2 Calls 2013-2018

Patrol District	Priority 2 Average % Increase 2013-2018
Western	76.9%
Central	58.9%
Eastern	47%
City Wide	59.57%

Responding to Priority 2 Calls for Service immediately upon dispatch is extremely important to the morale of Officers and is a life-safety issue for people in the community. The rest of this section is designed to explain more about the problem, a partial solution already implemented, and additional solutions to correct the problem.

Analysis of Timed Out Priority 2 Queue-Times

The most recent example of delayed response times for Priority 2 calls is data between July 2018 – June 2019. A graphic depiction in Figure 3.63 shows the 5,169 Priority 2 calls not dispatched within 30 seconds (per policy) due to a lack of available patrol officers to answer them.

Figure 3.32

The "Timed Out" Priority 2 Calls for Service from July 2018 to June 2019 is geographically portrayed in below:

Figure 3.33

The disparate impact of these calls on Areas of Concentrated Poverty (ACP) is shown in Figure X.X and is taken from the City's ACP map data of February 2018:

Figure 3.34   Saint Paul Areas of Concentrated Poverty – February 2018

Positive Efforts to Reduce All Queue-Times

RCECC Change to Policy

In the 4th quarter of 2018, a policy change occurred in the Ramsey County Emergency Communication Center (RCECC); which handles dispatch services for the Saint Paul Police Department. The policy change was done in conjunction with the Saint Paul Police Department and changed the following business practices:

- The RCECC identified when all squads were busy on Calls for Service.
- The RCECC looked at the Queue of pending Calls for Service received by the RCECC and identified Calls for Service that had been "In-Queue" beyond the maximum amount of time that any Call for Service can go without being dispatched to an Officer.
- The RCECC requested police district squads to break away from their current Call for Service to answer the newly "timed out" Call for Service that had not been assigned to a squad.
- This active recruitment of "squads to break" caused a significant declined in the average Queue-Times for all Calls for Service.

Saint Paul Police Western District Study

Also, in the 4th quarter of 2018, the Western District Patrol Operations command was studying how to reduce the Queue-Times for calls awaiting service, especially from 1400-1900 hours each day, where Queue-Times were very long. This period of the day experiences a shift change from Tour II (Days) to Tour III (Afternoons) between 1600 hours and 1700 hours each day.

The West District test solution was to move to some of the afternoon shift (Tour III) to an early start at 1400 hours each day, instead of the traditional 1600 hours start time. As a result, 22% of the Tour III officers moved to a 1400 hours start time. The other 78% of Officers continued to start at 1600 hours.

The goal was to determine if shifting Officers to an earlier part of the afternoon would decrease the Queue-Times for Calls for Service (CFS) during this period of the day.

The below charts for the months of Feb-June 2018 (blue line) and Feb-June 2019 (red bars) show the average number of Calls for Service (CFS) activity by hour of day for each month. From these charts, the reader can identify very consistent call volumes for each month between 2018 and 2019; except for June 2018-2019. *(All charted information in the following graphs are derived from CAD records)*

Average Count of Calls for Service (CFS) Activity

Figure 3.35(1)

Figure 3.35(2)

Figure 3.35(3)

Figure 3.35(4)

77

Figure 3.35(5)

Average Time Calls are in Pending Queue

The below graphs the months of Feb-June 2018 (blue line) and Feb-June 2019 (red bars) showing the Average Queue Times for CFS activity by hour of the day for each month. From these charts, the reader can identify two trends:

- The 1400-1700 hours time-frame in the targeted range has a definite decline in pending queue times for Calls for Service (CFS).
- The entire 24-hour time clock for the five (5) month period has a significant drop in Queue-Times for pending Calls for Service (CFS).

Figure 3.36(1)

Figure 3.36(2)

Figure 3.36(3)

Figure 3.36(4)

Average Time Calls are in Pending Queue (May 2018-2019)

Figure 3.36(5)

Average Time Calls are in Pending Queue (Jun 2018-2019)

Section 3.4 - Positive Effects on Priority 2 Queue-Times

Since both operational changes appear to have had a positive effect on Queue-Times, there are valuable findings to be applied going forward:

- Additional Officers allocated in different time frames may influence outcomes in Calls for Service Queue Times as shown in the large spikes in CFS from 1400-1700 were reduced significantly.
- Communication Center (RCECC) changes in dispatch practices may positively influence outcomes for Calls for Service Queue-Times as shown in the overall drop in pending Queue-Times throughout the day.

Additional correlations for Queue-Times were observed earlier in this study in Patrol Operations data between 2013-2018 in Chapter One. The three (3) correlative phenomena that occurred in 2016 were:

- The lowest average Priority 2 Queue Time (Table 2.41).
- The highest number of Officers assigned to Patrol Operations (Table 2.22).
- The lowest number of Calls for Service per Officer per year as primary Officer (Table 2.47).

These three (3) data points intersected in providing the lowest Priority 2 Queue-Time over a five (5) year period occurring in 2016. Figure 3.41 graphically demonstrates the relationship of this data from 2016-2018:

Figure 3.41

The above correlations illustrate the importance of the number of Officers assigned to Patrol Operations and the effect it has on service levels for high priority calls; and demonstrates that a confluence of these factors in 2016 showed the best results between 2016-2018.

The next section explores this data further and solutions for additional reductions to "timed out" Priority 2 Calls for Service.

Section 3.5 – Solutions to the Priority 2 Calls for Service Response Time

This section and Section 3.6 describe current staffing models in Patrol Operations and how to achieve the better Priority 2 Queue-Time response.

To address the Priority 2 Calls for Service that are not being answered within 30 seconds, we must revisit the graph depicting the delayed call-times. Figure 3.51 shows time delays involved in the 5,169 for the year period between July 2018 and June 2019.

Figure 3.51

The next graph (Figure 3.52) examines the distribution of the timed-out Priority 2 calls by hour of day over the year period between July 2018 and June 2019.

Figure 3.52

Figure 3.52 shows the number of timed-out Priority 2 Calls for Service, they range between 17-135 calls in a given hour of the day over a year period in a Patrol District.

If we use the high number in the range (135) for East District indicated with the red arrow, this statistic means that 135 Priority 2 Calls for Service were not dispatched within 30 seconds in the 3 PM hour of the day during a year period of time.

If we take this number (135) as an average over the year at the 3 PM hour, it also means that for 220 days of the year, all Priority 2 calls were dispatched within the 30 second required time frame (see equation below).

365 days – 135 days = 220 days

If we start to extrapolate out this equation for every hour of the day for every Patrol District, we can see that during any given hour over a year period, most Priority 2 calls can be covered by existing Patrol Officers. For those that cannot, it is a matter of adjusting to the appropriate number of Patrol Officer FTE's to eliminate most Priority 2 calls that "time-out."

Section 3.6 - Solution to Priority 2 Queue-Times/Timed-Out Calls for Service

As seen in Figure 3.52, the number of "timed-out" Priority 2 Calls for Service, where no Officer is available to respond, ranges between 17-135 calls in a given hour of the day over the period of a year.

As a result, this study proposes three (3) changes to prevent Priority 2 "timed-out" calls from occurring:

1. Add one (1) Police Officer to the mandatory minimum number of Officers assigned to each shift in each patrol district.
2. Change patrol policy so that the last Officer available for service in a patrol district does not engage in any proactive patrol activity unless necessary.
3. Change dispatch policy so that the last available Officer in a patrol district is only dispatched to Priority 2 calls for service; and the Officer in the patrol district assigned to the lowest priority call (e.g.; Priority 4 or 5) must break from their Call for Service to assist on the Priority 2 call.

In order to add one (1) Police Officer per shift, Tables 3.61(1) & 3.61(2) below will show the cumulative effect on personnel levels.

Table 3.61(1) - Current Saint Paul Police Department Patrol Operations Staffing Model by Tour

Calculations for Patrol District FTE's Summer 2019						
	Central District (see below for calculations)					
Tour	FTE's Assigned Per Tour	FTE's Scheduled Per Day Per Tour	Acceptable FTE Loss Per Day	Acceptable FTE Minimum	Math to Minimum	Raw Math Minimum
Tour I	21	12	4	8	(21/7)(4)=12	12
Tour II	25	14	4	(9+1)=10	(25/7)(4)=14	14.285
Tour III	30	17	6	11	(30/7)(4)=17	17.143
Total	76	43	14	29		
	East District					
Tour	FTE's Assigned Per Tour	FTE's Scheduled Per Day Per Tour	Acceptable FTE Loss Per Day	Acceptable FTE Minimum	Math to Minimum	Raw Math Minimum
Tour I	21	12	4	8	(21/7)(4)=12	12
Tour II	33	19	6	(12+1)=13	(33/7)(4)=19	18.857
Tour III	37	21	8	13	(37/7)(4)=21	21.142
Total	91	52	18	34		
	West District					
Tour	FTE's Assigned Per Tour	FTE's Scheduled Per Day Per Tour	Acceptable FTE Loss Per Day	Acceptable FTE Minimum	Math to Minimum	Raw Math Minimum
Tour I	21	12	4	8	(21/7)(4)=12	12
Tour II	33	19	6	(12+1)=13	(33/7)(4)=19	18.857
Tour III	37	21	8	13	(37/7)(4)=21	21.142
Total	91	52	18	34		

- The yellow section shows how many Patrol Officers should be assigned to our patrol schedule when all staffing positions are met.
- The blue section shows the maximum number of Patrol Officers that can be scheduled for the Tour.
- The orange section shows how many Patrol Officers can be off the schedule for the Tour before mandatory minimum staffing levels are met.
- The gray section shows how many Patrol Officers must be at work to meet mandatory minimum staffing levels.
- At the far right, the Raw Math Minimum shows the mathematical formula for calculating how many police officers are needed to meet daily shift requirements.

Below is the same chart calculated to show the increase in minimum shift requirements by one (1) Police Officer per shift.

Table 3.61(2) – Proposed Saint Paul Police Department Patrol Operations Staffing Model by Tour

Calculations for Patrol District FTE's - Staffing Study 2019						
	Central District (see below for calculations)					
Tour	FTE's Assigned Per Tour	FTE's Scheduled Per Day Per Tour	Acceptable FTE Loss Per Day	Acceptable FTE Minimum	Math to Minimum	Raw Math Minimum
Tour I	23	13	4	9	(23/7)(4)=13	13.142
Tour II	27	15	4	(10+1)=11	(27/7)(4)=15	15.428
Tour III	32	18	6	12	(32/7)(4)=18	18.285
Total	82	46	14	32		
	East District					
Tour	FTE's Assigned Per Tour	FTE's Scheduled Per Day Per Tour	Acceptable FTE Loss Per Day	Acceptable FTE Minimum	Math to Minimum	Raw Math Minimum
Tour I	23	13	4	9	(23/7)(4)=13	13.142
Tour II	35	20	6	(13+1)=14	(35/7)(4)=20	20
Tour III	39	22	8	14	(39/7)(4)=22	22.285
Total	97	55	18	37		
	West District					
Tour	FTE's Assigned Per Tour	FTE's Scheduled Per Day Per Tour	Acceptable FTE Loss Per Day	Acceptable FTE Minimum	Math to Minimum	Raw Math Minimum
Tour I	23	13	4	9	(23/7)(4)=13	13.142
Tour II	35	20	6	(13+1)=14	(35/7)(4)=20	20
Tour III	39	22	8	14	(39/7)(4)=22	22.285
Total	97	55	18	37		

In order to have an increase of one (1) Police Officer per shift:

- The yellow section must increase by two (2) Patrol Officers per Tour.
- The blue section will increase by one (1) Patrol Officer per Tour.
- The orange section will remain constant at the previous acceptable loss rate for each Tour before mandatory minimum staffing levels are met.
- The gray section shows an increase of one (1) Patrol Officer per Tour to meet mandatory minimum staffing levels.
- At the far right, the Raw Math Minimum shows the mathematical formula for calculating how many Police Officers are needed to meet daily shift requirements.
- To meet new mandatory minimums in relationship to the attrition levels discussed in Table 3.14, one (1) additional officer should be added to each Tour in each patrol district.

With the edition of one officer per shift and a change to dispatch and patrol protocols which preserves the last available Officer in a patrol district for only Priority 2 calls, the ability of the SPPD to reduce timed-out Priority 2 calls should be greatly increased.

As a result of these changes to positively effect Priority 2 response to Calls for Service, the SPPD will also likely see an increase in the following:

- The number of persons apprehended for crimes associated with high priority calls like Domestic Assaults and Robberies.
- The level of service to everyone in the community, especially people lived in Areas of Concentrated Poverty.
- An increase to Officer wellness, when more resources have been put in place to support their primary mission of protecting victims of crime.

Final Summary of Priority 2 Queue-Time Solutions

To correct the problems of Priority 2 response times and provide a higher level of service for the community, this study proposes the following strategic recommendations:

- Continue the Communications Center's (RCECC) policy of working to breaking Officers away from low priority calls to answer the newest Priority 2 calls that are "timing-out."
- Fully staff the general patrol function of the three (3) patrol districts; removing from these ranks any light duty, long-term sick, or military leave FTE's from their rosters and including in each patrol district's census only Officers able to work in the patrol officer function.
- **Increase the number** of Officers assigned to each Tour in **each patrol district by three (3) Officers**; while keeping minimum acceptable loss at the same rate. **Bringing the number of additional Officers to 27.**

Section 4.0 – Scheduling

The following section will cover:

- **Current scheduling process of the SPPD**
- **Problems and solutions for scheduling large events and SPPD-wide training**
- **Master calendaring solution for large events and SPPD-wide training**
- **Overview of alternate patrol scheduling models**

4.1 - Coordination of Patrol Assets with Demands of Scheduling

The section is an analysis of the scheduling process of the SPPD, cover an analysis of the current method of patrol division scheduling, and make recommendations about resolving conflicts between the scheduling of regular work days, special events, and all-staff training cycles.

Data/Observations:

Regular Patrol Operations Scheduling

The SPPD schedules Patrol Officers by Tour. These tours are:

Tour I: 2200-0800 hours

Tour II: 0700-1700 hours

Tour III: 1600-0200 hours

- Each Tour covers a 10-hour period and are overlapping. Tours I, II, & III in combination cover 24 hours per day, 7 days per week.
- Approximately 25% of Patrol Officer work on Tour I, 35% of Patrol Officer work on Tour II, and 40% of Patrol Officer work on Tour III.
- Calendar is divided into 7 Regular Day-Off (RDO) letters coded from the letters A-G (disregard letters X,Y,Z that appear on calendar).

The calendar depicted in Figure 4.1 illustrates the following:

- Day-off letters in clusters of three (3) (these represent Officers not working on that calendar day).
- The overall schedule rotates on a six (6) week schedule.
- Patrol Officers working three (3) weeks of 4 (10-hour) days followed by four (4) days off the schedule.
- The following three (3) weeks, the calendar rotates to five (5) (10-hour) days followed by three (3) days off the schedule.
- This cycle repeats throughout the entire calendar year.

Figure 4.11

January 2019

Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
		1 New Year's Day 1-2 C-D-G-Z	2 2-3 A-D-G-X	3 3-4 A-D-E-X	4 4-5 A-B-E-Y Payday	5 4-5 A-B-E-Y
6 5-6 B-E-F-Z	7 6-7 B-C-F-Z	8 7-1 C-F-G-X	9 1-2 C-D-G-X	10 2-3 A-D-G-Y	11 3-4 A-D-E-Y	12 3-4 A-D-E-Z
13 4-5 A-B-E-Z	14 5-6 B-E-F-X	15 6-7 B-C-F-X	16 7-1 C-F-G-Y	17 1-2 C-D-G-Y	18 2-3 A-D-G-Z Payday	19 2-3 A-D-G-Z
20 3-4 A-D-E-X	21 Martin Luther King, Jr. 4-5 A-B-E-X	22 5-6 B-E-F-Y	23 6-7 B-C-F-Y	24 7-1 C-F-G-Z	25 1-2 C-D-G-Z	26 1-2 C-D-G-X
27 2-3 A-D-G-X	28 3-4 A-D-E-Y	29 4-5 A-B-E-Y	30 5-6 B-E-F-Z	31 6-7 B-C-F-Z		

1

Figure 4.12 below is an example of this Regular Day Off (RDO) calendar form as used for Patrol Officer coverage projections for a Tour. In this case, Tour I in Eastern District Patrol.

Figure 4.12

Eastern District Tour I 2019 — 21 Officers
(Minimums: 8) (Based on 88 total officers)

Tour I		BCF	CFG	CDG	ADG	ADE	ABE	BEF
A		310	310	310				310
A		310	310	310				310
A		322	322	322				322
B			311	311	311	311		
B			329	329	329	329		
B			329	329	329	329		
C					321	321	321	321
C					321	321	321	321
C					315	315	315	315
D		320	320				320	320
D		320	320				320	320
D		318	318				318	318
E		324	324	324	324			
E		326	326	326	326			
E		326	326	326	326			
F				314	314	314	314	
F				314	314	314	314	
F				312	312	312	312	
G		328				328	328	328
G		325				325	325	325
G		325				325	325	325
Total		12	12	12	12	12	12	12
Minimums		8	8	8	8	8	8	8
Allowed Off		4	4	4	4	4	4	4

21 Officers
Allowed off: 4

A	3
B	3
C	3
D	3
E	3
F	3
G	3

89

The use of 10-hour shifts at the patrol district level is a constructive way of scheduling given call loads, overlaps, and peak times. See section 3 for further analysis. This system of scheduling works well as a patrol operations schedule when it is fully staffed.

Work completed by outside research by the Police Foundation [19] in 2011 found that a 10-hour work day for police patrol shiftwork is better for sleep/fatigue, job performance, quality of life, and reductions in overtime accrual as compared to eight (8) and twelve (12) hour day options.

The 10-hour schedule the SPPD is currently using is one that has been in practice for over 25 years. This schedule covers the basic scheduling needs for Patrol Operations. However, many other scheduling schemata exist within a 10-hour system. While not all would be compatible with an agency the size of the SPPD, there are 10-hour schedules with different merits and organizational dynamics and potential positive effects on organizational dynamics.

This study endorses the continued use of the 10-hour day. While the SPPD may consider other structures of this format, 10-hour schedules are the most compatible for the SPPD's patrol operations. The following are some of the outcomes of the current 10-hour scheduling format:

- Provides a 10-hour day for all staff.
- Equitable regardless of seniority position.
- Creates even coverage over the entire schedule for every patrol Tour (I, II, III).
- Allows schedule predictability for officers and supervisors for a full calendar year.
- Does not take into consideration peak times of need for staffing by hour of day or day of week.
- Does not allow for flexibility to move staff for peak times of coverage.
- Does not allow for movement of staff to cover known openings on the schedule.
- The overlapping nature of the schedule does not allow for better staff coverage during peak periods of service need.

Saint Paul is a city that serves as a state capitol, major city in Minnesota, and as a focal point of sports, holiday, and cultural events. Most events occur on an annualized basis or are scheduled out many months to a year in advance. As a result, the SPPD has an opportunity to identify this calendar well ahead of any given event's occurrence.

4.2 - Large Event & Training Staffing

During interviews, staff at all levels have expressed that source of stress is scheduling large events and training for the following reasons:

- The overlapping nature of multiple events on the same day.
- The lack of broad communication about person in-charge of a given event.
- Short notice from event commanders about staffing required from patrol districts and investigative units for regular on-duty staff for events (i.e.; high school hockey tournaments, festivals).
- Scheduling of mandatory SPPD-wide training during the same time frames as large events.

In the past. three types of staffing were used to have sworn officers covering major events:

1. On-duty personnel (paid at regular wage rate to cover a portion from district patrol operations)
2. On-duty overtime (posted and signed up for by officers on a volunteer basis)
3. Off-Duty Police Officers (paid for privately by event hosts)

In 2019, the SPPD began to change how major events are being scheduled. The SPPD is moving to an all-paid overtime system. This system requires all major event hosts to staff all sworn officer positions at the event using on-duty overtime. The goal is that by 2020, all off-duty employment will be eliminated from large events and no regularly scheduled district patrol staff will be used for major events. Thus, placing the cost burden onto the event host.

The Inspections Unit of the SPPD administrates the program and uses an on-line scheduling product to notify staff, allow staff to sign up for their preferred voluntary overtime shifts, and then to assign out the final schedule to officers interested in working specific event details.

Risk Management Considerations:

- 10-hour schedules have been found through research to be beneficial to Officer health and wellness.
- Moving away from 10-hour scheduling may create wellness issues for Officers.
- Off-duty employment is difficult to monitor, control, and places sworn staff in the position of being in-charge of and making decisions about private security while still representing the SPPD with their sworn officer rank, peace officer powers, and use of the SPPD uniform.

Recommendations:

- Have the Inspections Unit continue removing off-duty employment from larger events. At the time of publishing of this document, this has progressed even further than at the beginning of this study.
- Continue to have process improvements to the master operations plan document and SPPD-wide communication that is being done by the Special Operations Unit regarding large event planning.
- Master Calendaring: The SPPD should entertain a master calendaring process. This is currently done in certain instances when the agency knows of a large-scale event and restricts time-off or "red-lines" the calendar.

Completing an overlay of:

- Regular Shift Minimums
- Major Event Demands
- Mandatory Training Needs

Next, it is recommended the SPPD do the following:

- Identify all major known events for the following calendar year in October of the preceding year in a Master Calendaring Conference (MCC).
- Identify the expected minimum staffing needed for each event in the Master Calendaring Conference.
- Identify how many expected regular duty staff are expected to work from each Patrol District or other Unit of the agency at each event during the MCC.
- Identify command positions in-charge of each of these events at the MCC.
- Overlay the proposed training calendar for the upcoming year and identify those events that cause peak demand for staffing of events and training.
- Develop a plan to move the parts of the training calendar most in conflict with patrol and special event operations.
- After the bid is completed for each calendar year, each patrol district command staff should immediately place into their staffing calendars "red-lines" or different shift minimums for peak days of training and/or major events.

This methodology will allow our SPPD staff to take better control of scheduling and pre-plan needs for staffing of District operations, special events, and training.

- **Conversion of Major Events to Overtime**

All large city events requiring sworn police officers should be scheduled using overtime assignments. The benefits are as follows:

- Removes conflicts posed by off-duty employment status of sworn staff.
- Eliminates the strain put on patrol districts to provide regular on-duty staff
- Keeps regularly scheduled patrol district staff assigned to their regular duties.

One operational consideration of this model is that while staff may be signing up voluntarily for overtime, scheduling mandatory training over large/major events, may still create a different organizational stress in that it may reduce the availability of officers to staff large events when mandatory training is scheduled at the same time.

4.3 Overview of Other Scheduling System Options for Patrol Districts

With other scheduling systems available, the SPPD should consider, and potentially field test different schedules determine their effectiveness in field operations. As previously stated, each scheduling system has bonuses and drawbacks. Below are two systems of scheduling that are worth further study. These systems are in use in other agencies and versions of one of these scheduling formats is currently in use in some units of the SPPD outside of district patrol operations.

Team/Power Shift Schedule:

Figure 4.31

The **Team/Power Shift Schedule** provides for 16 days worked per 28-day period with 14 days worked with the same team of co-workers. Two (2) days per twenty-eight (28) period are worked with the other team.

Example: Patrol Officer Smith is working on Team A. The Officer works fourteen (14) days of the twenty-eight (28) day period with Team A. There are two (2) additional 10 Hour days of required time that Officer Smith needs to work to meet his/her 160 hours for the twenty-eight (28) day cycle. These two (2) 10 hour "power shift" days are scheduled within the Team B schedule. Power shift days may be scheduled for coverage of:

- Known loss factors from the schedule
- Training
- Special Details
- Additional Coverage

Example Schedule:

Figure 4.32

| Team A |
| Team B |
| Required Time Days for Officer Smith |

	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
Week 1	Team A				Team B	Ofc. Smith	
Week 2		Team A				Team B	
Week 3			Team A				Team B
Week 4			Ofc. Smith	Team A			

This schedule allows for the following:

- Staff who consistently work with one another.
- Supervision can be overlapped consistently with the same staff each work day.
- Predictability of 88% of the yearly schedule for planning purposes.
- Flexibility to assign regularly scheduled days for training and shift coverage.
- Allows for the employee to take vacation without interrupting 88% of the work schedule.

It should be noted that the use of the word "power shift" does not denote extra personnel. These power shift days are an integral, yet flexible, part of the schedule.

G1/G2 "Heavy Wednesday" Schedule

The G1/G2 "Heaving Wednesday" schedule is currently in use in our FORCE, Gang Unit, and ACOP Units of the SPPD. The dynamics of this schedule create two (2) teams of officers, each working together for their entire work week and all staff work on each Wednesday as an overlap day.

Figure 4.33

	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
Week 1	Team A			Team A&B	Team B		
Week 2		Team A		Team A&B		Team B	
Week 3			Team A	Team A&B			Team B
Week 4				Team A&B			

The G1/G2 schedule allows for the following:

- Staff who consistently work with one another; this may produce more reliability in performance outcomes of the group.
- Supervision can be overlapped consistently with the same staff each work day.
- 100% predictability of yearly schedule for planning purposes.
- Ability to schedule in-service training, special events, and some details on all staff days (Wednesdays).

Section - 5.0 Patrol Operations – Specialized Units

The following section will cover:

- **Descriptions of specialized units managed by Patrol Operations**
- **Risk management considerations and recommendations for each unit.**

There are several units with specialized functions that report within the Patrol Operations Division:

- **SWAT** – Special Weapons & Tactics Team
- **ODU** – Ordinance Disposal Unit (Bomb Squad)
- **Negotiators** – Auxiliary unit to SWAT for barricaded, suicidal, & hostage situations
- **FORCE Unit** - Focusing Our Resources on Community Efforts
- **Watch Commander Office** – Night hours SPPD command

The following subsections will cover them.

Section 5.1 - Special Weapons And Tactics (SWAT) Team - Patrol Operations Division

The SWAT Team has:

- The organizational structure shown in Figure 5.11;
- A current personnel table shown in Table 5.11;

The SWAT Team Commanders report to the Deputy Chief of Patrol Operations.

Figure 5.11

Figure 5.11   SWAT Team

Personnel Type	# of FTE's
Commander	2
Sergeant	8
Bomb Technician	10
Total Staff	**33**

The SWAT Team is a collateral duty team comprised of sworn members of the SPPD; meaning all members of the team have other full-time assignments and being a member of the SWAT Team is an additional duty that is done on a part-time basis away from their regular duty assignments.

Data/Observations:

- The team is led by two Commanders. This allows for two-deep leadership at the top level of the team.
- The team has eight (8) Sergeants, some of whom due to their level of experience and leadership abilities, can lead the team if there happens to be an absence of both team Commanders.
- SWAT Team membership starts through passing a series of skill and physical testing. Both men and women can complete these tests. At that point, candidates take on a probationary status for up to a year, where they receive training and function within the team in the training environment. At the end of the year, an assessment is made and they either fill open positions on the team or are removed from the team. This process has been occurring formally for about 10 years and has proven to determine the ability of candidates.
- The team replaced all expired bullet resistant armor in 2019.
- All team members are also equipped with noise canceling headsets with a microphone which has greatly improved the personal protective equipment for noise issues, which are substantial in this training and operational environment.
- All team members are offered a basic AR-15 rifle. About 90% of team members put add-on items on their weapons to create a rifle that is more customized to their physical needs.
- The SWAT Team has a current philosophy to render safe the area around a situation they are brought into, surround the threat, and then draw the problem person(s) out and into a controlled environment for safe apprehension. This tactical approach is done to minimize the use of force and potential property damage in any situation.
- The SWAT Team has networked with other special tactics teams to learn their current techniques and have helped to cascade this philosophy throughout SPPD training.

- The SWAT Team has avoided, through their tactical applications, using chemical munitions inside a residence since 2010. This is viewed by this study as positive change as houses are sometimes uninhabitable after the use of chemical munitions inside of them.
- The team has very good protective armor vehicles in-service but needs one transport vehicle and a new command post vehicle.
- In personal equipment, each team member must buy much of their own non-protective equipment, which is a burden financially, as the clothing allowance for Officers is not large enough to cover the costs of both uniforms of the day and SWAT gear.

Risk Management Considerations:

- SWAT related problems that occur in our community produce a high level of risk exposure for the City.
- The use of gas related munitions inside of a building can create liability up to the cost of the structure.
- Ensure that SWAT tactical innovations continue to be disseminated to all sworn officers through training; thus, equipping all Officers with up-to-date techniques.

Recommendations:

- Ensure team commander and trainers are connected to national level training that can bring new tactics and approaches for the use of the SWAT Team and the entire SPPD.
- Have a budgeting mechanism to cover all standard purchases for new SWAT member equipment and worn equipment replacement.

Section 5.2 Ordinance Disposal Unit – ODU

The Ordinance Disposal Unit has:

- The organizational structure shown in Figure 5.21;
- Seven (7) year personnel history from 2013-2019 shown in Table 5.21;

The Commander of ODU reports to the Deputy Chief of the Patrol Division.

Figure 5.21

Table 5.21

Personnel Type	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Commander	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Sergeant	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Bomb Technician	11	10	10	10	10	10	10
Total Staff	**12***	**12***	**12***	**12***	**12***	**12***	**12***

*Commander & Bomb Technicians are all collateral duty assignments.

Data/Observations:

- The unit has one (1) Commander position that was formally added in 2019 to give a clear administrative reporting structure to the team.
- For many years, one (1) Sergeant has been assigned as the full-time leader/coordinator of ODU. All other unit members are part of a collateral duty assignment, serve on a part-time basis.
- ODU is considered a federal asset and is one of four bomb squads in Minnesota. It has a responsibility for the Eastern Metropolitan area, east of I-35 to Duluth and all Northwest Wisconsin as a Federal asset.
- Budget items are from federal and state grants and the unit has purchased upwards of $3 million of equipment from grants. State of Minnesota reimburses the team at $200.00/hour for all ODU responses that occur outside the City of Saint Paul.
- Out of city callouts account for 70% of their 200-250 callouts per year.

- The team is equipped to handle up to three callouts at the same time and have a dry land and underwater capacity; underwater capability is important as we are considered a port city by the U.S. Coast Guard and Homeland Security.
- Each bomb technician has 3 days of training per month.
- Each bomb technician receives the following training in preparation for this role:
    o Basic Bomb Tech School – 6 weeks
    o Hazardous Materials Training – 3 weeks
    o Dive School – 1 week
    o Yearly training for recertifications – 2-3 weeks per year
- Unit is egalitarian due to the nature of the work, rank structure is essentially used only for the purposes of administrative work delegation.
- Recently the team was relocated to East Team and it allowed 90% of their assets to be consolidated into one place.
- Unit administrative work:
    o Grant Writing
    o Upkeep of four bomb squad trucks and robots
    o Supply ordering
    o Ordinance destruction
    o Inspection and tracking of training and equipment

Risk Management Considerations:

- As a large city in the Midwest, the presence of an ODU team is an asset that greatly reduces lost staff time due to their quick response to the 60+ calls the City of Saint Paul generates per year.
- There is a risk in maintaining this team in the event federal and state grants are no longer available.
- Risk to SPPD personnel at any event where devices are found and need to be disposed.
- Bomb squad members take more time away from their primary job due to training.

Recommendations:

- Retain team and support their efforts to continue to secure grants for equipment and program.
- Keep the Commander position in place as administrative oversight and consultant for the team.
- Consider the addition of one (1) Officer FTE to a full-time status to work on the continual duties associated with having a federal asset as part of our organization. The work associated with this unit requires high standards from state and federal scrutiny for grants, program, and training.

Section - 5.3 F.O.R.C.E. Unit

The FORCE Unit has:

- The organizational structure shown in Figure 5.31;
- Three (3) year personnel history from 2017-2019 shown in Table 5.31;

The Sergeant of FORCE reports to the Commander of Investigations for Western District.

Figure 5.31

Table 5.31

Personnel Type	2017	2018	2019
Sergeant	1	1	1
Officer	9	9	9
Total Staff	**210**	**10**	**10**

The FORCE Unit (Focusing Our Resources on Community Efforts) has been a function of the SPPD for over 25 years. FORCE was a centralized unit utilized SPPD-wide until 2010. It was de-centralized into three teams at the police district level in 2010, and then re-consolidated unit one unit in 2017.

Data/Observations:

- The FORCE Unit serves all three patrol districts on problem property issues.
- Problem Property functions for the FORCE Unit primarily deal with hot spot complaints of narcotics and weapons violations.
- Unit Sergeant attends community meetings across the city.
- Problem properties are divided into patrol districts and three (3) FORCE Officers are assigned to each districts' problem properties.
- Success in their efforts is mostly gauged by the number of arrests they make intersecting with the problem addresses.

- They work closely with district Code Enforcement Police Officers on problem locations.
- FORCE staff are often used for scene security at homicide and shooting scenes across the city.

Risk Management Considerations:

- One concern is FORCE Unit repetition of function with that of the Narcotics/Vice unit and the Gang Unit.
- The type of discretionary enforcement work done by this unit needs good management level supervision to prevent accusations of disparate enforcement tactics.

Recommendations:

- Disband the FORCE Unit due to its parallel duties with Gangs, Narcotics/Vice, and similarities to district Code Enforcement. Re-deploy staff as follows:
  - 1- Sergeant to afternoon shift Gang Unit.
  - 4- Officers to afternoon shift Gang Unit.
  - 3-Officers to Intelligence Unit.
  - 1-Officer to Sex Crimes/POR
  - 1-Officer to Robbery/Kidnapping

Section 5.4 – Watch Commander Office

The Watch Commander Office:

- The organizational structure shown in Figure 5.41;

The Watch Commander reports to the Deputy Chief of Patrol Operations.

Figure 5.41

```
┌─────────────────────┐
│  Deputy Chief of    │
│  Patrol Operations  │
│        (1)          │
└──────────┬──────────┘
           │
┌──────────┴──────────┐
│    Commander        │
│        (2)          │
└─────────────────────┘
```

The Watch Commander Office is a long-standing function of the SPPD going back generations. It has taken different forms of scheduling, and currently covers from 1700-0300 hours five days each week and from 1830-0230 two nights per week.

Data/Observations:

- Two Commanders are assigned to the Watch Commander Office.
- Responsibilities include review of incoming arrests for quality control of probable cause, report writing, and other procedural concerns.
- Position staffs with full-time Watch Commanders at least 5 nights per week, and then has other command staff fill in for vacations and other uncovered nights.
- Watch Commander position fills in the peak hours of arrests made during a 24-hour period and acts in place of oversight that would otherwise be done by Patrol Commanders in each district during daytime hours.
- Watch Commanders provide for managerial oversight when needed in high-risk incidents or for problem solving situations with more complex aspects that may be difficult for Patrol Sergeants to accomplish during high call volume periods.
- Watch Commander acts as the conduit for notification to upper administration on larger incidents including homicides, car chases, aggravated assaults, and officer involved shootings.

Risk Management Considerations:

- Managerial oversight during periods of time where most command and administration is not readily available is an important element of oversight for issues of risk to the SPPD.
- Having this level of command coverage in the evening hours is a minimum amount. This does leave a gap in the very early morning hours that is covered by Patrol Sergeants. However, the

costs associated with "staffing up" management for what is ostensibly the lowest activity period of the day (0300-0700) may not be easy to accomplish.

- It is important that this position continues to enforce policy and procedure as part of the position and use discretionary override when needed.

Recommendations:

- Continue the practice of an established Watch Commander position within the SPPD.
- Continue to have this command position work during the peak evening hour time frame.
- Consider expansion of the position if budget dollars were available to do so.

Section 5.5 – Canine Unit

The Canine Unit has:

- The organizational structure shown in Figure 5.51;
- A current personnel table shown in Table 5.51;

Figure 5.51

Table 5.51

Personnel Type	2019
Commander	1
Sergeant	2
Officer	18
Total Staff	**21**

The Canine Unit has Officers with canine partners working 24/7. The unit has the structure shown in Figure 5.81 and unit staff shown in Table 5.82. The Commander of the Canine Unit reports to the Deputy Chief of Patrol Operations. No Data/Observations

A separate study was completed in the first quarter of 2019 about the Canine Unit. Therefore, no additional research findings are presented in this document.

Section 5.6 Crisis - Negotiations Team

The Crisis Negotiations Team has:

- The organizational structure shown in Figure 5.61;
- A current personnel table shown in Table 5.61;

Figure 5.61

```
Team
Commander
(1)
  |
Negotiators
(11)
```

Table 5.61

Personnel Type	2019
Commander	1
Negotiators	11
Total Staff	**12**

*all collateral duty positions

Data/Observations:

- The Crisis Negotiations Team is a collateral duty for sworn officers of the Officer, Sergeant, and Commander rank of the SPPD. When hired for the team, a new member may be an Officer or Sergeant and can remain on the team through the rank of Commander due the amount of training required, and experience team members acquire.
- The team works in a coordinated effort with SWAT and Patrol Operations.
- The process for screening new members has several aspects to capture the qualities needed to be a negotiator.
- Continuing team membership requires regular attendance at unit training and ability to regularly respond to team callouts.

Risk Management Considerations:

- Negotiators must continually maintain latest standards in training on subject matter pertaining to persons in crisis in order to operate with current best practices during field operations.

Recommendations:

- Maintain team at current levels of staffing and the allowance for the Officers, Sergeants, and Commanders to be a part of the team to retain persons with experience.

Major Crimes Division Data Analysis 2019

Section 6.0 - Introduction

The scope of this section of the study will accomplish the following:

- **Describe unit and investigator workloads**
- **Describe unit organization**
- **Describe unit staffing levels**
- **Identify process and structural problems**
- **Identify recommendations for process and staffing issues or further research needed**

Section 6.1 – Major Crimes Definitions & New Cases Equation

This chapter covers the Saint Paul Police Department's **Major Crimes Division**. Figure 8.1 shows the division's organization flow chart.

Figure 6.1

The Major Crimes Division is led by a Deputy Chief who is assisted by an Executive Officer (Sergeant rank) and shares a 0.5 FTE Office Assistant. The Deputy Chief reports directly to the Assistant Chief. The division is made up of nine (9) major units, and sub-units within them, to manage the span of control.

In criminal investigations, one (1) case is equal to one (1) crime or set of crimes that happened in an incident. In some instances, this is a single crime that is simplistic to solve, report on, and to prosecute. In other cases, there are many criminal acts involved, more than one suspect, and extensive evidence that must be reviewed during the investigation for best practice in criminal investigations. Typically, more complex cases take longer to reach final disposition with the investigator or prosecutor to close the case.

Section 9 will describe all the specific investigative units within the Major Crimes Division. The data presented about each unit of investigations will include a table of data showing six (6) years of case data for each unit. The six (6) years of case data was retrieved from the Saint Paul Police Records Management System (RMS) database to provide yearly totals of information. Each category of

information is described on the left side of the table with each column representing one full year of data.

In the beginning of each sub-section in this chapter a new investigative unit will be introduced and an RMS data set will be presented.

The below "**Sample Unit**" data set shows the different ways a case can be closed by the different disposition types shown in **red**. In **blue**, you will see the **Average Case Time (days) to Closed Cases** statistic showing the average time it took for case completion.

Sample Unit RMS Case Data Figure 6.2	Sample Unit	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
	Total # of Cases	1830	1724	1740	1742	1739	1901
	# of Cases Per Investigator	261	215	217	290	348	237
	Avg. Case Time (days) Closed Cases	61	85	83	84	87	115
	Recommended Range of Cases Per Investigator Per Year						
Types of Closed Cases	Cleared by Arrest	195	180	202	217	218	271
	Declined	109	135	79	118	110	198
	Noted	261	342	351	333	330	258
	Other/Unk.	1	6	8	9	1	12
	Unfounded	41	28	22	6	20	56
	Recovered Property	0	1	1	0	0	1
	Exceptional Clearance	1	1	2	1	3	49
	Pended	578	468	398	412	475	288
	TOT Other Agency	644	563	677	645	581	768
	Adults Booked for Crime	177	222	149	134	156	162
	Adults Cited for Crime	20	11	8	3	5	11
	Juvenile Arrested Not Booked	2	0	2	3	0	0
	Juvenile Booked at JDC	10	10	4	5	1	0

* In the glossary, there is a key for definitions of all the terms in the left-side column of the above chart.

At the end of each section, the headings of Data/Observations, Risk Management Considerations, and Recommendations will be utilized.

Also, the two following descriptions will be used in the text of this chapter to describe the "type" of unit being described. These descriptors are Hold Book Driven Workload and Investigative Driven Workload. The following are the definitions of these phrases:

- ▪ Hold Book Driven Workload: This describes a Major Crimes unit where most of the work is due to new arrests made on a regular basis; often times daily. These units typically have a shorter number of "Average Case Time (Days) Closed Cases;" meaning the number of days from the time the case began to the time when the case is closed due to a final disposition. In these types of units, the scope of the work is usually focused on initial findings that happen within days of the beginning of the case. The initial findings determine how the case will be handled due to suspect(s) that are in-custody creating a "hold book" case that needs to be charged within 36 hours of arrest or the person in-custody must be released under the law.
- ▪ Investigative Driven Workload: This describes a Major Crimes unit where the major focus is on building evidence of the following types: interviews, physical objects, video, and digital evidence. There may be an in-custody "hold book" element to these cases, but longer evidentiary processes are necessary to work towards the final finding of fact in these cases.

Caseload Management and Caseload Level Concerns

A significant concern of investigators, managers, and administrators of the SPPD is the caseload carried by unit investigators. While there is no national standard for all investigations (26), this study will provide an optimal range of caseloads that an investigator should be managing at any given time. This standard range for Saint Paul Police Sergeant Investigators has been derived through examining the following factors:

- Interviews with command staff managing investigative units
- Interviews with investigators
- Review of caseload data
- Review of other studies/literature
- Analysis of the Saint Paul Police Department investigative unit data
- An acceptable community standard for service

In determining a recommended range of cases per year for an investigator, the range of 25-40 cases being managed at one time is recommended. This number of cases managed by an investigator allows for:

- Effective tracking of data
- Evidence tracking and clearance
- Report writing
- Interviews with suspects/arrestees
- Forensics
- Statement collection from victims and witnesses
- Review of digital evidence
- Video management
- Search warrants

The effectiveness of investigators has been observed to deteriorate when caseloads consistently get into or above the 35-40 case range, where investigators begin to lose their ability to manage the quality of the above listed factors. Therefore, this is an area of caution when looking at investigator caseloads.

New Cases Equation (NCE): An equation that will be used for understanding the workload of investigators in this study will be the New Cases Equation. This equation will calculate the total number of new cases an investigator should be expected to manage in a year to maintain an optimal average daily caseload.

The **New Cases Equation (NCE)** can be used to determine how many new (incoming) cases per year an investigator should be assigned and still be able to manage at the optimal average daily caseload level. The following numerical factors must be used in the equation:

- 365 (number of days per year)
- Optimal Average Daily Caseload
- Average Case Time (Days) Closed Cases

The above three (3) factors need to be included in the **New Cases Equation (NCE)**:

$$\left(365 \div \frac{\text{Avg. Case Time (Days) Closed Cases}}{} \right) \times \text{Optimal Average Daily Caseload} = \text{Optimal \# of new assigned cases per year per investigator}$$

Next, enter numbers into this equation with the assumption that each investigator should have an average of **30** cases to manage at any one time, with the numeric value from the **Average Case Time (Days) Closed Cases** from the **Sample Unit** example in **Figure 8.2** ; located in the 2018 data column was **115** cases:

- 365 (number of days per year) = 365
- Optimal Average Daily Caseload = 30
- Average Case Time (Days) Closed Cases = 115

$$\left(365 \div 115 \right) \times 30 = 95 \text{ cases}$$

The result is that the average number of new cases that should be assigned to an investigator per year is **95** cases; knowing the average case takes **115** days to close with the fixed number of cases being managed at an average of **30** cases at a time.

Calculating a Recommended Range of Cases Per Investigator Per Year Using the New Cases Equation (NCE):

If an acceptable **Recommended Range of Cases Per Investigator Per Year is calculated** from the **New Cases Equation (NCE)**, the bottom of the range for **Optimal Average Daily Caseload** would be put into the

equation to calculate the **NCE**; then putting in the top of the range for the **Optimal Average Daily Caseload** would be put into the equation to calculate the **NCE**.

To calculate this, enter a range for the **Optimal Average Daily Caseload**. Carry forward the earlier example using the **Sample Unit**. Below are the values used the example:

- 365 (number of days per year) = 365
- Optimal Average Daily Caseload Range: 25-40
- Average Case Time (Days) Closed Cases = 115

Bottom of the Range Calculation (Average Daily Caseload of 25):

$$\left(365 \div 115 \right) \times 25 = 79 \text{ cases}$$

Top of the Range Calculation (Average Daily Caseload of 40):

$$\left(365 \div 115 \right) \times 40 = 127 \text{ cases}$$

This gives the caseload range for the **New Cases Equation (NCE)** of 79-127 newly assigned cases per year as the expectation for an investigator with the **Average Daily Caseload** range of 25-40 cases.

Targeting Caseload Levels

In the RMS Caseload Data Chart for each investigative unit is a line marked Recommended Range of Cases Per Investigator Per Year. For each year, this line will have a pre-calculated range using the New Cases Equation calculation that will be juxtaposed with the corresponding year's actual average new cases assigned for investigators.

The range in the NCE calculations will be 25-40 cases and is viewed as the standard applied to the study for the purposes of analysis and comparison.

Section 7.0 - Major Crimes Unit Analysis

The work of the Major Crimes Division is made up of investigations of Felony, Gross Misdemeanor, and Misdemeanor crimes where either a party reports something after the offense and the suspect in the case is not immediately available to arrest; or when a crime is reported, and persons are taken into custody during or shortly after the commission of a crime.

The following are the unit descriptions, data/observations, risk management considerations, and recommendations:

Section 7.1 - Robbery/Homicide Unit-Major Crimes Division

The Robbery/Homicide Unit has:

- The organizational structure shown in Figure 7.11;
- Six (6) year personnel history from 2013-2018 shown in Table 7.11;
- Six (6) year caseloads and activity from 2013-2018 shown in Table 7.22;

The Robbery/Homicide Senior Commander reports to the Deputy Chief of Major Crimes.

Figure 7.11

Crime Types Assigned to Robbery/Homicide

A. Kidnapping: when the victim is 18 years or older and there are no criminal sexual conduct allegations
B. Impersonations of a peace officer
C. Abduction when the victim is 18 years or older and there are no criminal sexual conduct allegations
D. Suicide attempts
E. Riot
F. Bigamy
G. Coercion
H. Assaults on SPPD personnel
I. Death investigations including homicide, suspicious, suicide and child deaths
J. Critical Incidents
K. Robbery

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L. Cold Cases
M. Harassment, stalking and terroristic threats (non-domestic)
N. Unlawful possession of tear gas and/or electronic control devices
O. Drive-by shooting and other offenses involving the intentional or accidental discharge of a firearm (with an identified victim)
P. Unlawful possession of bullet proof vest
Q. Obstruction of Legal Process
R. All non-domestic assaults

Robbery/Homicide Personnel 2013-2018

Table 7.11

Personnel Type	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Sr. Commander	1	1	1	1	1	1
Sergeant	10	9	10	10	11	11
Officer	0	0	0	0	0	1
Civilian	1	1	1	2	1	1
Total Staff	**12**	**11**	**14**	**13**	**13**	**14**

RMS Caseload Data 2013-2018 - Crime Data Robbery/Homicide Unit

Table 7.12

Homicide/Robbery	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Total # of Cases	3446	3244	3519	2993	2530	2340
# of Cases Per Investigator	**344.6**	**360.4**	**352**	**299.3**	**230**	**212.7**
Avg. Case Time (days) Closed Cases	**51**	**38**	**40**	**38**	**53**	**84**
Recommended Range of Cases Per Investigator Per Year	**178-286**	**240-384**	**228-365**	**240-384**	**178-275**	**109-174**
# of Homicide Cases	14	13	21	21	24	18
# of Robbery Cases	665	788	850	815	837	630
# of Aggravated Assaults	1045	466	501	476	472	462
Cleared by Arrest	594	502	501	389	461	422
Declined	176	166	183	159	129	109
Noted	1313	1397	1387	1233	695	706
Other/Unk.	5	10	7	9	4	2
Unfounded	33	25	16	11	10	7
Recovered Property	0	0	2	6	1	1
Exceptional Clearance	5	0	2	3	3	69
Pended	1299	1111	1393	1163	1197	1006
TOT Other Agency	21	32	28	20	30	18
Total Booked for Crime	804	647	664	534	511	434
Cited for Crime	150	83	89	92	53	49
Juvenile Arrested Not Booked	7	8	6	4	2	2
Juvenile Booked at JDC	33	23	27	16	14	7

Robbery/Homicide Budget 2013-2018

Table 7.13

	2013				2014		
	Budgeted	Actual	% (+/-) Budget		Budgeted	Actual	% (+/-) Budget
General	$15,225	$11,218	-26%	General	$14,936	$15,724	+5%
Overtime	$86,000	$267,608	+211%	Overtime	$86,000	$190,200	+121

	2015				2016		
	Budgeted	Actual	% (+/-) Budget		Budgeted	Actual	% (+/-) Budget
General	UNK	UNK	UNK	General	$13,991	$15,193	+8%
Overtime	UNK	UNK	UNK	Overtime	$151,000	$228,679	+51%

	2017				2018		
	Budgeted	Actual	% (+/-) Budget		Budgeted	Actual	% (+/-) Budget
General	$13,991	$17,950	+28%	General	$13,991	$11,654	-17%
Overtime	$151,000	$234,010	+55%	Overtime	$133,250	$213,673	+60%

**Please note a lack of financial data reported for FY2015

Data/Observations:

- The Robbery/Homicide Unit is currently divided into the following configuration:
    - 1 Senior Commander
    - 6 Homicide Investigators
    - 3 Robbery Sergeant Investigators
    - 1 Cold Case Sergeant Investigator
    - 1 Officer assigned to assist all Sergeant Investigators
    - 1 Clerical Staff assigned to assist all Sergeant Investigators and the unit Senior Commander.
    - 1 Investigative Assistant
    - 2 Investigative Sergeants assigned to the Special Investigations Unit (sub-unit of Homicide)
    - 2 Police Officers assigned to the Special Investigations Unit (sub-unit of Homicide)
- Staff assigned to Robbery/Homicide are dedicated employees.
- The Robbery/Homicide Unit has a high level of ability to solve homicide cases.
- The "Cleared by Arrest" rate for Homicide is over 90% in most years; placing SPPD in the highest tier of SPPDs in the nation for solving of homicide cases

- The staff work long hours and believe in the work they are doing to solve crimes on behalf of victims and to reduce further violence.
- The unit normally exceeds their overtime budget by at least 50%.
- Unit overtime is used by Homicide investigators, Gang Unit co-mingled cases, and the Forensic Science Unit.
- The level of overtime spent in most years by the unit could fund two (2) or more additional investigative sergeants.
- The average caseload per investigator is over 200 cases per year.
- The average range of cases per investigator greatly exceeds recommended levels under the standard NCE calculation.
- Average time to close a solvable homicide is one (1) year.
- The unit is "Hold Book" driven due to the large number of new arrests occurring on a regular basis; these cases must be processed within 36 hours of arrest, causing time and resources to be taken away from longitudinal investigations.
- The work of the unit has become more complex and technical in nature due to technology.
- Conducting search warrants, the review, and data mining of the following platforms are a new occurrence and necessary for a proper and unimpeachable investigation: social media, computers, cellular phones, Google/search-terms, CCTV footage, officer body worn camera footage, squad car camera footage, and other emerging technologies.
- The sentiment of unit staff is that the many different crime types assigned to the Robbery/Homicide are too great given the complexity of cases assigned to them and the number of investigators in the unit.
- The current backlog of unsolved homicides in the City of Saint Paul is approximately 133 cases since 1981.
- The unit averages five (5) calls per week on cold cases from friends, families, and law enforcement agencies.
- The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) recommends that the optimal number of active homicide investigations that any one person is the lead investigator is three (3) to four (4) Homicide open cases per year due the increased complexity of modern casework [27].
- A national study indicates that if there is not an adequate number of homicide investigators to fully handle cases, the number of successfully handled cases will decrease [27].
- Saint Paul Homicide works in teams of two investigators, which is directly in-line with national models for homicide investigations [27].
- Non-sworn staff and police officer rank staff are nationally recommended to assist in homicide investigative units with the multitude of tasks confronting a homicide investigation that can distract the lead investigators in a case.
- Restricting the detailing of homicide investigators to participate in staffing details outside their unit (e.g.; traffic direction, security details) should be an organizational priority; making them the last unit in an organization to send staff to such events [27].

- PERF recommends that all homicide investigators be issued a full package of agency electronics; including cell phones, laptops/tablets, and other devices for increasing their efficiency while in the field.
- Homicide's Special Investigations function was transferred to the unit in March/April 2019 when the former stand-alone Special Investigations Unit (SIU) was dissolved with many of the assets becoming the Safe Streets/Task Force Officer Unit. Two SIU functions are currently within Homicide; Computer Forensics and the more traditional intelligence and apprehension element of SIU. SIU field work is very helpful in assisting in homicide investigations, freeing up case investigators to focus on core case functions.
- The Computer Forensics Unit is staffed historically by an Officer and a Sergeant. Currently, there are two Sergeants assigned to this function and handles the forensic examination of approximately 200 cell phones and 24 computers/laptops per year. These cases can possess large amounts of digital data to be examined.
- The majority of Computer Forensics work previously originated from the Internet Crimes Against Children Unit; now majority is from Homicide investigations.

Risk Management Issues:

- Many non-death related cases cannot be investigated with any rigor due to the lack of personnel.
- Many persons are not held accountable for violent crimes they commit due to lack of investigative resources.
- People who have committed a homicide(s) are not being held accountable for their crimes in cold cases.
- DNA technology is now available and there is follow up necessary regarding older evidence where DNA should be searched for and submitted for testing if present in old homicide cases. More staff time is needed to use this resource to bring the evidence chain to a final conclusion through testing and solve some of the associated crimes.
- Interviews with staff indicate that the stress level of working in Robbery/Homicide is too great. While case content is stressful, staff identified that most of the stress comes from high caseload, lack of time to solve cases, and the amount of overtime needed to complete their work.
- The lack of SPPD issued cell phones and laptop computers are an operational security, which allows for the co-mingling of personal and SPPD data/information.
- Cold cases that are being actively pursued with an intentional methodology followed by a unit increases a SPPD's morale and create greater trust and satisfaction in its local police agency [27].
- Accreditation process is needed for Computer Forensics. It is an effective unit that needs accreditation to meet the emerging rigor of this growing field of law enforcement investigations.

Recommendations:

- All Investigators in the above-mentioned units should have SPPD cell phones and computer technology that assists them in being able to operate more efficiently in field operations (27). Additionally, this will prevent the co-mingling of data on personal communication and computer equipment and avoid any potential data practices concerns.
- The high level of Hold Books assigned to this unit must be relieved through a process of re-structuring the unit workload. Hold Book driven work detracts from the thorough investigation of homicides.
- The study standard range for cases under management of 25-40 cases does not apply to Homicides or Death Investigations due to the extreme case complexity; reduction in caseloads are necessary.
- The Robbery/Homicide Unit caseload per investigator must be drastically reduced to increase effectiveness of solving crimes that are not related to the crime of Homicide. By doing this, the SPPD will deliver better results and service to the community, reducing repeat crimes by the same offenders, and increasing the level of wellness of investigators.
- A Homicide Investigator should be assigned as a co-lead investigator for 3-4 homicides per year and carrying an average caseload of other death investigations not exceeding a total of 12-15 total investigations at one time.
- Retain the one (1) Officer rank to the Homicide function specifically of the unit. An Officer position in this unit can perform many ancillary functions for a case that allow the investigator to focus on core issues as the principal investigator.
- Transfer Computer Forensics (2) investigators and functionality to the Forensic Science Unit as a SPPD-wide asset. Additionally, this unit should seek national accreditation and make sure that a full menu of annual training for unit investigators is pursued to gain certifications and maintain them.
- The two (2) Sergeants and two (2) Officers in the main SIU function should be merged into other units as part of the Major Crimes recommendations. Transfer the two (2) Sergeants to Robbery/Kidnapping and one (1) Officer to Sex Crimes/POR and one (1) Officer to Juvenile/Missing Persons.
- **Add one (1) Office Assistant** specifically for the Homicide Unit for unit administrative assistance with case work.
- The Robbery/Homicide Unit must be split into four (4) sub-units reporting to two (2) Commanders.
- The four (4) units should be as follows with the list of crimes each unit should investigate:
  - **Homicide Unit:** 10 Investigative Sergeants; 1 Officer:
    - Homicide
    - Suspicious Deaths
    - Overdose Related Deaths
    - Suicides
    - Suicide Attempts

- - Child Deaths
  - Critical Incidents
- o **Cold Case Homicide Unit:** 2 Investigative Sergeants
  - Cold Case Homicides
- o **Robbery/Kidnapping Unit:** 4 Investigative Sergeants; 1 Officer
  - Robbery
  - Kidnapping: Where the victim is 18 years or older and there is no criminal sexual conduct allegations
  - Abduction: When the victim is 18 years or older and there are no criminal sexual conduct allegations
  - Riot
  - Unlawful possession of tear gas and/or electronic devices
  - Unlawful Possession of a bullet proof vest
- o **Violent Crimes Against Persons Unit:** 6 Investigative Sergeants; 1 Officer
  - All non-domestic assaults
  - Drive-By Shooting and other offenses involving the intentional or accidental discharge of a firearm (with an identified victim)
  - Harassment
  - Stalking
  - Terroristic Threats (non-domestic)
  - Assaults on SPPD personnel
  - Obstruction of Legal Process
  - Impersonation of a police officer
  - Coercion
  - Bigamy

Unit re-structuring visual charts are as follows:

Figure 7.13   **Homicide Unit**

```
                    Commander
                  Homicide Unit
                         |
          ┌──────────────┴──────────────┐
     Homicide                      Cold Case
     Section                       Homicide
                                   Section
          |                            |
    Investigative                Investigative
     Sergeants                    Sergeants
       (10)                          (2)
          |
       Officer
        (1)
          |
   Administartive
     Assistant
        (1)
```

Figure 7.14   Robbery/Violent Crimes Unit

```
                         Commander
                      Robbery/Violent
                          Crimes
                             |
        ┌────────────────────┼────────────────────┐
   Robbery/Kidnapping    Violent Crimes       Administrative
        Unit            Against Persons          Assistant
                             Unit                  (1)
        |                      |
  Investigative          Investigative
   Sergeants              Sergeants
      (4)                    (6)
        |                      |
     Officer                Officer
       (1)                    (1)
```

Breakdown of Cases Under New Model (using 2018 existing data)

	Total Cases
Homicide Unit	410
Cold Case Unit	133
Robbery/Kidnapping	750
Violent Crimes Against Persons	1162

Section 7.2 - Sex Crimes Unit-Major Crimes Division

The Sex Crimes Unit has:

- The organizational structure shown in Figure 7.21;
- Six (6) year personnel history from 2013-2018 shown in Table 7.21;
- Six (6) year caseloads and activity from 2013-2018 shown in Table 7.22;

The Sex Crimes Unit Commander reports to the Deputy Chief of Major Crimes.

Figure 7.21

Crime Types Assigned to Sex Crimes Unit

A. Kidnapping: when the victim is 18 years or older and there are no criminal sexual conduct allegations
B. All Sexual Assaults
C. Child Abuse Investigations

Sex Crimes Unit Personnel 2013-2018

Table 7.21

Personnel Type	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Commander	1	1	1	1	1	1
Sergeant	7**	8**	8	6	5**	8
Officer	3^	3^	3^	3^	2^	2^
Clerk	.5*	.5*	.5*	.5*	.5*	1
Total Staff	**11.5**	**12.5**	**12.5**	**10.5**	**8.5**	**12**

*Clerical FTE Shared with Family Violence **Includes Elder Abuse Inv. ^POR Officers

RMS Caseload Data 2013-2018 - Sex Crimes Unit

Table 7.22

Sex Crimes	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Total # of Cases	1830	1724	1740	1742	1739	1901
# of Cases Per Investigator	261	215	217	290	348	237
Avg. Case Time (days) Closed Cases	61	85	83	84	87	115
Recommended Range of Cases Per Investigator Per Year	150-239	107-172	110-176	109-174	105-167	79-127
Cleared by Arrest	195	180	202	217	218	271
Declined	109	135	79	118	110	198
Noted	261	342	351	333	330	258
Other/Unk.	1	6	8	9	1	12
Unfounded	41	28	22	6	20	56
Recovered Property	0	1	1	0	0	1
Exceptional Clearance	1	1	2	1	3	49
Pended	578	468	398	412	475	288
TOT Other Agency	644	563	677	645	581	768
Adults Booked for Crime	177	222	149	134	156	162
Adults Cited for Crime	20	11	8	3	5	11
Juvenile Arrested Not Booked	2	0	2	3	0	0
Juvenile Booked at JDC	10	10	4	5	1	0

Special Note: There are 300-350 Child Abuse cases reviewed per month by the Sex Crimes Unit. Currently, only about 200 cases per year are opened as full investigations and included in the above statistics. All the other cases are reviewed but not counted in yearly statistics at this time.

Data/Observations:

- During fall 2018 the Sex Crimes and Family Violence were split into two (2) units. A second Commander was added to manage the Family Violence Unit along with a clerical FTE. This division of labor reduced command level supervision by half and reduced the scope of each unit and reduced conflict between multiple missions being pursued.

- Sex Crimes investigators believe that splitting up the unit has improved the focus of the unit to only have to work on crimes of sexual violence, predatory offender registration, and child abuse cases.
- Sex Crimes becoming a standalone unit allows for more thorough review of all reports by the unit commander.
- Lack of transcriptionist who re-types whole interviews creates a large backlog of case work due to the continual need of investigators to type narratives of interviews they have conducted.
- The Predatory Offender Registration (POR) program is embedded within the Sex Crimes Unit. It historically had three (3) officers assigned to the program; currently one (1) police officer is assigned to the program.
- POR has 1,110 registered sex offenders living in Saint Paul; 3,000 check-ins occur at the department headquarters each year by POR Officers in the Sex Crimes Unit.
- POR program is unable to do residential compliance verification checks by visiting residential addresses of registered sex offenders due to the lack of staffing.
- Sex Crimes Unit is a mandatory cross reporter with Ramsey County Child Protection. The number of cases that are coming in are increasing every year.
- Ramsey County Child Protection sends 300-350 cases per month to the SPPD Sex Crimes Unit requiring review by a Sex Crimes Sergeant Investigator each time. No case numbers are assigned to these case reviews unless an investigation is opened.
- Each day, one (1) or two (2) of the Child Protection cases sent by Ramsey County Child Protection are opened as new cases to be investigated by our Sex Crimes Unit; totaling approximately 400 additional cases per year.
- Sex Crimes Unit has only enough resources to deal with the worst cases; Gross Misdemeanor Malicious Punishment or higher-level charge and cases where drugs and guns are present.
- Sex Crimes Investigators receive cases of Child Abuse (physical abuse or maltreatment) and Deprivation of Parental Rights which they believe is a specialized subset of investigative work with specialized training that they do not possess.
- Investigators believe there is too much work to focus on the incoming case load.
- The Sex Crimes Unit receives Indecent Exposure cases which are cases of urinating in public. As such, they believe this type of quality of life issue should not be handled by the Sex Crimes Unit.
- The number of cases assigned per investigator is well over 200 per year; averaging 261 cases per investigator per year for the last six (6) years.
- The number of new cases assigned to Sex Crimes investigators exceeds the recommended case range by approximately 100%.
- The number of days for a case to be closed has risen by almost 100% from 2013-2018; from 61 days to 115 days; this study finds the increase in time is due to the growing complexity of the cases being managed and the high number of child protection cases reviewed that are not counted in the overall RMS caseload of Sex Crimes investigators.

Risk Management Issues:

- The large number of cases being handled by the Sex Crimes Unit creates a system of triage and does not allow investigators to always pursue investigations as quickly or thoroughly as should be done.
- Having only one POR officer prevents checking field compliance of registered sex offenders.
- Child Abuse cases are being placed at a threshold of severity for pursuing criminal charges. Cases are only examined at a Gross Misdemeanor level or above in severity; or where guns and drugs are present in the home. This triage threshold does not address certain crimes at all.
- Investigator stress due to the extreme workload is causing employee wellness issues.

Recommendations:

- The Sex Crimes Unit should add an additional eight (8) investigators to handle a caseload that will move the historical number of cases averaging in the lower 200's down to between 100-130 cases per investigator per year. This will allow the unit to become a more investigative driven unit.
- **Add eight (8) Sergeant Investigators** will allow for caseloads to be aligned with the optimal average caseload level.
- **Add two (2) Officer** positions to the Predatory Offender Registration (POR) program within the Sex Crimes Unit.
- Re-establish sex offender residential verification checks with a historical full complement of three (3) POR officers.
- Assign case numbers to all incoming child abuse reviews from Ramsey County Child Protection or other sources for more accurate accounting of services provided in the reviewing process.
- Establish a transcription service to transcribe all interviews done by investigators to save time spent on clerical tasks.
- Move all Indecent Exposure reports to the respective patrol district investigative units where they occur.
- A Child Abuse Investigations Unit should be established to review and investigate the current number of at least 3,600 Child Abuse cases being sent to the SPPD for review each year. **The unit should consist of the following staffing model:**
  - **1 Commander**
  - **4 Sergeant Investigators (Child Abuse Investigations Only)**
  - **1 or 2 Sergeant Investigators for Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) investigations (*see recommendations for ICAC in Section 7.5)**
  - **1 Office Assistant**

Figure 7.22 Child Abuse Unit Organizational Chart

```
                    ┌─────────────────┐
                    │    Commander    │
                    │       (1)       │
                    └────────┬────────┘
         ┌──────────────┬────┴────┬──────────────┐
┌────────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐
│  Investigative │ │ ICAC Sergeant│ │Office Assistant│
│    Sergeants   │ │      (2)     │ │      (1)      │
│       (4)      │ │              │ │               │
└────────────────┘ └──────────────┘ └──────────────┘
```

Section 7.3 - Family Violence Unit-Major Crimes Division

The Family Violence Unit has:

- The organizational structure shown in Figure 7.31;
- Six (6) year personnel history from 2013-2018 shown in Table 7.31;
- Six (6) year caseloads and activity from 2013-2018 shown in Table 7.32;

The Family Violence Unit Commander reports to the Deputy Chief of Major Crimes.

Figure 7.31

Crime Types Assigned to Family Violence Unit

- Domestic Assault (misdemeanor, gross misdemeanor, felony)
- Assault 1st through 5th degree (minus 4th degree)
- Threats of Violence (formerly terroristic threats)
- Harassment
- Stalking
- Interference with Emergency Call
- Violations of; Orders for Protection, Domestic Abuse No-Contact Orders, Harassment Orders
- Domestic Assault by Strangulation
- Non-Consensual Dissemination of Private Sexual Images (Revenge Porn)

Family Violence Unit Personnel 2013-2018

Table 7.31

Personnel Type	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Commander	1	1	1	1	1	1
Sergeant	6	6	6	6.4	6	7**
Officer	3	2	2	2	1	2
Civilian	.5*	.5*	.5*	.5*	.5*	1
Total Staff	**11.5**	**10.5**	**13.5**	**12.5**	**12.5**	**13**

*Clerical FTE shared with Sex Crimes 2013-2017 **Includes Elder Abuse Inv.

RMS Caseload Data 2013-2018 – Family Violence Unit

Table 7.32

Family Violence	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Total # Cases Assigned	3198	3014	2924	2534	2923	3342
Total # of Cases Closed	**2924**	**2921**	**2685**	**2296**	**2777**	**3112**
# of Cases Per Investigator	**533**	**502**	**487**	**396**	**487**	**477**
Avg. Case Time (days) Closed Cases	**12**	**19**	**28**	**7**	**10**	**15**
Recommended Range of Cases Per Investigator Per Year	760-1216	480-768	325-521	1303-2805	912-1460	608-973
Cleared by Arrest	1296	1415	1173	994	1203	1274
Declined	386	804	1224	1010	1297	1432
Noted	291	223	231	253	263	397
Other/Unk.	2	3	6	7	3	2
Unfounded	15	2	2	0	0	0
Exceptional Clearance	1	0	1	0	1	0
Pended	925	468	44	26	7	0
TOT Other Agency	8	7	4	6	3	36
Total Booked for Crime	1288	1360	1174	867	1059	1123
Cited for Crime	373	19	11	5	19	10
Juvenile Arrested Not Booked	21	3	0	0	0	0
Juvenile Booked at JDC	1	2	1	2	0	0

Data/Observations:

- The Family Violence Unit has investigators who are focused and passionate about their mission of making victims and their families safe by holding offenders accountable.
- The unit has done an excellent job of sustaining the original Blue Print for Safety model devised over a decade ago in a joint federal grant between Saint Paul Police and Praxis International. It is still a model for advocacy, investigation, and prosecution; and the unit staff believe that their work is homicide prevention.

- This is a Hold Book driven unit due to the volume of cases and the average number of days until a case is closed. Due to a small number of cases that remain open for continued investigation, the "Averaged Case Time Closed Cases" would be even lower.
- During 2018, unit "Cleared by Arrest" rate was 37% for the year.
- For the first six months of 2019, the unit "Cleared by Arrest" rate was 51%.
- As a unit, staff are prevented from running short of staff, due to vacations or other staff shortages, through the ability to use overtime and good management of the scheduling function by the unit commander with the support of the SPPD's administration.
- Due to the constant processing of new cases, the unit's work does not allow for the unit to run short of personnel. To prevent this problem, SPPD administration allows overtime when needed to cover this Hold Book driven unit to prevent offenders from getting out of custody without court appearances which compromises victim safety.
- The unit has well established partnerships with City and County Attorneys.
- The unit has well established partnerships with victim advocacy groups.
- This unit is a model for all SPPD's investigative units and the City and County Attorney's Offices. This is due to the high level of cooperation that has developed between the Family Violence Unit and the City and County Attorneys assigned to Domestic Violence prosecution processes directed by the protocols in the Blue Print for Safety.
- The NCE equation appears skewed in the RMS data. This is due to the forced nature of the 48 Hour Rule timeline for charging jailed persons; which are continuously being processed by this Hold Book Driven unit.

Risk Management Considerations:

- A reduction in the number of investigators assigned to this unit would have a negative effect on the wellness of staff.
- A break down in the communication and cooperation between unit staff, the City or County Attorney's Offices, and/or advocacy groups would seriously damage the effectiveness of investigating and prosecuting domestic abuse cases.

Recommendations:

- **Add (1) Sergeant Investigator** to reduce overtime and increase time-off the schedule relief factor for the entire unit.
- At an administrative level, continue to examine the working relationships and process improvements that have been made and future recommendations from all the partners working on the Blue Print for Safety.

Section 7.4 - Crimes Against Property Unit (CAPROP)

The CAPROP Unit has:

- The organizational structure shown in Figure 7.41;
- Seven (7) year personnel history from 2013-2019 shown in Table 7.41;
- Six (6) year caseloads and activity from 2013-2018 shown in Tables 7.42-7.45:

The CAPROP Commander reports to the Deputy Chief of Major Crimes.

Figure 7.41

Crime Types Assigned to CAPROP Units by sub-unit:

ARSON:

- Arson, 1st through 5th Degree (609.561 to 609.5632)
- False Fire Alarm/Tampering with Alarm System (609.686)
- Negligent Fires/Dangerous Smoking (609.576)
- Wildfire Arson (609.5641)
- Use of Ignition Device (609.5633)

Auto Theft:

- Auto Theft
- Breach of trust
- Possession of Theft tools
- Possession of Controlled Substance charges

Burglary:

- Burglary 1st - 4th Degree
- Attempted Burglary
- Possession of Burglary Tools
- All crimes to include juvenile offenders
- Home Invasion Robbery or Assault- Burglary 1st Degree

Fraud & Forgery:

- 609.2335 Financial Exploitation of vulnerable Adult
- 609.2336 Deceptive or Unfair Trade Practices; Elderly or Disabled Victims
- 609.631 Check Forgery
- 609.506 False info to Police (false name to PD, Not related to MV which in my experience goes to T&A)
- 609.52 Theft by swindle
- 609.535 Issuance of Dishonored Checks
- 609.527 ID Theft
- 609.54 Embezzlement of Public Funds
- 609.611 Insurance Fraud
- 609.625 Aggravated Forgery
- 609.63 Forgery
- 609.631 Counterfeiting of Currency
- 609.635 Obtaining signature by False Pretense
- 609.64 Recording , Filing of Forged Instrument
- 609.645 Fraudulent Statements
- 609.65 False Certification by Notary Public
- 609.652 Fraudulent DL and ID Cards
- 609.7475 Fraudulent Financing Statements
- 609.82 Fraud in Obtaining Credit
- 609.821 FTC Fraud
- 609.822 Mortgage Fraud
- 609.83 Falsely Impersonating Another
- Voter Fraud

CAPROP Unit Personnel 2013-2018

Table 7.41

Personnel Type	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Commander	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Officer(s) APS	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Sergeant	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Arson							
Sergeants	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Auto Theft							
Officer(s)	0	0	1	0	0	2	1
Auto Theft							
Sergeants	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
Burglary							
Sergeants	3	2	3	2	3	3	3
Fraud & Forgery							
Clerical	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Civilian Analyst	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Total Staff	**17**	**16**	**18**	**16**	**17**	**19**	**19**

The following tables are SPPD RMS Data for each sub-unit of CAPROP:

RMS Caseload Data 2013-2018

Table 7.42

Arson/APS	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Total # of Cases Assigned	162	157	156	132	217	134
Total # of Cases Closed	138	157	134	134	175	181
# of Cases Per Investigator	**162**	**157**	**156**	**132**	**217**	**134**
Avg. Case Time (days) Closed Cases	**98**	**65**	**70**	**70**	**61**	**83**
Recommended Range of Cases Per Investigator Per Year	**93-148**	**140-224**	**130-209**	**130-209**	**149-239**	**110-176**
Cleared by Arrest	19	21	16	11	10	12
Declined	4	3	1	5	5	9
Noted	24	17	15	15	44	30
Other/Unk.	11	23	9	5	8	10
Unfounded	0	0	2	1	0	0
Recovered Property	0	1	0	0	0	0
Exceptional Clearance	0	0	0	0	0	1
Pended	79	83	90	94	93	108
TOT Other Agency	1	9	1	2	15	11
Total Booked for Crime	13	17	12	10	10	23
Cited for Crime	0	0	2	1	0	0
Juvenile Arrested Not Booked	1	0	0	0	0	1
Juvenile Booked at JDC	2	0	0	0	1	0

RMS Caseload Data 2013-2018

Table 7.43

Auto Theft	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Total # of Cases Assigned	2428	2733	2591	2761	3078	3448
Total # of Cases Closed	2271	2380	2741	2519	2847	3305
# of Cases Per Investigator	**607**	**683**	**648**	**690**	**770**	**862**
Avg. Case Time (days) Closed Cases	**35**	**17**	**25**	**45**	**18**	**25**
Recommended Range of Cases Per Investigator Per Year	**260-417**	**536-858**	**365-584**	**202-324**	**506-811**	**365-584**
Cleared by Arrest	145	153	189	154	178	305
Declined	66	54	69	66	84	94
Noted	382	378	1	574	631	582
Other/Unk.	3	7	8	7	4	4
Unfounded	59	69	56	50	62	99
Recovered Property	372	27	30	1	4	45
Exceptional Clearance	0	3	1	1	1	1
Pended	1214	1636	1623	1520	1691	1932
TOT Other Agency	30	53	90	146	192	244
Total Booked for Crime	242	243	283	281	316	457
Cited for Crime	31	23	20	12	29	43
Juvenile Arrested Not Booked	2	4	1	6	1	1
Juvenile Booked at JDC	1	8	2	7	6	7

RMS Caseload Data 2013-2018 - Table 7.44

Burglary	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Total # of Cases Assigned	3083	2465	2285	2406	2458	1963
Total # of Cases Closed	2545	2229	2230	2383	2387	1860
# of Cases Per Investigator	**514**	**410**	**380**	**401**	**409**	**327**
Avg. Case Time (days) Closed Cases	**44**	**28**	**52**	**33**	**28**	**33**
Recommended Range of Cases Per Investigator Per Year	**207-332**	**325-521**	**175-281**	**277-442**	**326-521**	**276-442**
Cleared by Arrest	189	136	142	170	177	168
Declined	32	48	34	42	43	30
Noted	31	58	54	132	47	38
Other/Unk.	12	4	4	2	3	7
Unfounded	20	13	17	21	8	11
Recovered Property	3	4	1	2	3	10
Exceptional Clearance	6	1	10	4	2	3
Pended	2238	1960	1965	2004	2101	1590
TOT Other Agency	14	5	3	6	3	3
Total Booked for Crime	237	190	145	212	156	156
Cited for Crime	7	9	12	8	0	3
Juvenile Arrested Not Booked	3	2	2	0	0	3
Juvenile Booked at JDC	19	15	24	16	10	21

RMS Caseload Data 2013-2018

Table 7.45

Fraud & Forgery	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Total # of Cases Assigned	1478	1444	1308	1490	1727	1513
Total # of Cases Closed	1032	1116	1077	1404	1384	1342
# of Cases Per Investigator	**493**	**722**	**436**	**745**	**576**	**447**
Avg. Case Time (days) Closed Cases	**87**	**200**	**70**	**38**	**45**	**89**
Recommended Range of Cases Per Investigator Per Year	**105-168**	**14-73**	**130-209**	**240-384**	**202-324**	**102-164**
Cleared by Arrest	76	88	84	37	32	70
Declined	35	59	40	27	12	24
Noted	165	69	86	59	105	85
Other/Unk.	3	0	0	0	1	0
Unfounded	4	3	1	3	3	0
Recovered Property	2	0	0	0	1	0
Exceptional Clearance	0	2	0	1	0	0
Pended	519	742	738	1151	1094	989
TOT Other Agency	228	153	128	126	135	174
Total Booked for Crime	113	160	85	59	41	96
Cited for Crime	5	8	2	4	3	3
Juvenile Arrested Not Booked	1	0	0	0	1	1
Juvenile Booked at JDC	9	0	1	1	0	1

Data/Observations:

General:

- Due to the current structure of the unit and the volume of cases, the Burglary and Auto Theft units with CAPROP are Hold Book driven units.
- The commander of this unit has a very large span of control; and within the unit are several specialty areas of criminal investigation.
- The unit currently changing the work of the clerical Office Assistant III and the civilian analyst to do more information collection, sharing, and analysis.

Auto Theft:

- The number of auto thefts in Saint Paul continue to be an increasing problem for the unit; 2018 marked a year with over 1,000 more auto thefts than in 2013.
- Auto Theft Investigators have increased their collaboration in recent years with the following law enforcement agencies: Roseville, Maplewood, Ramsey County Sheriff's Office, and Minneapolis, to share information and potentially identify same offenders who commit crimes in the city. Additionally, they have networked with Dakota County, West Saint Paul, and South Saint Paul to complete an Auto Theft "task force" due to the overlap in their Auto Theft related crimes with Saint Paul.
- The unit is trying to re-work how workflow is managed to create time to focus on the top offenders in the category of Auto Theft.
- The average caseload per Auto Theft investigator is too high in comparison to the optimal average caseload standard.
- The unit has a civilian analyst funded by an Auto Theft grant.
- The unit commander is working to change the focus of the unit from a reactive "Hold Book" driven approach to spending more time targeting top offenders with the County Attorney, Ramsey County judges, and staff.
- CAPROP has had a "bait car" program for eight (8) years; the program is being revisited by the current commander. Staff are working to keep the vehicles moving around the city and look like cars in use. This requires hours of work each day by investigators. Unknown at this time if this recent change will be effective.

Burglary

- Another major focus of the unit is Burglary investigations. In this area, there has been a slight decrease in residential burglaries and slight increase in commercial burglaries.
- Five (5) Burglary investigators currently work on residential/retail burglaries and one (1) investigator works on city-wide Commercial Burglaries.
- Historically, Burglary investigations have shifted between a centralized group working out of headquarters and decentralized investigations that have been a part of Patrol District investigations. In 2010, the most recent consolidation took place with a centralized Burglary Unit as part of CAPROP at the headquarters offices.
- This study has found a current concern among staff in the Patrol Districts and in CAPROP about the lack of connection between the centralized Burglary Unit with district investigators and patrol officers. At issue is the information about burglary investigations, follow up, career criminals, and prevention flowing to and from the centralized Burglary Unit to the Patrol District operations.
- A re-examination of the efficacy of the centralized Burglary Unit function was in-progress in the command staff prior to this study. The commander of CAPROP and the three Patrol District

Senior Commanders believe that better service can be provided in solving burglary investigations if investigations were reassigned to investigations at the Police Districts.

Risk Management Factors:

- The current level of Auto Thefts in Saint Paul is creating a quality of life and crime problem in the City.
- There is an officer wellness concern in this investigative unit; it is a cause for concern due the high-volume of cases investigated by this unit annually.
- There is the potential of information being lost to the Patrol Districts on burglaries with current organizational structure of a centralized Burglary Unit.
- Decentralizing the Burglary Unit back to the Patrol Districts causes concern in the following areas:
  - Lack of quality control between Patrol Districts on how Burglary cases are being managed.
  - Potential lack of coordination and communication between Patrol District investigative units in each district.
  - Lack of a pooled resource for Burglary investigations.

  However, retaining it as a centralized unit raises the following areas of concern:

  - Lack of communication with the district Patrol Officers and command staff.
  - Lack of attention to a Patrol Districts burglary patterns
  - Lack of communication with other property crime investigators in district property crime investigations who may be investigating the same suspects for other property crimes.

Recommendations:

General:

- **Reduce** the span of control of the CAPROP commander by removing burglary investigations.

Auto Theft:

- Commander of CAPROP should create a rubric of solvability for Auto Theft to more quickly pend cases with little or no chance of being solved; thus, creating more time for investigators to proactively address the top ten offenders currently committing Auto Thefts in Saint Paul. This rubric model should be an administratively supported standard of triage in this high-volume unit.
- The CAPROP Unit should work to automate the pend letter process. The work flow should become paperless through automatic email generated letters sent to victims of auto theft and other unit related crimes that have no solvability factors. This should be done to save time of

the unit clerical staff and investigators from working on cases lacking solvability; allowing for more time to focus on cases with solvability factors.

- **Add three (3) Auto Theft Investigators** to reduce the average caseload per investigator to within the optimal caseload range.

Burglary:

- Restructure the Burglary function of the Saint Paul Police Department to a de-centralized model with the following criteria:
    - Place two Investigative Sergeants for residential/retail Burglary investigations in each Patrol District.
    - **Add one (1) Investigative Sergeant** to the overall complement of burglary investigators as a city-wide Commercial Burglary investigator in the Western District. Placement in this district is due to the number of Commercial Burglaries happening in the Western District and for space and span of control concerns.
    - Create a regular meeting of all burglary investigators to share information, connect trends between Patrol Districts, and keep up regular relationships between these investigators when joint work is necessary.

Section 7.5 - Safe Streets/Task Force Officer Unit

The Safe Streets/Task Force Officer Unit has:

- The organizational structure shown in Figure 7.51;
- Seven (7) year personnel history from 2013-2018 shown in Table 7.51;
- Six (6) year caseloads and activity from 2013-2018 shown in Tables 7.52 & 7.53;

The Safe Streets/Task Force Officer Unit (Safe Streets) has the following organizational structure shown in Figure 7.51 and Table 7.51 shows the history of personnel assigned the unit from 2013-2019. Tables 7.52 & 7.53 show a six (6) unit history of caseloads and activity from 2013-2018.

Figure 7.51

The Safe Streets Commander reports to the Deputy Chief of Major Crimes. The current unit make up has four different task force affiliations:

FBI Safe Streets Task Force: This is a task force combining police officers from local agencies which are coordinated with local FBI agents to work on inter-jurisdictional cases concerning organized crime, drug trafficking organizations (DTO's), homicides, and gun trafficking cases. The SPPD is reimbursed for overtime, vehicles, electronic devices, and training for every officer assigned to this task force. These assets are to be used only by the SPPD member assigned to the task force.

Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF): This is a confederation of police officers from local agencies who are coordinated with local FBI agents to address domestic and international terrorism intelligence, criminal actions, and investigations. The SPPD is reimbursed for overtime, vehicles, electronic devices, and training for every SPPD member assigned to this task force.

Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC): This Investigative Sergeant position is networked with three different task forces:

- Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension's ICAC group.
- FBI Child Exploitation Task Force
- Center for Missing and Exploited Children-Cyber Tips

The purpose of ICAC is to investigate internet based sexual exploitation of children; primarily through pornographic images of minors. The SPPD credited for overtime, electronic devices, and training for every SPPD member assigned to this task force. These assets are to be used only by the SPPD member assigned to the task force.

Crime Types Assigned to Safe Streets/Task Force Officer Unit

- Narcotics
- Weapons Violations
- Violent gangs
- Homicide

Crime Types Assigned to Joint Terrorism Task Force Unit

- Cases assigned through FBI
- Bomb Threats
- Domestic Terrorism

Crime Types Assigned to Internet Crimes Against Children Unit

- Child Pornography

Safe Streets Personnel 2013-2018

Table 7.51

Personnel Type	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Commander	1	1	1	1	0*	0*	1
Sergeant(s) Safe Streets	2	2	1	5	2	2	2
Officers Safe Streets	4	4	4	5	5	5^^	5^^
Officers JTTF	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Sergeant(s) ICAC	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
North Star Fugitive Task Force	1	1	1	1	1	1	0^
Civilians	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total Staff	**11**	**11**	**10**	**15**	**11**	**9**	**11**

*Supervised by Special Investigations Unit Commander ^Current vacancy in position due to BWC policy ^^Not filled due to lack of overall personnel available within the SPPD

RMS Caseload Data 2013-2018

Table 7.52

ICAC	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Total # of Cases	78	36	44	32	35	28
# of Cases Per Investigator	**78**	**36**	**44**	**32**	**35**	**28**
Avg. Case Time (days) Closed Cases	**233**	**110**	**112**	**153**	**220**	**377**
Recommended Range of Cases Per Investigator Per Year	**39-67**	**83-133**	**81-130**	**60-95**	**42-66**	**24-38**
Cleared by Arrest	18	19	19	9	7	8
Declined	5	1	1	6	2	0
Noted	8	2	4	4	4	8
Other/Unk.	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unfounded	5	1	1	0	0	1
Exceptional Clearance	1	0	0	0	0	3
Pended	29	9	15	10	21	4
TOT Other Agency	12	4	4	3	1	4
Total Booked for Crime	6	5	4	4	2	1
Cited for Crime	1	0	0	0	0	0
Juvenile Arrested Not Booked	0	0	0	0	0	0
Juvenile Booked at JDC	0	0	0	0	0	0

RMS Caseload Data 2013-2018

Table 7.53

Safe Streets**	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Total # of Cases	28	50	35	73	29	UNK
# of Cases Per Investigator	**4.6**	**8.3**	**7**	**7.3**	**4.1**	**UNK**
Avg. Case Time (days) Closed Cases	**1243**	**1136**	**481**	**479**	**516**	**733**
Recommended Range of Cases Per Investigator Per Year	**Data Not Applicable**	**Data Not Applicable**	**Data Not Applicable**	**Data Not Applicable**	**Data Not Applicable**	**Data Not Applicable**
Cleared by Arrest	21	29	17	37	14	32
Declined	0	0	1	3	2	5
Noted	1	11	13	19	3	10
Other/Unk.	0	2	2	1	1	1
Unfounded	0	0	0	0	1	0
Recovered Property	0	1	0	0	0	1
Exceptional Clearance	0	0	0	0	1	1
Located Missing Person	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pended	6	6	2	11	6	3
TOT Other Agency	0	1	0	2	1	21
Total Booked for Crime	21	24	13	52	21	52
Cited for Crime	0	0	0	3	0	0
Juvenile Arrested Not Booked	0	0	0	0	0	0
Juvenile Cited for Crime	0	0	0	1	0	0

**Partial RMS information due to federal data systems used for case management

Data/Observations:

Safe Streets/Task Force Officer Unit

- There has been a historical shift in the assets of the current Safe Streets unit which occurred in March 2019 during a SPPD reorganization. Prior to March 2019, the current Safe Streets unit was part of the Special Investigations Unit. This unit had one commander, sergeants in Computer Forensics, task force officers (Safe Streets, JTTF, ICAC, Marshals Fugitive), and investigative intelligence sworn staff working together in this unit together. The March 2019 reorganization by SPPD administration split up the Special Investigations Unit and move its staff into the following areas:
  - Safe Streets
  - Special Operations Unit (2 sergeants who worked on investigative intelligence)
  - Special Investigations (2 Sergeants & 2 Officers) sub-unit with the Robbery/Homicide Unit.
  - Computer Forensics (2 Sergeants) sub-unit within the Robbery/Homicide Unit.
- Optimal staffing for Safe Streets is 2 Sergeants and 6 Officers; this allows for two (2) teams of four (4) to work on investigative assignments (1 Sergeant and 3 Officers). Due to the high risk/high reward operations they are involved in and tactics used, a team of four persons is often needed to be safe and effective.

- Currently, there is one Officer rank vacancy in the Safe Streets program that is not being filled due to other SPPD staffing of personnel.
- There is a vacancy in the U.S. Marshals North Star Fugitive Task Force. This is due to a conflict between our SPPD's mandate for sworn staff to wear body cameras and the Federal system which does not currently have a provision for the use of body cameras during for sworn staff. This caused Chief Todd Axtell to discontinue our participation in this task force. Currently the Federal government is creating guidance on the use of body worn cameras in task force environments. It believed before the end of 2020 this guidance will be completed allowing Saint Paul Police to rejoin this task force.

ICAC

- For the ICAC Unit, there is a high volume of work that must occur in each case handled by the ICAC investigator as indicated by the long Average Case Time Case Closed data for each year.
- The workload per case in ICAC is similar to a Homicide investigator and should be limited to an assigned case range of 10-20 cases per year.
- The average amount of time it takes to close a case for the ICAC investigator is 201 days.
- There is no redundancy for the ICAC Investigative Sergeant position.
- The ICAC position currently lacks overlap between investigators assigned to this unit; thus, leaving an inherent flaw when the position is replaced by a new Investigative Sergeant. Carry over of institutional knowledge about the work of the position.
- The current one-person isolated office is not recommended for mental health of staff per information gained at the national ICAC conference in 2019.
- All the investigators in this unit (except for ICAC) work outside of the Saint Paul Police Department; and have problems with logging into and using the SPPD's Records Management System (RMS) where they create some of their reports. This makes documentation for reports that should go into RMS difficult to complete.

Risk Management Considerations:

Safe Streets/Task Force Officer Unit

- Keeping a small span of control is important for this high risk/high reward environment.
- There is a high level of discretionary authority in these positions needs continual supervision and review.
- These positions have a high level of investigative expertise and the SPPD must manage the turnover in these units to keep institutional knowledge.

ICAC

- There is a lack of redundancy in ICAC for institutional knowledge or loss factor of current Investigative Sergeant due health, injury, etc.

- The mental and physical health of these positions is a concern due to the nature of the hours of work, stress levels created by the work, and work content, especially in ICAC.

Recommendations:

Safe Streets/Task Force Officer Unit

- Add back a U.S. Marshals Task Force officer after the body worn camera guidelines are established and are in alignment with SPPD policy.
- Add back a sixth officer position in the Safe Streets task force to have two (2) full teams of investigators.
- Improve the ability of outside task force officers to interface with the SPPD's RMS.

ICAC

- **Add one (1) Sergeant Investigator** in the ICAC section to reduce the average number of cases assigned to an investigator.
- Create office space for ICAC investigator(s) that is in alignment with the national ICAC guidelines.
- Move the ICAC Unit (positions) to the new unit recommendation for a Child Abuse Unit in the Major Crimes Division. This will get it into a span of control that is located within the same building as its commander and reduce dispersed span of control of the Safe Streets commander; and well within the span of control manageable by a new Child Abuse Unit commander.

Section 7.6 - Gang Unit/Gun Unit

The Gang Unit/Gun Unit has:

- The organizational structure shown in Figure 7.61;
- Seven (7) year personnel history from 2013-2018 shown in Table 7.61;
- Six (6) year caseloads and activity from 2013-2018 shown in Table 7.62;

The Gang Unit Commander reports to the Deputy Chief of Major Crimes.

Figure 7.61

Crime Types Assigned to Gangs/Gun Unit

- Violations of conditions of Permit to Purchase Firearm
- Violations of Permit to Carry Firearm
- BB Gun Incidents in Public Places
- Gang related crimes with firearm
    - Aggravated assaults
    - Homicides
    - Sexual assaults
    - Terroristic threats
    - Burglaries
    - Auto-thefts
    - VOCSL
    - Riot
    - Crime for the benefit of a gang
- Violations of Firearm Hardware
    - Short barreled shotguns
    - Altered serial numbers

Gang Unit Personnel 2013-2018

Table 7.61

Personnel Type	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Commander	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Sergeant	6	9	6	6	7	7	7
Officer	9	6	11	12	16	16	16
Office Assistant	0	1	0	0	1	1	1
Total Staff	**16**	**17**	**18**	**19**	**25**	**25**	**25**

RMS Caseload Data 2013-2018

Table 7.62

Gang Unit	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Total # of Cases Assigned	1391	1320	1516	1776	2089	1483
Total # of Cases Closed	1222	1335	1413	1698	1885	1451
# of Cases Per Investigator	**231**	**147**	**253**	**296**	**298**	**212**
Avg. Case Time (days) Closed Cases	**105**	**95**	**60**	**60**	**64**	**109**
Recommended Range of Cases Per Investigator Per Year	**87-139**	**96-154**	**152-243**	**152-243**	**143-228**	**83-133**
Cleared by Arrest	162	196	196	199	190	228
Declined	41	40	35	24	45	48
Noted	576	653	585	847	958	625
Other/Unk.	9	4	6	5	2	2
Unfounded	17	7	14	2	6	2
Recovered Property	56	61	71	125	102	83
Exceptional Clearance	1	0	0	0	8	0
Pended	358	371	504	493	572	463
TOT Other Agency	2	3	2	3	2	2
Total Booked for Crime	294	337	364	312	328	392
Cited for Crime	24	40	22	51	25	12
Juvenile Arrested Not Booked	3	4	6	2	1	0
Juvenile Booked at JDC	17	20	26	15	22	12

Data/Observations:
- The Gang/Gun Unit work is part of the Chief of Police's overall strategy to combat gun violence in the city.
- The Gun Unit is a sub-unit within the Gang Unit that reports to the overall unit Commander. The Gun Unit is comprised of four (4) Investigative Sergeants.
- An Investigative Sergeant and two (2) Officers are assigned to the Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms Task Force. These task force members are housed for some of their work hours with the Gang/Gun Unit and have other task force responsibilities outside of the

SPPD. This task force is attached to the Gang/Gun Unit due to their purpose in combating illegal gun possession and violence.

- This unit is an Investigations Driven unit due to the number of cases, types of cases, and time it takes to close the average case.
- The Gang/Gun Unit is part of the community engagement of the SPPD by its support of the G.R.I.P. program, which is a community-based program intervening with youth who are either in gangs currently or are in at-risk groups for gang recruitment.
- The Gang/Gun Unit is present at many community festivals each year where gang activity has historically occurred, or criminal intelligence is indicating gang activity may occur.
- Investigative cases handled by the Gang/Gun Unit have different origins, including:
  - Self-Initiated reports from work in criminal intelligence or community events.
  - Information reports written by police officers.
  - Aggravated Assault cases referred to the unit for investigation due to a gang nexus.
  - Robbery cases referred to the unit for investigation due to a gang nexus.
  - Homicide cases referred to the unit for investigation due to a gang nexus.
  - Drug or weapons cases referred to the unit for investigation due to a gang nexus.
- The Gang/Gun unit is called in to assist with about 50% of all homicide cases in the city.
- The Gun Unit is currently working at a very high level of functionality. Every person identified in a gun related case has contact made with them by a case investigator.
- The Tour II (daytime) shift staff of the general Gang Unit has one (1) Investigative Sergeant and four (10) Officers.
- The Tour III (afternoon) shift staff of the general Gang Unit has one (1) Investigative Sergeant and four (6) officers.
- The Gang/Gun Unit sees a lot of overlap in their investigations and the case work they do with F.O.R.C.E. and Homicide.
- The unit has a high level of responsibility for criminal intelligence gathering and dissemination without dedicated staff for this function.
- Additional overtime spent by the Gang/Gun Unit is attached to the Homicide Unit budget of the SPPD.

Risk Management Considerations:

- The SPPD must always ensure this is a high functioning unit due to its importance to the prevention, detection, and intervention in Gang activity in Saint Paul. A break-down in the Gang/Gun Unit's functionality would have a negative impact on the quality of life in the community.

- Assuring accountability to supervision is critical to the legitimacy of the Gang/Gun Unit. Poor performance due to a lack of supervision would greatly hinder the ability of this unit to continue to function in the high discretionary fashion in which it currently operates – which is also a strength of the unit.
- High levels of accountability for "buy funds" needs to be continually monitored.
- The SPPD must ensure administrative oversight that the criminal intelligence gathering done by this unit does not become profiling or "guilty by association."
- Criminal intelligence information that is gathered by this unit must not be allowed to be ignored or lost due to a lack of resources for packaging it for dissemination.

Recommendations:

- One (1) Investigative Sergeant position should be added as an administrative sergeant to the Commander. This will allow to manage the larger than normal span of control and operations of the unit.
- The FORCE Unit staff should have one (1) Investigative Sergeant and four (4) Officers from the current unit merged into the Gang Unit Tour III staff; thus, expanding the Gang Unit Tour III to a second working group of one (1) Investigative Sergeant and four (4) Officers.
- The expanded Tour III staff should work opposite sides of the schedule to cover all seven (7) days of the week until 0200 or 0300 hours each morning with one (1) Investigative Sergeant and four (4) Officers. This will provide the SPPD the ability to have staffing available for an "initial investigative response team."
- The Tour III staff should be trained and constituted formally as an **"Initial Investigative Response Team"** for shooting scenes which are classified as:
    - Aggravated Assaults
    - Attempted Homicides
    - Homicides
- The **"Initial Investigative Response Team"** will be positioned to handle the interior initial evidence collection and scene preservation, victim/witness interviews, and criminal intelligence development. This team will determine whether a case should be packaged and delivered to the Violent Crimes Against Persons/Robbery/Homicide/Crime Lab units; or to assist those units if circumstances dictate that they should response to the scene for further immediate in-depth investigations. This will also alleviate the burden on Patrol Division operations for committing a high level of resources to preserve these scenes.
- The overtime and general supply budget of the Gang Unit should be re-examined to better reflect the fiscal resources to sustain this unit given the level of involvement they have in so many cases involving violent crime.

Section 7.7 - Juvenile Unit – Major Crimes Division

The Sex Crimes Unit has:

- The organizational structure shown in Figure 7.71;
- Seven (7) year personnel history from 2013-2019 shown in Table 7.71;
- Six (6) year caseloads and activity from 2013-2018 shown in Table 7.72;

The Juvenile Unit Commander reports to the Deputy Chief of Major Crimes.

Figure 7.71

Crime Types Assigned to the Juvenile Unit

1. All Misdemeanors involving juvenile offenders
2. All Gross Misdemeanors involving juvenile offenders
3. All Felonies involving juvenile offenders
4. Fifth Degree Sexual Assault cases involving juvenile offenders

Juvenile crimes not investigated by Juvenile Unit:

1. *Homicide*
2. *Sex Crimes*
3. *Child Abuse (with juvenile offender)*
4. *Burglaries*
5. *DUI*

Gang Unit Personnel 2013-2018

Table 7.71

Personnel Type	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Commander	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Sergeant	9	9	9	7	9	9	7
Officer	4	4	4	4	3	2	1
Clerk	1	2	1	1	1	1	1
Total Staff	**15**	**16**	**15**	**13**	**14**	**14**	**10**

Table 7.72

Juvenile Unit	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Total # of Cases	4679	3830	3651	3502	3229	3962
# of Cases Per Investigator	**425**	**348**	**331**	**389**	**294**	**396**
Avg. Case Time (days) Closed Cases	**21**	**22**	**35**	**36**	**28**	**113**
Recommended Range of Cases Per Investigator Per Year	**434-695**	**416-663**	**261-417**	**254-406**	**326-521**	**81-129**
Cleared by Arrest	970	730	606	594	437	805
Declined	23	47	74	75	77	208
Noted	522	439	298	339	275	318
Other/Unk.	5	5	11	6	8	11
Unfounded	13	13	11	18	18	26
Recovered Property	17	8	8	7	11	8
Exceptional Clearance	352	376	299	201	233	295
Located Missing Person	2386	1919	2000	1877	1788	2020
Pended	377	285	336	360	357	256
TOT Other Agency	14	8	8	25	25	15
Total Booked for Crime	167	163	150	105	147	257
Cited for Crime	213	129	148	130	91	116
Juvenile Arrested Not Booked	617	508	294	189	145	198
Juvenile Booked at JDC	509	447	389	381	274	463

A subset of cases embedded within the overall number of cases handled by the Juvenile Unit is Missing Persons/Runaways. These events include adult cases (for Missing Persons) and are investigated by an

Officer rank investigator assigned to these specific types of cases. This subset of case data is shown below in Table 7.73.

Table 7.73

Juvenile Unit Missing Persons/Runaway Cases	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Total # of Cases	2185	2046	2370	1959	1946	2135

Data/Observations:

- Staff report a high level of teamwork among co-workers within the unit.
- Unit staff appreciate getting investigators who transfer-in from other units as they add new dimensions to their investigative capabilities; including staff from Sex Crimes, Gangs, and other specialty units.
- Juvenile cases require specific time lines in many instances that need to be followed; necessitating substantial attention from an investigator in the hours and days just after a juvenile is arrested.
- The study found through auditing that other Major Crimes units that have responsibility for investigating some juvenile crimes (*listed at the top of this section*) do not properly keep the Juvenile Criminal Histories database up to date.
- The actual average number of cases per investigator is within the range of the recommended range of cases per investigator in two (2) of the last three (3) years.
- In 2018, caseloads were noticeably outside the recommended range of cases per investigator due to the longer Average Time (days) to Closed Case number.
- Juvenile cases require additional staff time per case due to the involvement of parents.
- The majority of crimes the unit currently investigates are Robbery and Auto Theft.
- The number of felony cases investigated prevents staff working with parents of troubled children they have identified as needing their assistance; or spending a lot of time discussing referrals to Ramsey County services that may assist them.
- Due to workloads, staff are unable to attend community events that would be beneficial to help address juvenile issues.
- In March 2019, the School Resource Officer (SRO's) program was removed from the Juvenile Unit and placed within the Community Outreach Unit of the Community Engagement Division. Staff said this has reduced their "eyes and ears" in the schools to better assist juveniles who are having issues.
- The removal of the SRO program from the Juvenile Unit reduced the span of control for the unit commander as it removed nine (9) sworn staff from the unit.
- Policy changes in the Saint Paul Public Schools has reduced by 60-70% the number of cases they handle where children have been cited or arrested in school environments.

- The Juvenile Unit participates in the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative coordinating committee which involves community, school, and justice partners to change policies and increase diversion for juvenile offenders.
- The Juvenile Unit sees the effect of Saint Paul Schools policy changes where school staff are now handling many juvenile crimes through diversion process handled directly by the school system.
- Cases handled by the Juvenile Unit that transfer to a diversion process are mostly lesser offenses referred to Youth Services Bureau (YSB); however, there is concern about YSB's ability to continue to sustain this work due to cuts to YSB staffing.
- Staff numbers of Sergeant Investigators has remained at around the eight (8) investigator over time.
- Staff numbers historically included three (3) Missing Persons/Runaway Officers who function in the role of investigators. In the last 2 years, that number fell to two (2) officers and now stands at only one (1) officer. This staff loss was due to transfers to other units and replacements have not yet occurred.
- The number of cases of Missing Persons has remained steady in a range from 1946-2370 over the six (6) year period, while criminal juvenile offenses have decreased from 2013-2018.
- The number of cases being handled by the current one (1) Missing Persons/Runaway Officer is far beyond the ability or scope of one person to manage. There is a universal belief by unit staff that three (3) Missing Persons/Runaway Officers are necessary due to the volume of these type of cases.

Risk Management Considerations:

- Continued assessment of caseloads; if the caseload average continues to trend outside of the recommended range, the need to add additional investigators must be reviewed.
- Lack of crime specialization among investigators may lend itself to inefficiencies.
- The SPPD should monitor the concern about the communication linkage between the School Resource Officers and Juvenile investigators due to the separation of these two staff groups under the March 2019 reorganization.
- The number of cases under the Missing Persons/Runaway classification is consistent from year to year and exposes the SPPD to criticism for the lack of investigative staff currently assigned to these cases.
- Out of date juvenile criminal histories from units outside of Juvenile Unit can create a lack of accurate data for Juvenile investigators when making case decisions.

Recommendations:

- **Add two (2) Officers to Missing Persons/Runaway** investigations for a total of three (3) consistently assigned to this responsibility.
- Work on a communication linkage between Juvenile Unit investigators and SRO's in Saint Paul Public Schools. *Note: The removal of the SRO function from Juvenile had the positive affect of*

reducing the Juvenile Unit commander's span of control. It also placed the SRO's in a unit where the focus is outreach versus enforcement which is also complimentary to the goals of what the Saint Paul Schools want from our SRO program given school district policy objectives.

- Increase compliance with keeping the juvenile criminal history database updated by other Major Crimes unit investigators.

Section 7.8 – Narcotics/Human Trafficking/Criminal Proceeds Unit (NHTCP) - Major Crimes Division

The NHTCP Unit has:

- The organizational structure shown in Figure 7.81;
- Seven (7) year personnel history from 2013-2019 shown in Table 7.81;
- Six (6) year caseloads and activity from 2013-2018 shown in Tables 7.82 & 7.83;

The Narcotics/Vice Commander reports to the Deputy Chief of Major Crimes.

Figure 7.81

Narcotics/Vice Personnel 2013-2019

Table 7.81

Personnel Type	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Commander	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Sergeant	6	7	7	7	7	6	7
Officer	10	12	12	12	12	14	14
Clerical/Analysis	1	1	1	1	1	2	2
Total Staff	**18**	**21**	**21**	**21**	**21**	**23**	**24**

RMS Caseload Data 2013-2018 - Crime Data - Narcotics

Table 7.82

Narcotics	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Total # of Cases	1162	732	1050	812	881	1041
# of Cases Per Investigator					**98**	**116**
Avg. Case Time (days) Closed Cases	**113**	**215**	**202**	**143**	**146**	**262**
Recommended Range of Cases Per Investigator Per Year					**63-100**	**35-56**
Cleared by Arrest	648	432	622	479	493	728
Declined	159	71	85	85	66	119
Noted	100	87	132	51	83	314
Other/Unk.	10	1	4	6	5	4
Unfounded	0		1	2	2	2
Recovered Property	35	26	29	49	61	71
Exceptional Clearance	0	1	1	1	1	1
Pended	194	106	153	113	139	75
TOT Other Agency	16	8	23	26	31	10
Total Booked for Crime	1073	632	870	690	646	829
Cited for Crime	237	159	182	100	125	199
Juvenile Arrested Not Booked	3	7	2	0	0	2
Juvenile Booked at JDC	6	3	0	6	1	0

Table 7.83

Vice Unit	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Total # of Cases	264	225	98	101	143	138
# of Cases Per Investigator					**36**	**35**
Avg. Case Time (days) Closed Cases	**105**	**91**	**222**	**214**	**168**	**133**
Recommended Range of Cases Per Investigator Per Year					**54-87**	**69-110**
Cleared by Arrest	128	22	33	45	71	75
Declined	8	7	1	1	7	2
Noted	19	104	21	10	11	14
Other/Unk.	1	2	4	0	1	1
Unfounded	6	0	1	0	2	1
Recovered Property	1	0	0	0	0	25
Exceptional Clearance	1	0	0	0	0	0
Located Missing Person	0	1	0	0	1	0
Pended	40	26	22	29	35	25
TOT Other Agency	60	63	16	16	15	20
Total Booked for Crime	105	21	31	32	48	29
Cited for Crime	45	44	2	17	33	69
Juvenile Arrested Not Booked	7	1	0	4	0	0
Juvenile Booked at JDC	1	0	0	3	0	3

Data/Observations:

- The Narcotics/Human Trafficking/Criminal Proceeds Unit (NHTCP) is three interconnected operations that serve to approach organized drug and human trafficking cases from five (5) different disciplines.
- Narcotics: Two (2) Sergeants and four (4) Officers are assigned to this subset of the larger NHTCP Unit. These sworn staff members are responsible for working local Saint Paul/Ramsey County drug cases. They are officially a part of the Ramsey County Violent Crime Enforcement Team (VCET). They sometimes work together as part of cases involving the County Sheriff's Office or suburban agencies that are also a part of this team but spend the majority of their time working on Saint Paul specific drug cases of mid-level or higher echelon drug trafficking operations.
- Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Task Force/Homeland Security Investigations (HSI): One (1) Sergeant and four (4) Officers are assigned to the DEA Task Force and one (1) Sergeant assigned to HSI are networked with federal assets and other agencies across the Midwest to combat drug trafficking operations moving across international and state lines.
- Human Trafficking Task Force: One (1) Sergeant, one (1) Research Analyst, and two (2) Officers are assigned to this subset which is housed at the Minnesota BCA and is part of a state-wide Human Trafficking task force. Being a part of this task force allows our staff to investigate and enforce prostitution and human trafficking laws anywhere in the state.
- SPPD of Safety and Inspections (DSI): (1) Sergeant who is the SPPD point of contact for all related issues at City of Saint Paul DSI.
- The NHTCP Unit has evolved over time. Before 2010, Narcotics was a standalone unit, as was our traditional Vice Unit. With the advent of a more sophisticated understanding of human trafficking, the nexus of forensic accounting in law enforcement, and shifting patterns in drug trafficking, the modern unit is more sophisticated in its investigative techniques.
- An internal estimate by NHTCP staff indicated that these unit functions could grow by 50% due to the amount of criminal activity occurring in their areas of expertise. However, NHTCP is self-moderating and typically only takes on the work that it can handle. Thus, not making expansion necessary to be successful as an operation.
- The crime data in the above charts is not complete due to multiple systems in use both at the Federal, State, and City level. These statistics are good "snapshots" but are not meant to be complete.
- The partnerships with Minnesota BCA, DEA, and HSI are good fiscal relationships as these task force relationships provide staff vehicles, covering of overtime costs, cell phones/computers, and other equipment purchases to the partnership for SPPD.
- The majority of prosecutable cases brought to the Federal system through the local task forces are from Saint Paul Police NHTCP investigators.
- A partnership opportunity with DEA in their prescription drug task force is available to the SPPD with the same offering of cars, overtime, and equipment for participation. So far, the SPPD has not participated due to staffing issues.

- The asset with the most unique qualities in this group is the Criminal Proceeds sub-unit. These three (3) sworn staff are all certified forensic accountants and can develop financial intelligence on cases that previously the SPPD was unable to ascertain through traditional law enforcement investigations. The concern in this unit is the need for legacy training for people who would be hired into these positions in the future as the work is specialized in nature.
- Saint Paul has become a hub for distribution of many different types of narcotics (including methamphetamine, heroin). This is a departure from previous decades where the Saint Paul and surrounding area was a "destination" for drugs to be sold. However, Saint Paul now is seen by drug trafficking operations as a place where drugs are brought to and then sent out in a distribution network into Wisconsin, the Dakotas, northern Minnesota, and Canada.

Risk Management Considerations:

- For the Commander position, it is important to have someone with experience at the command level due to complexities of this position.
- Set certain length of time that a person serves in NHTCP; regular rotation of staff starting at the 5-year mark as this is an excellent unit to develop staff. Lack of rotation reduces opportunities for other staff to have exposure to these types of investigative responsibilities.
- Internal and external inspections of unit data unit must be done to ensure that there is no abuse of the discretionary authority of persons inside the unit.
- Legacy planning for replacement of Criminal Proceeds sworn staff.

Recommendations:

- Commander position should be rotated every 3-5 years. Fresh perspectives on these critical operations is necessary for continuing success.
- Develop a legacy plan that identifies replacement employees for the Criminal Proceeds staff along with formal training and field experience to prepare them for taking on these positions.
- Evaluate the opportunity to provide a sworn officer to become a member of the DEA's prescription drug task force.

Section 7.9 – District Investigations (Western, Central, and Eastern District)

The District Investigations Units have:

- The organizational structure shown in Figure 7.91;
- Seven (7) year personnel history from 2013-2019 shown in Table 7.91;
- Six (6) year caseloads and activity from 2013-2018 shown in Table 7.92 – 7.94;
- Each District Investigations Unit operates within the Patrol Operations Division and are physically located within each Patrol District office.

Each District Investigative Commander reports to their respective District's Senior Commander.

Figure 7.91

District Investigations Personnel 2013-2019

Table 7.91

Personnel Type	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Commander (East, Central, West)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Sergeant (East)	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Sergeant (Central)	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Sergeant (West)	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
Total Staff	**7**	**7**	**7**	**7**	**7**	**7**	**8**

Table 7.92

Central District Investigations	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Total # of Cases Assigned	4758	4222	4355	3915	4360	3803
# of Cases Per Investigator	**2379**	**2111**	**2177**	**1957**	**2180**	**1915**
Avg. Case Time (days) Closed Cases	**50**	**48**	**14**	**17**	**17**	**36**
Recommended Range of Cases Per Investigator Per Year	**182-292**	**190-304**	**652-1042**	**536-859**	**537-859**	**253-405**
Cleared by Arrest	1640	1296	1180	881	1071	748
Declined	13	26	28	29	15	16
Noted	1402	634	833	929	914	849
Other/Unk.	31	226	6	31	13	2
Unfounded	16	43	18	13	9	14
Recovered Property	191	197	223	132	152	202
Exceptional Clearance	10	0	0	13	1	0
Pended	1776	1245	1178	1570	1554	1430
TOT Other Agency	17	8	4	49	17	26
Total Booked for Crime	1185	954	920	677	814	717
Cited for Crime	718	354	310	259	301	216
Juvenile Arrested Not Booked	33	2	3	1	6	18
Juvenile Booked at JDC	15	4	3	5	4	25

Table 7.93

East District Investigations	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Total # of Cases Assigned	4272	3722	3848	3705	4506	3437
# of Cases Per Investigator	**2136**	**1861**	**1924**	**1852**	**2253**	**1718**
Avg. Case Time (days) Closed Cases	**18**	**17**	**15**	**14**	**42**	**47**
Recommended Range of Cases Per Investigator Per Year	**506-811**	**536-858**	**608-973**	**652-1042**	**217-348**	**194-311**
Cleared by Arrest	1235	985	1037	837	716	990
Declined	10	22	33	22	32	23
Noted	612	567	661	841	1074	611
Other/Unk.	4	15	7	4	5	1
Unfounded	11	21	13	7	13	8
Recovered Property	170	159	157	136	98	239
Exceptional Clearance	0	6	0	0	5	0
Pended	1541	1393	1427	1369	1322	1683
TOT Other Agency	37	18	46	38	63	125
Total Booked for Crime	998	908	887	749	666	871
Cited for Crime	373	162	187	101	107	173
Juvenile Arrested Not Booked	12	19	21	1	2	2
Juvenile Booked at JDC	4	2	1	3	3	2

Table 7.94

West Investigations	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Total # of Cases	4801	4486	4607	4479	5357	4613
# of Cases Per Investigator	**2400**	**2243**	**2303**	**2239**	**2678**	**2306**
Avg. Case Time (days) Closed Cases	**39**	**35**	**51**	**32**	**67**	**66**
Recommended Range of Cases Per Investigator Per Year	**233-374**	**261-417**	**179-286**	**285-456**	**136-218**	**138-221**
Cleared by Arrest	1227	902	904	700	1242	1287
Declined	29	14	33	25	29	25
Noted	817	678	956	921	852	670
Other/Unk.	0	0	0	13	6	10
Unfounded	27	10	22	26	16	26
Recovered Property	233	139	171	178	242	408
Exceptional Clearance	0	2	3	2	5	14
Pended	2454	2725	2501	2578	2930	2168
TOT Other Agency	14	16	17	36	33	5
Total Booked for Crime	723	739	717	639	714	651
Cited for Crime	739	364	356	237	624	678
Juvenile Arrested Not Booked	15	12	4	11	2	4
Juvenile Booked at JDC	7	2	4	2	0	1

Data/Observations:

- District investigative units handle all other cases not managed by special units.
- Many in-custody arrests at the misdemeanor level are handled by district investigators.
- Unit investigators try to establish rapport with new patrol officers and teach them the basics of what is needed to make for good report taking for investigative follow up.
- Investigators find differing quality in reports they review generated by Officers, poorer quality reports make follow up investigations difficult to conduct.
- Most cases handled are property crimes such as Theft and Property Damage; but also include Trespassing, Loitering, Obstruction of Legal Process, Harassment, etc. These units also handle these and other cases from Misdemeanor to Felony levels.

- Historically district investigations are Hold Book driven units and manage high volumes of cases every day.
- Each district investigative unit greatly exceeds the recommended case range.
- Unit investigators constantly find themselves well outside their ability to pay special attention to many cases due to the lack of time available to them.
- In 2019, the SPPD instituted an on-line crime reporting Investigative Sergeant. This is a brand-new position and data is just beginning to be collected. At the time of this report, approximately 2,000 cases have already been reviewed through this system.

Risk Management Considerations:

- The high volume of cases being managed by district investigators raises a concern for quality control.
- Employee wellness is a concern for investigators who are in this high-volume environment long-term.
- The lack of quality control of reports being approved by supervisors is a concern due to the additional work needed to be done by investigators to create an effective case for investigation.
- On-line reporting creates a new stream of information and expectations from members of the community that will need to be monitored.

Recommendations:

- **Add two (2) Sergeant Investigators** to each District Investigative Unit to reduce the high-volume caseload per investigator (this is in addition to the recommendation to transfer Burglary investigations to district investigations).
- Address quality control of report writing through training and managerial oversight.
- In 2020, evaluate the effectiveness and re-directed workflow from other investigative units that occurs from the establishment of the on-line reporting function.

Section 8.0 - General Overall Recommendations for Major Crimes Division

The following section will cover:

- **General recommendations for Major Crimes Division**
- **Additional command staff member**
- **Adding Criminal Intelligence unit**

Recommendations:

Section 8.1 – General Recommendations for all Major Crimes Units

- **Creation of an investigative rubric/decision chart** for each investigative unit. This initiative should be supported by SPPD administration to decide the process for all incoming cases a unit receives. A current major stress in investigative units is the time and resources spent on cases with a lack of solvability factors; as standards vary department-wide for investigative units. This puts investigators in the position of having to use their own varying level of experience or level of relationship with a victim to close a case with no real solvability factors. Standardized rubrics/decision charts will create continuity, standardization, clearer paths to pending cases with no solvability, and provide more investigator time to solve cases with solvability factors.
- Investment in transcription services for statements of victims and suspects. An inordinate amount of time is wasted across the SPPD by investigators who work to write paraphrased or fully transcribed statements into their reports. This is an enormous problem that can be fully remedied by either hiring transcriptionists as SPPD employees or as a third-party service.
- The SPPD needs to continuously monitor the amount/volume of cases sent to investigators as an employee health issue and quality control issue. The number of cases the average investigator handles within a year period is very high and volume outstrips their ability to do quality work on all the cases assigned to them. This will also serve the community by more effective investigations that will hold offenders accountable, reduce future victimization, and restore victims of crime.

Section 8.2 - Proposed Additional Units/Command Staff

- **Criminal Intelligence Unit:** The Saint Paul Police Department, along with law enforcement agencies nationwide, has experienced large changes in how investigations are conducted over the past decade. Some factors include:
  - Use of social media communication tool
  - Widespread use of smart phones
  - Universal access and use of computers
  - Access to the "dark web" for criminal enterprise
  - Smart technologies available for consumers
  - Common use of public and private video cameras and surveillance video recordings
  - Body worn cameras and in-car cameras used by law enforcement

- Computer forensic technology
- Concerns about foreign and domestic terrorism
- Increase in forensic technology for law enforcement
- Public expectations about police use of technology to solve crime

For these reasons, it is important for the Saint Paul Police SPPD to adapt its business practices around the use available technology and build a strengthened competency around gathering and disbursing criminal intelligence. The SPPD has developed, at times in the past and present, excellent criminal intelligence data to hold offenders accountable and prevent further criminal activity in the community. A repeated theme has been observed in the interviews with investigative units about the need to provide more coordinated efforts around criminal intelligence. The following is a proposal to address this need.

This report is recommending a resource to address system-wide resources for data mining, relationship mapping, crime mapping, information bulletins, and video analysis. The recommendation of this report is for the formation of a **Criminal Intelligence Unit**. Unit functionality would include:

- 24 hour video surveillance using the CCTV Unit as a sub-unit of Criminal Intelligence
- 16 hours per day of Sergeant level supervision of the activities of the unit
- 16 hours per day intelligence analysis done by on-sight analysts
- Crime mapping for emerging and long-term issues
- Video analysis
- Relationship mapping
- Daily bulletins covering violent offenders, gun violence, and career criminals currently active in the community.
- The addition of a Criminal Intelligence Unit will provide a 24-hour amenity to investigations, special event planning and operations, and Patrol Division daily operations.
- Have physical space and operating procedures to accommodate liaisons from different units of the SPPD, with dedicated space and a working relationship with liaisons from:
    - Homicide Unit
    - Narcotics Unit
    - Special Operations Unit
    - Gang unit
    - Violent Crimes Against Persons

Figure 8.21   **Criminal Intelligence Unit Organizational Chart**

As part of this proposal the following FTE additions/changes are proposed to occur:

Current FTE Position Shifts:

- 2 Civilian analysts would move from the Technology Unit to the Intelligence Unit.
- 1 Sergeant from CCTV/Video Management would move to the CCTV arm of the Intelligence Unit.
- 3 Officer position from the FORCE Unit to the Intelligence Unit.
- 4 Officer positions from CCTV/Video Management would move back into other existing Officer rank positions in the SPPD; then add 6 civilian CCTV Technicians to create a 24-hour functionality for our camera network for all Patrol and Investigative operations.

Additional FTE Positions:

- **1 Civilian Analyst position**
- **6 CCTV analysts/technicians**
- **1 Clerical Position**

Table 8.21   **Criminal Intelligence Unit Staffing (Proposed)**

Personnel Type	2013
Commander	1
Sergeant	3
Officer	6
Clerical	1
Civ. CCTV Technicians	6
Civilian Analyst	3
Total Staff	**20**

Section 8.3 - Proposal for Director of Strategic Criminal Intelligence and Investigations

This study recommends a Director of Strategic Criminal Intelligence and Investigations for the Saint Paul Police Department. The Director will oversee operations of the Major Crimes units that deal with higher profile cases and ensure cross-unit coordination to maximize the SPPD's ability to react to emerging problems and complex cases.

- o It is proposed to establish this position as a Senior Commander level position to supervise five (5) units of the Major Crimes Division (as proposed under the reorganization of Homicide) into multiple units:
  - Homicide
  - Robbery/Kidnapping
  - Violent Crimes Against Persons
  - Gang Unit
  - Criminal Intelligence Unit.
- o The position is necessary for the following reasons:
  - The growing complex nature of investigations
  - The potential and real phenomena of organizational silos that are often inadvertently created
  - More direct oversight at the administrative level to ensure multiple unit resources are being properly distributed in emerging or long-term crime problems.
  - A direct contact with community members and groups who have concerns or the ability to connect information to investigative units about cases being investigated.

Figure 8.31   Proposed Span of Control of the Director of Strategic Criminal Intelligence & Investigations

Support Services and Administration Division Data Analysis 2019

Section 9.0 - Introduction

The scope of this section of the study is to accomplish the following:

- **Describe unit and staff workloads**
- **Describe unit organization**
- **Describe unit staffing levels**
- **Identify workflow and structural problems**
- **Identify recommendations for process, workflow, and staffing issues or further research needed**

Section 9.1 – Division Organization

This section covers the Saint Paul Police Department's Support Services Division. The Division is led by a Deputy Chief, Executive Officer (Sergeant), and shares a 0.5 FTE Office Assistant. The administrative team is responsible for the management of the division as shown below in Figure 9.1.

Figure 9.1 shows the division organization flow chart.

Figure 9.1

Section 9.2 - Employee Assistance Program

The Employee Assistance Program (EAP) consists of one (1) Sergeant rank program coordinator and is assisted by a cadre of contracted psychologists working on a fee for service basis with our EAP program; and a group of volunteer Peer Counselors who are SPPD members. The purpose and function of EAP promotes the mental and emotional well-being of SPPD employees and their families by providing EAP services and health education. The EAP follows strict confidentiality standards.

The EAP Director reports to the Deputy Chief of Support Services. Table 9.21 shows a six (6) year budget history of the unit.

Table 9.21 - Referral Data
KEY:

- (A) TOTAL referrals: all personal/agencies mandated and voluntary EAP utilization
- (B) SWORN voluntary: SPPD sworn voluntary EAP utilization only
- % SWORN: percent of SPPD sworn voluntary EAP utilization

*See "A" and "B" data below

Year	Total Referral -Type A	Total Referrals-Type B	% of Sworn Staff Referrals
2014*	90	47	UNK
2015	119	69	Data not kept
2016	163	86	15
2017	180	105	18
2018	160	106	18
2019**	96	67	18

*Partial data for 2014; *Sergeant assigned as EAP Director mid-year 2014;**Data is only for 6 months for 2019

Data/Observations:

- EAP services are available to all employees (sworn and civilian) and their household family members.
- Currently, SPPD has a voluntary EAP utilization by sworn personal at 18% or approximately 1-in-5. For all industries, the national average EAP utilization is 3–6% [29].
- EAP Services include:
    - 24-hour availability
    - Private coaching from the EAP Director
    - Professional counseling services with contracted licensed mental health professionals/therapists

- o Critical Incident response
- o Support and/or referral to other resources as appropriate from the EAP Director or Peer Support Team members

- The EAP Director is a sergeant who may or may not be a clinician/therapist. *Note: Therapists are licensed by the State and may provide therapeutic counseling and/or therapy. The interactions that a non-clinician EAP Director provides could be described as coaching.*
- The EAP Director oversees the police SPPD's Peer Support Team. The EAP Director is assisted in this role by a peer support team member who has been designated as the Peer Team Coordinator. The Peer Team Coordinator is permitted to use up to 10% of his or her worktime towards these duties.
- Peer Support Team members are volunteers to who have regular assignments within the police SPPD and their own chain of command. When participating in peer support team related duties, they are encouraged to consult the EAP Director or Peer Support Team Coordinator as needed.
- The only data shared by EAP is general information about the number of requests for EAP service.

Types of Officer Distress Categories as classified by EAP (28)

Officers can experience a wide range of mental and emotional distress throughout their career. This distress can often be sorted into one of three categories, with the understanding that sometimes there are interrelated or co-occurring problems. The three categories can be used to organize an agency's thinking about officer distress and how best to respond, as well as actions to take to prevent some problems.

1. Critical Incidents and Traumatic Events are work-related events that temporarily overwhelm coping mechanisms.
2. General Mental and Emotional Distress are the range of psychological problems that all humans may suffer.
3. Behavioral Health Crisis is a loss of psychological function required to do the work.

- Note about EAP data and utilization: Data regarding EAP use is stored on an *Iron Key* remote hard drive with no connection to the SPPD or other network. The contents of *Iron Key* can only be accessed by the current EAP Director and requires his finger print/swipe. The names of people who have requested EAP services are deleted after one year. There is no printed information that includes names or other identifying data. Furthermore, it is not the EAP Unit's goal that utilization reaches 100%. Not all staff need EAP services; however, all staff can benefit from EAP outreach, education and confidence in a high functioning EAP. Increase utilization can be viewed as a positive indication that help is being sought for mental and emotional distress, and that the EAP Unit and the services it provides are accessible, trustworthy and beneficial. However, increase EAP utilization could also be related to increased stress or other factors. (two end notes)

Risk Management Considerations:

- The SPPD has a long history of an EAP that is confidential for employees and their families. Law enforcement personnel frequently deal in disorder as part of their duties, they need stable ground on which to stand. Due to the stressors of police work, this type of service that is confidential, is tailored to the needs of police officers and their loved ones, and can be immediately accessed is essential for members of the SPPD.
- On-call status of EAP director is 24/7. There is no relief factor built into this position.

Recommendations:

- Continue the EAP Function within the SPPD with a sworn director/coordinator.
- Create a back-up system of on-call relief for the EAP director.
- Merge the EAP function and Peer Support function into a unit with the COAST Unit (listed in Section 10 of this study) under the title of Behavioral Health Services Unit.

Section 9.3 - Fleet and Radio Services Unit

The Fleet and Radio Services Unit has:

- The organizational structure shown in Figure 9.31;
- Current personnel history is shown in Table 9.31;

The Fleet Sergeant reports to the Deputy Chief of Support Services and Administration.

Figure 9.31

Table 9.3

Personnel Type	# of Staff
Sergeant-Fleet Manager	1
Civilian Radio Shop Manager	1
Radio Technicians	5
Office Assistant III Clerical	1
Total Staff **(Full-Time)**	8

Data/Observations:

- The Saint Paul Police Department has a fleet of 550 vehicles. The vehicles are assigned to individual units. Maintenance and repairs to vehicles is managed by the Fleet and Radio Services Sergeant.
- The SPPD vehicle fleet is comprised of marked (black and white) squad cars and unmarked vehicles.
- Each year, Fleet and Radio Services introduces about 30 marked patrol cars, 3 Sergeant Patrol cars, 3 Investigator cars, and 3 Commander cars into the fleet.
- The average front line squad is driven over 3,000 miles per month.
- The Fleet manager is responsible for supervising the build-out of all cars for use in patrol and investigations.
- The Fleet manager coordinates the repair of all "crashed vehicles" that need repair from either the public safety garage (city department) or from an external vendor; including covering the repair costs of other vehicles where SPPD is at-fault for the accident as the City of Saint Paul is self-bonded for insurance.
- SPPD fleet vehicles are driven to very high mileage levels due to two (2) years where the SPPD did not buy cars; thus creating an inability to rotate the fleet properly.
- SPPD is currently keeping front line squads in use over the 100,000 mile mark.
- Many back up cars have over 100,000 miles and repairs are very costly.
- Large training events (e.g.; Emergency Vehicle Training) place a large stress on the fleet, as front-line squads must be taken out of the Patrol Districts to accommodate these training sessions.
- The Sergeant/Fleet Manager is responsible for:
  - Fleet rotation
  - Ordering of new cars
  - Performs administrative functions for forfeited and abandoned vehicles at the Impound Lot.
  - Creating replacement vehicle plans
  - Supervise the Radio Services staff
  - Working with the Public Safety Garage mechanics on SPPD squad repairs and maintenance
  - Dealing with body shop repair vendors
  - Performs administrative functions with dealerships holding master state vehicle purchasing contacts.

Risk Management Considerations:

- The SPPD has an aging fleet of vehicles which presents concerns in rising costs of older vehicle maintenance, performance issues of emergency vehicles, and the lack of updated safety features. Newer vehicles will provide more safety for employees and community members.

- The volume of work placed on one manager of fleet operations, reduces the opportunities for maximizing the value of the resale, scrap value, and vehicle turn around due to only one person managing all fleet business operations.

Recommendations:

- Consider replacing the sworn fleet manager position with a civilian fleet management specialist.
- Continue with the Fleet function within the SPPD. The size and scope of the work integrates very specialized fleet needs that requires the coordination of multiple departmental units (Fleet/Radio Services, Range Staff, Technology, and Video Management) to integrate all the elements of a police squad car: radios, long gun systems, in-car camera, and squad laptops.
- **Add one** civilian fleet management specialist to process all vehicle turnover issues.
- Eliminate vehicles from the fleet that have over 100,000 miles due to condition and repair costs associated with them. The SPPD passes a price point between depreciating value (resale) and repairs costs at this point.
- Expand budget to maintain a tiered fleet approach:
  - Front line squads – first year of operation
  - Secondary squads – second year of operation
  - Tertiary squads – back up squads in 3-5 years of operation (not past 100,000 miles)

Section 9.4 – Training Unit

The Training Unit has:

- The organizational structure shown in Figure 9.41;
- Seven (7) year personnel history from 2013-20198 shown in Table 9.41;

The Training Unit Commander reports to the Deputy Chief of Support Services and Administration.

Figure 9.41   **Training Unit**

Training Unit Personnel 2013-2018

Table 9.41

Personnel Type	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Commander	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Sergeant	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
Officer	2	2	2	6	8	8	7
Civilian	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Total Staff	**10**	**10**	**10**	**14**	**16**	**16**	**15**

Data/Observations:

- The Training Unit has the following responsibilities:
    - **POST Board Compliance:** Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) Board is a state licensing authority which requires the SPPD to maintain records for all licensure related classes sworn staff attends inside or outside the agency that are accredited for POST education credits for retention of licensed peace officer status in Minnesota. It is the responsibility of the Training Unit to have accurate record keeping for all SPPD Officers and for all training offered by SPPD.
    - **Professional Development Institute:** Provides training to SPPD staff and to outside law enforcement officers, which includes a catalog of year-round classes with a fee structure for outside agency attendees.
    - **New Officer Academy:** This function typically occurs once per year for a term of 4-5 months for new hire officer candidates. It is a 40 hour per week curriculum for the entire academy term. Between 20-40 new officers attend one academy per year.
    - **RRA Training:** This is a quarterly training curriculum that all sworn officers must attend to review and learn the latest updates to use of force laws, techniques, and policy.
    - **CIT Program:** The Crisis Intervention Training (CIT) program is a 40-hour program that is taught to all new Officers and is provided to existing staff at regular intervals.
    - **EVOC Program:** Emergency Vehicle Operation Course is a state mandated program provided to new officers and existing sworn staff to improve and maintain vehicle handling skills.
    - **Field Training Officer (FTO) Program:** FTO program is the phase of training new hires attend after successfully passing the New Officer Academy. This is a 4-5-month program of training and evaluation as a new police officer in the capacity of a patrol officer.
    - **Less Lethal Weapons:** This is a program for all new and existing sworn staff that trains use of force options in the following platforms: Taser, Pepperball, 40 mm, Aerosol Chemicals, and other options as they develop.
    - **Skills Academy Accreditation:** This is a program currently under development. The program is a combination of recruitment and pre-service training for licensure and employment as a police officer for SPPD. This program is geared toward recruitment of people with a non-law enforcement educational background.
    - **In-Service Training:** Curriculum that is developed on a regular basis to meet all Minnesota state licensure requirements for maintaining a peace officer license for sworn staff.
    - **Pistol and Rifle Training Program:** This program is part of the New Officer Academy and part of the continuing education and qualification for all sworn staff.
    - **Civilian Police Academy:** This is an eight (8) week thirty-two (32) hour curriculum where members of the public, along with members of the Police Civilian Internal Affairs Review

Commission (PCIARC), get an introduction and orientation to the functions of the SPPD and an opportunity to learn some of the skills needed by police officers.

Table of Yearly Training Time and Staff Allocated

Table 9.42

Type of Training	Hours of Staff Preparation Per Year	Number of Staff Dedicated	Number of Students Attending per year	Hours of Student Hours of Training Provided Per Year
Professional Development Institute	3,140 hours	1.5	Varies	Varies
New Officer Academy	480 hours	3	20-44	12,800-28,160
RRA Training	2,080 hours	2	600	9,600
CIT Program	360	1	80	3,200
EVOC	100 hours	1 (8-10 during sessions)	200	1,600
FTO Program	160 hours	1	95 FTO's	12,800-28,160
Pistol & Rifle Program	2,000	5	>600	7,200 pistol 1,600 rifle
Less Lethal Program	80	2	130	160
Skills Academy Accreditation	2,080	2	N/A at this time program in development	N/A at this time program in development
Continuing Educa8tion: In-Service Training	480 hours	1	600+	12,000
P.O.S.T. Board Licensure Compliance	2,080 hours	1	NA	NA
Civilian Police Academy	40 hours	1	48-160	1,536-5,120

- The Training Unit staff have multiple sessions of training going on at one time almost every day of the work week.
- For 30 years, the average police officer at the Saint Paul Police Department was only required to have 12 hours of firearms training each year and 8 hours of in-service training each year, totaling only 20 hours of mandatory training per year.
- The amount of state mandates and community expectations for staff training now exceed what can be done in 20 hours of in-service training per year.
- Several types of training now being mandated are new additions to SPPD curriculum. This is a result of community input, state regulation, and industry standards. As an example: in the last three (3) years, the SPPD has instituted RRA training as a result of a policy change developed with community collaboration. This has precipitated the need for 26-32 training sessions to process the entire SPPD each quarter, translating into over 120 sessions of training for just RRA per year.
- The amount of re-certification training that occurs each year has increased in the last 3-4 years with the introduction of more less lethal options, RRA, and CIT.
- The previous standard for average in-service training for an officer was 20 hours per year.
- The current training standard has added 24 hours of new training per year per officer.
- The current minimum in-service training for an officer is 44 hours per year. This is a 120% increase in just the past 3 years.
- An ad hoc program is done with the non-sworn recruit programs of Parking Enforcement Officers, Community Liaison Officers, and LECPA students to engage them in skills development and physical training.
- The current level of civilian office staff (1 person) requires that unit trainers (sworn staff) must participate in the clerical accounting of staff training to ensure all records compliant with Minnesota P.O.S.T. Board requirements.
- The unit would like to do more work to build competencies of current and future supervisors with appropriate time for development and administrative support to accomplish program.

Risk Management Considerations:

- The Training Unit staff time is highly taxed. Officer wellness is a concern given the high level of activity across the unit.
- The Training Unit has a responsibility for keeping accurate and complete compliance records for state licensure for all staff; high level of compliance exposure for the SPPD in this area.
- Increased workloads that will cause need for additional staff from four (4) sources:
  - State mandates.
  - Community standards/expectations.
  - New technologies that require initial and continuing training for staff.
  - New programming creating paths to employment that expand the pool of potential employees from diverse communities.

- Proper timing of staff turnover in unit is necessary to capture training knowledge and expertise.

Recommendations:

- Establish plans for legacy planning that have administrative support for having two (2) or more people in place with subject matter status on all Training Unit programs.
- Continue to increase scenario-based training to better reflect real circumstances Officers face at work when dealing with persons in crisis and use of force applications; this includes the continual training of less-lethal options (these options are growing due to the number of less-lethal products entering the market).
- Establish an internal program that builds leadership competencies in personal introspection, philosophy, and skills to cultivate people for future thinking and preparation for leadership roles in the SPPD and open to sworn and civilian staff who have an interest in exploring leadership roles in their career.
- Create a Sergeant Leadership Training program (see below section for expanded explanation)
- Establish an Investigator Training program (see below section for expanded explanation)
- **The addition of one (1) Office Assistant.** The purpose of this position would be to absorb the accounting of all the MN POST Board mandates and licensing requirements for the SPPD.
- **Add one (1) Officer position** as a full-time less-lethal options trainer.
- **Add one (1) Sergeant and two (2) Officers**. This is contingent on the concept of two police academies per year being established. Instituting continuous academies will aid the SPPD in avoiding "feast or famine" cycles it experiences in staffing. However, two (2) academies per year translates into almost ten (10) months of academy training; requiring a full-time staff to accommodate this plan.

Below are two (2) sub-sections regarding training for general supervision and investigators.

Training for Staff Promoted to Sergeant

The SPPD regularly promotes to the rank of Sergeant. The assignment of newly appointed Sergeants varies widely upon promotion. Some of duty types are as follows:

- Patrol Sergeant
- Major Crimes Investigator
- District Investigator
- Traffic & Accident Investigator
- Technology Unit

For those appointed to Patrol Sergeant or other direct supervision positions, they are expected to supervise groups of 8-20 police officers and/or civilian employees in a district/unit environment. These Sergeants have widely varying assignments from highly technical positions, investigative units, or patrol operations; and each Sergeant has the positional authority and the expectation that at a moment's

notice to direct resources, supervise subordinates, ensure good customer service, and make administrative decisions affecting the operation of SPPD.

Data/Observations:

The SPPD has an inconsistent approach to supervisory training for people newly promoted to the rank of Sergeant. In the last generation of SPPD training, documentation exists about two separate time periods in 2006 and 2015 where training has been delivered to first line supervisors who had recently been promoted [18]. In both instances, the training was not sustained for more than one group of new supervisors; and was initiated based on personalities willing to commit their personal time and resources to developing and delivering supervisory training.

In my interviews with staff, most said that they received very little or no training when becoming a Sergeant or Commander. There was no distinction between those who were assigned to investigations, operations, or support services. Many have said that in addition to not getting any formal training, they received little or none "on-the-job" training in the type of work they were assigned. Some units had Field Training Officer (FTO) manuals in their units, but they were often out of date. Most supervisors said they were left to figure things out on their own; and it has caused them to be inefficient and less effective, especially in the early stages of a new assignment.

The common theme is that no formalized processes exist to pass on job knowledge between the person vacating a position and the one entering a job. No overlap or plan is in place to capture knowledge and provide information about the position between people leaving a position and those new to the assignment.

Risk Management Considerations:

The SPPD has a large pool of potential talent to draw from when it promotes people to Sergeant. However, the lack of formalized training and enculturation of supervisors leads to the following risk management concerns:

- Lack of knowledge transfer between staff leads to inefficiency and ineffectiveness as either supervisors or investigators.
- May create a lack of due diligence or understanding about responsibilities to City of Saint Paul policy, SPPD policy, FLSA, HIPPA, OSHA, and other federal, state, and local accountability standards that affect the decision-making process to problems faced by supervisors.
- Allows for errors to occur either in investigations or in supervision due to a lack of basic knowledge about the skills needed to do successfully execute the duties of their position.
- Reduces the potential opportunities the organization has for enculturing sergeants with the vision, mission, and values of the organization.
- Misses an opportunity to formally give people tools to implement SPPD philosophy in the daily work of supervision.
- Opens the SPPD for liability for lack of training of supervisors and investigators.

Recommendations:

Sergeant training must be institutionalized as part of the human resource cycle during a promotional process within the SPPD. As a result, the following is recommended:

General Sergeants Training

- This training should be scheduled when a promotional process begins.
- Training should include all new Sergeants promoted off a civil service list and all candidates that may be reached during the duration of a sergeants' promotions list. This becomes a projection that may result in the training of some candidates who are not promoted.

General Sergeants Training should have the following layered characteristics:

1. **Organizational Philosophy, Mission, Vision, & Values, Strategic Thinking**
   a. Introduction of administration's philosophy and approach to SPPD supervision and the role of the supervisor in the organization.
   b. Illustrate how to communicate and reinforce the mission of the SPPD **"Protect the peace and maintain public safety through trusted service with respect"** in everything they do as a supervisor.
   c. Discussion of Mission, Vision, and Values and how Sergeants affect them in their everyday work.
   d. Strategic thinking of the SPPD and how Sergeants positively affect outcomes.
2. **Operational aspects, functionality of supervision, tactics and strategies, techniques, policy and procedure.**
   a. Presentations and discussions about the functions of supervision.
   b. Studying personal interactions and how to lead others.
   c. Personality inventories about self-as-supervisor and how to positively affect outcomes with staff.
   d. Followership and expectations of a supervisor as a representative of administration.
   e. Effects of policy and procedure on supervision.
3. **Technical, Employment Law, Regulatory, Policy & Procedure.**
   a. Technical parts of supervision including TASS, RMS, and other programs used by supervisors.
   b. Review of employment law as a supervisor.
   c. Regulatory issues faced by supervisors including OSHA reporting and risk management.
   d. Policy and Procedure issues that supervisors handle on a regular basis; as well as high risk issues that occur less frequently.

Figure 9.42

Supervisory Training

Organizational Philosophy, Mission, Vision, & Values, Strategic Thinking

Operational aspects, Techniques, Strategies, Policy & Procedure

Technical, Employment Law, Regulatory, Policy & Procedure

4. **Create a rotation of new and existing sergeants to attend outside programs**
   a. Law enforcement programs, like those offered by the MN Bureau of Criminal Apprehension's Supervision and Management and Leadership in Police Organizations (LPO) programs, are opportunities to expose our first line supervisors to peers from other agencies and experience instructors from a broad spectrum of backgrounds that can continue to add value and perspective to their practice of leadership within the organization.

Sergeant Training for Investigations

Data/Observations:

A reoccurring theme in many interviews with Commanders and Sergeants involved the lack of formal training and transition for Officers promoted to the rank of Sergeant in investigations. According to staff, there is little formal training associated with entering an investigative unit. Often, there is a Field Training manual to be used by the new investigator, but manuals are often out of date or do not have information that will provide a new investigator the direction on workflow associated with the caseloads they are accountable for completing.

Some new Investigative Sergeants have previous experience as an Officer working in an investigative unit (e.g.; Gang Unit, Family Violence Unit, etc.). However, this previous experience may not prepare them for the role of a Sergeant Investigator due contractual restrictions on Officers in investigative units. When Sergeant Investigators receive training is given it is usually after a person has been in an investigative unit for a substantial period of time.

Risk Management Considerations:

The lack of consistent training for new investigators has several potential outcomes:

  a. Inability to solve cases
  b. Lack of efficiency as a new investigator
  c. Potential for media relations issues
  d. Inability to meet charging attorney thresholds for pursuing a case
  e. Mismanagement of cases
  f. Not meeting the mission of the agency
  g. Violations of suspect rights
  h. Inadequate advocacy for victims

Recommendations:

When a new Sergeant Investigator is assigned to a unit, the following needs to occur:

1. Accommodations for New Investigators

  a. A formal Field Training process adhered to and supervised by the unit commander.
  b. An up-to-date Field Training manual made available to new Investigators.
  c. A digital step-by-step process that "blueprints" the work flow, necessary forms, charging documents, and points of contact for case management for each major type of case handled by an investigative unit.
  d. Overlap transfers to provide training and orientation between incoming and outgoing Sergeants between assignments (e.g.; 1-2 week period of transition with both Sergeants working together in the assignment)

2. Investigator Training

The SPPD should institute an annualized training schedule for the training of new and existing investigators. This should include a minimum level of training that new investigators must attend during their first year assigned to an investigations position.

Sergeant Investigator training should include the following:

- Constitutional Law
- Case Law
- Civil and Criminal Liability for Misfeasance/Malfeasance
- Interviewing Skills
- Search Warrant Writing/Execution
- Investigative Writing Skills
- Case Management
- Management/Disposal of Evidence
- Crime Scene Processing
- Crime Scene Management

**Additionally, Police Officers that are assigned to investigative units should also be mandated to attend this training cycle. It provides them with an excellent baseline of new skills that they can take to other Police Officer rank assignments and/or will give them the training necessary if promoted to the position of Investigative Sergeant.

3. Cycle of Training

The below diagram depicts a recommended yearly cycle of training classes to be offered for a core curriculum for new investigators. As a result, no matter when a sergeant is assigned to investigations, the SPPD will be able to provide basic coursework needed by new investigators during their first year as an investigator.

Figure 9.43

Yearly Cycle of Investigative Training

(one course occurs every 4-6 weeks on a yearly schedule)

Section 9.5 – Impound Lot

The Impound Lot Unit has:

- The organizational structure shown in Figure 9.51;
- Seven (7) year personnel history from 2013-2019 shown in Table 9.51;

The Impound Lot Manager reports to the Commander of Property & Evidence. This Commander reports to the Deputy Chief of Support Services and Administration.

Figure 9.51

The Impound Lot Unit is a sub-unit of Property & Evidence. The role of this unit within the SPPD is to manage the Enterprise Fund as a city owned operation that does in-take, storage, release, and billing regarding vehicles impounded by the Saint Paul Police Department located on Barge Channel Road in Saint Paul.

The Impound Lot Unit also serves this same function for the Snow Emergency System of the City of Saint Paul which is run by Saint Paul Public Works. During Snow Emergencies, the Impound Lot staff opens a temporary Snow Lot for impounded vehicles which is an area rented to the City by the Minnesota State Fair on Como Avenue in Saint Paul.

Table 9.51

Personnel Type	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Civilian Manager	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Afternoon Supervisor	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Property Clerks	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
Property Clerks (part-time permanent)	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Property Clerks (part-time temporary/seasonal for snow emergencies)	*20-35*	*20-35*	*20-35*	*20-35*	*20-35*	*20-35*	*20-35*
Office Assistant III Clerical	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Total Staff	**14**	**14**	**14**	**14**	**14**	**14**	**14**

Data/Observations:

- Impound Lot operations are open to the public from 8 AM to 10 PM daily.
- Impound Lot staff are on-site 24 hours per day/7 days a week for in-take of towed vehicles impounded by police employees.
- During Snow Emergencies declared by the City: The Snow Emergency Lot on Como Avenue and the Impound Lot on Barge Channel Road are both open to public 24 hours per day for a 96-hour period.
- The building at the Impound Lot on Barge Channel Road is owned by SPPD and the property is leased to the SPPD by the Saint Paul Port Authority.
- The Saint Paul Port Authority (as lease holder) does not provide improvements to the surface lot or the secure fence line at the Impound Lot on Barge Channel Road.
- The lot location is less desirable due to the threat of flooding from high river levels. The lot has been evacuated every few years due to high water levels. The threat is primarily at the entrance to the lot which is cutoff during high water.
- The building at the main Impound Lot is of very poor quality, not ADA compliant with the customer office at the top of a staircase, and needs serious improvements to bathrooms,

customer entrance, staff workspace, etc. Past plans for improvements exist, but none have been acted upon.

- The vehicle storage garage space is lacking the space needed for incoming vehicles needing to be processed. With more forensic work being done by investigations, more space and time for each vehicle is needed. Currently, work must be rushed to keep bays open for new incoming evidentiary vehicles.
- The camera system at the Impound Lot which monitors the fencing and interior of lot needs replacement.
- The Impound lot does experience breaches of the fence line with cars broken into multiple times each year.
- The camera system at the Impound Lot is older technology; and is often the only way to determine what is occurring on the exterior lines of property.
- The manager and night supervisor of the Impound Lot have served in the unit for many years and have processes in place for dealing with many types problems that occur within the operation (e.g.; problem customers, snow emergencies, lot flooding)
- There has been a long-term loss of two full-time Property Clerks; one in 2009 and another in 2012. These were due to staff attrition and never replaced with full-time staff and vacancies have been covered with part-time staff. The Impound Lot manager would like to convert the part-time positions into full-time positions using the same amount of staffing budget. Using part-time Property Clerks sometimes causes scheduling problems due to conflicts with other employment held by these employees.

Risk Management Factors:

- Tow lot operations deal with vehicles which are the largest or second largest asset most people own; as a result, staff deal with some people who are very upset. Customer service must remain at the highest levels in this SPPD operation.
- Impounded vehicles are the responsibility of the SPPD. The SPPD must make regular evaluations of the Impound Lot for security of vehicles stored on site.
- Diminishing revenue from snow emergencies should be examined to see what efficiencies or policy changes could occur to reduce expenses.

Recommendations:

- Renovation of the existing building or construction of a replacement building for compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), provide decent workspace and storage for employees, and provide building storage and more interior vehicle storage for evidentiary vehicles.
- Install a new fence to improve site security at the Impound Lot on Barge Channel Road.

- Install a new surveillance camera system is needed to improve security monitoring is needed at the Barge Channel Road site.
- Revisit the role of the SPPD in Snow Emergencies; does the City need the SPPD's involvement in a public works function?
- Continue with civilian management of Impound Lot. This is an area where sworn staff are unnecessary to carry out the function.
- **Add two (2) full-time Property Clerks** to stabilize scheduling that currently relies on part-time availability. This should be done by reducing the number of part-time property clerks and converting existing staff budget dollars to pay for full-time clerks. This is a revenue neutral adjustment.

Section 9.6 – Property and Evidence Unit

The Property and Evidence Unit has:

- The organizational structure shown in Figure 9.61;
- Seven (7) year personnel history from 2013-2019 shown in Table 9.61;

The Property and Evidence Unit (PEU) has the following organizational structure shown in Figure 9.61 and Table 9.61 shows the history of personnel assigned the unit from 2013-2019. The PEU Sergeant reports to the Property & Records Commander who reports to the Deputy Chief of Support Services.

Figure 9.61 – Property and Evidence Unit

Table 9.61

Personnel Type	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Sergeants	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Property Clerk	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5
Photo Lab Technician	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Total Staff	**6.5**	**6.5**	**6.5**	**6.5**	**6.5**	**6.5**	**6.5**

The Property & Evidence Unit is responsible for the intake, management, and disposal of all criminal evidence and recovered property handled by the SPPD.

Data/Observations:

- The staff of the unit consists of a Police Sergeant, four (4) full time Property Clerks, one (1) part-time Property Clerk, and one (1) Photo Lab Technician.
- The unit is scheduled to work a week day schedule during business hours.
- Photo lab technician has a "good" workload at the current time and is used by the entire agency for printing/photo skills.

- The PEU staff are subject to callback on overtime for major incidents, (i.e.; Homicides)
- The PEU staff are willing to respond for call-backs concerning major crime scenes to enter evidence and empty the property locker bank on weekends when no open lockers are available.
- The unit staff collect all evidence placed in all SPPD evidence lockers and catalogs items.
- The unit is responsible for front counter traffic at their office for people claiming property or to return disposed evidence.
- The unit has three (3) small evidence drop boxes at East, Central, and Western Districts to collect smaller items and prevent staff from always having to drive to Headquarters to deliver evidence.
- A major issue for temporary storage is property taken from prisoners being booked into the Ramsey County Jail. The Jail does not take personal property, therefore creating a large amount of property that must be managed and ultimately disposed of by the PEU staff.
- Evidence Manager is a program that uses a bar code system that was fully implemented in 2016 to track evidence and property held by the SPPD. This has been a very successful system according to unit staff. The current contract with Evidence Manager software expires in 2020.
- PEU staff has made changes to storage systems in recent years and eliminated some outdated storage systems.
- Current glass and barrier systems need upgrading due to the fragility of these barriers as the unit does get combative visitors at their front counter operation.
- Camera system for the unit was installed at the time of the building opening in 2003 and is of low quality.
- Currently, PEU is working towards accreditation through the International Association of Property and Evidence (IAPE).
- Accreditation planning has consisted of applying the standards to the practices of the SPPD Property Room. A visit from IAPE is being planned for 2020 to achieve accreditation.

Risk Management Considerations:

- The proper tracking of items, management of space, and compliance with state law and SPPD policy in the process of disposal or return of property and evidence is critical to effective unit operation.
- Critical to the function of this unit is accountability for money, guns, drugs, and valuable property. Staff in this function must be beyond reproach in their work. Recruitment and evaluation of these employees is of extreme importance.
- Audits of Property & Evidence from within the unit and by Inspections on a regular basis is essential.
- Making sure that decisions are made about the future contracting with or replacement of Evidence Manager should be done well in advance of a contract expiration in 2020.
- Retention of staff for institutional continuity.

Recommendations:

- Continue to retain Evidence Manager as the management software for PEU, unless a strategic decision is made, and institutional support is provided for such a significant software change.
- Upgrade glass and barriers in the lobby area of the Property Room for more security of non-sworn staff.
- Potentially look at barrier door in the main lobby of Headquarters to "buzz access" to the elevators for better control going to the Property Room or Records Unit.
- Upgrade to a new camera system for surveillance of facility.
- Continue to plan for compliance with the IAPE accreditation standards.
- Continue with 4.5 Property Clerks for unit.
- Consider a change to a civilian Supervisor of unit, thus displacing the current Sergeant within the unit. Police Sergeants are prone to rotating out of positions and there is a need for long-term consistency at a supervisory level.

Section 9.7 – Records Unit

The Records Unit has:

- The organizational structure shown in Figure 9.71;
- Seven (7) year personnel history from 2013-2019 shown in Table 9.71;

The Property & Records Commander reports to the Deputy Chief of Support Services and Administration.

Figure 9.71 – Records Unit

Table 9.71

Personnel Type	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Commander	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Records Supervisor	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Review Officer	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Office Assistant II	5.2	5.2	5.2	5.2	5.2	5.2	5.2
Office Assistant III	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
Total Staff	**18.2**	**18.2**	**18.2**	**18.2**	**18.2**	**18.2**	**18.2**

Data/Observations:

- The Records Unit handles approval of reports, routing of case reports to units for investigation, special data practice reviews of reports, internal/external requests for reports, and public data requests for police reports.

- The Review Officers review all SPPD reports, and either approve or reject each report for content. Review officer position manages a constant stream of reports entering the records management system (RMS), creating a demanding pace of work.
- The Records Unit has five (5) Review Officers. This is not enough Review Officers to cover the position 24/7. As a result, part-time help and overtime must be used cover normal hours of operation, vacation, and sick calls.
- Office Assistants II and III work on redaction of reports, in-house report management, and work on walk up public desk service.
- Currently, public access is granted from 8 AM to 4:30 PM. This has been a change for the Records Unit where previously there were also late evening and Saturday hours. Walk up service, by its nature, interrupts Office Assistants II and III while working on other tasks. This has been a positive change for staff.
- The current use of secure email to City Attorney's Office to send reports has been a good time saving measure. The previous method required the packaging of printed reports for delivery to the City Attorney's Office.
- The current on-line reporting system has an Investigative Sergeant screening and reviewing reports submitted by the public on-line out of West District Investigations. This has been a good workflow change for the Records Unit. It has removed some initial report review from Records staff.

Risk Management Considerations:

- Avoid drops in unit staffing levels; this will help employee wellness in this unit which has a high daily volume of reports to process.
- Minnesota data practice laws must be understood by all unit members and continuing education on these laws must be done.
- Communication with all staff is an important element in any 24-hour operation. Mechanisms must be in place to make sure of consistent communication to all unit members of this unit which runs 24/7.

Recommendations:

- **Add one (1) Review Officer** to cover the position 24/7. This will eliminate overtime and scheduling problems for the position.
- Create a "quality circle" for the continuous improvement of the report writing system and the records management system used by the SPPD. This would include the Records Unit, Technology Unit, Investigations, and Patrol Operations.

Section 9.8 – Human Resources Unit

The Human Resources Unit has:

- The organizational structure shown in Figure 9.81;
- Seven (7) year personnel history from 2013-2019 shown in Table 9.81;

The Human Resource Unit manager reports to the Deputy Chief of Support Services and Administration.

Figure 9.81 – Human Resources Unit

Table 9.81

Personnel Type	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Human Resource Manager	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Office Assistant IV	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Office Assistant III	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
Payroll Clerk	3	3	0	0	0	0	0
Officers	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Total Staff	**5**	**5**	**3**	**3**	**3**	**3**	**6**

The Human Resource Unit has responsibility for acting on behalf of the City of Saint Paul as liaison between the SPPD and the City government's Human Resource Department. Several years ago, the City's Human Resource Department made it a requirement that the SPPD employ a civilian Human Resource Consultant as unit head.

Data/Observations:

- The following are the major items with administrative accountability within the Human Resource Unit:
    - All hiring process administration
    - All employee retention administration
    - Management of employee transfers
    - Tracking of all employee discipline
    - Administering all testing processes for new employment and promotions
    - Updating PERS database for employee information
    - Creation of identification cards for employees
    - Providing information to administration and employees about medial leaves of absence
    - Personnel Evaluations
    - Management of Personnel Files
    - Worker's Compensation administration and compliance
    - Coordination of Commendation Review Board
    - Officer of the Year Banquet
    - Point of Contact of TASS Payroll System
    - Accommodation Coordinator
- The Human Resource Unit has a very interconnected work flow with the Training Unit, Background Unit, Payroll function, and Police Administration.
- The unit prevents many potential workplace violations that may otherwise occur due to lack of familiarity or regular application of many different state and federal work regulations.
- The unit lost three (3) Payroll Clerks in 2015 due to the centralization of the City's payroll function. One (1) OA III was put in place at that time to assist with unit functions that the payroll staff had handled. However, the Human Resource Unit still functions as the SPPD's SME on the TASS payroll system and the Employee Self-Service system (ESS).
- There is a reorganization currently occurring with the Background Unit, where it is supposed to report to Human Resources. It is unclear how this workflow is going to work as it is still under development by administration. It appears Backgrounds will have reporting responsibility to Support Services Executive Officer and the Human Resource Unit will be a consultant to the Background process for employees and volunteers.
- Physical secure storage space has been a long-time concern for the unit due to the sensitive nature of personnel files. Personnel files have a long retention schedule and are being scanned over time into a digital format. This process is reducing the footprint needed for physical storage at this time. A concern will be if Background files need to move into the Human Resource space. There is currently to ability to accommodate these files if during unit mergers, those files migrate to Human Resources.
- There is a permissions process which occurs when someone transfers to a new unit where digital permissions are changed by the City's central Office of Technology (OTC). A form called

the "Tech Form" is used by the Human Resource Unit to generate these permissions changes and it is used by OTC and the SPPD's Technology Unit. Currently, according to interviews with staff, there are process problems with this form; and communication over how to fix it has broken down between the SPPD's Technology Unit and City OTC.

Risk Management Considerations:

- Important to have highly relational people in this unit since every unit and person in the SPPD interacts with this unit. A negative change in personnel in the unit could have a very deleterious effect on the SPPD's functionality.
- Confidentiality continues to be extremely important due to the very sensitive nature of the records and requests the unit handles.

Recommendations:

- SPPD should address the Tech Form issue. The technical nature of this problem is difficult to express in this format; however, a lot of repetitive work is done on a regular basis due to the lack of proper authorizations and timing around them that could be accomplished if different city departments could troubleshoot the problem together.
- Add a 0.5 FTE to assist in the management of the high number of requests for information and assistance in digital systems used by employees. While the 1.0 FTE for payroll was removed from the unit in 2015, TASS as the replacement system still requires the unit to assist in troubleshooting and reporting. TASS, along with other digital systems, require SME assistance of a broad range of staff from across the SPPD.

Section 9.9 – Forensic Services Unit

The Forensic Services Unit has:

- The organizational structure shown in Figure 9.91;
- Seven (7) year personnel history from 2013-2019 shown in Table 9.91;

The Forensic Services Unit civilian manager reports to the Deputy Chief of Support Services and Administration.

Figure 9.91 – Forensic Services Unit

```
                        Laboratory Director
                        (civilian manager)
                              (1)
        ┌──────────────┬──────────────┬──────────────┐
   Sergeant         Sergeant      Office        Forensic
   Crime Scene      Crash         Assistant III  Scientist II
   Specialist       Reconstruction  (1)           (1)
   Supervisor       & Crime Scenes
   (1)              (1)
   ┌────────┬────────┐
Forensic      Crime Scene/Lab
Scientist I   Officer
Civilian      (6)
(3)
```

Table 9.91

Personnel Type	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Director	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Sergeants	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Crime Scene Technician Officer	3-4	3-4	5	5	4	4	6
Civ. Forensic Scientist III	0	0	1	1	1	0	0
Civ. Forensic Scientist II	1	1	0	0	1	1	1
Civ. Forensic Scientist I	1	1	1	1	2	3	3
Office Assistant	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Total Staff	**9**	**9**	**11**	**11**	**12**	**12**	**14**

Data/Observations:

- In 2013, the unit previously known as the Crime Lab began a transformation from a decades old system of operation to a new Forensic Services Unit. This process included a full audit and set of recommendations to change the field and lab services and the hiring of a civilian Director with a broad background in forensic lab services and management.
- The FSU Director acts as the quality assurance manager and is credentialed for this role.
- Quality Assurance is very time consuming and does not allow the Director to manage the unit on a daily basis.
- The SPPD is currently working on a plan to hire a Quality Assurance manager in the next year; not currently funding for this position.
- Currently, there are two (2) Sergeants who work in FSU. One has responsibility for the supervision of the FSU crime scene technicians (Officers/Civilians) and the other is an SME in Crash Reconstruction, Crime Scene collection, and is the backup to the other Sergeant who does most of the unit supervision.
- From 2015-2017, the unit had a Forensic Scientist III. That person left the SPPD and the Lab Director has absorbed those duties until current employees have enough experience to compete for the position.
- Currently, any Officer who is brought into FSU is expected to have a five-year commitment to the unit due to the training and experiential learning curves involved in this work.
- All new staff are trained in the following areas under the listed time tables:

- DNA Collection (2-3 months)
- Latent Fingerprint Processing (2-3 months)
- Crime Scene Response (1 month)
- Crime Scene Photography (1 month)
- Latent Print Examiner qualification has been reached by three (3) members of the staff.
- All training programs are internal. It is a mix of online programs and practicums with certified staff and signed off by a Sergeant supervisor.
- While work schedules are based on an eight (8) hour day, all staff typically work a (10) hour day due to workload.
- An additional workload has been placed upon the unit with the NIBIN program.   NIBIN is the National Integrated Ballistic Information Network. It was created by the ATF, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, in 1999. It is a database of digital 2D and 3D images of marking found on casing and bullets recovered from crime scenes or from confiscated weapons test-fired in a lab. The SPPD's NIBIN program also swabs for DNA in every NIBIN case.
- A NIBIN technician has been hired as part of a three (3) year federal grant for the NIBIN program.
- The NIBIN program has increased the SPPD's DNA caseload by 140%.
- The current staff are very motivated to do a good job; however, the Director is concerned with burnout of employees due to the long workdays.
- Crime scene response creates additional stress on staff time, as they often happen in the evening after the normal workday.
- Crime scenes necessitate a lot of additional follow up processing in the lab which must happen immediately following a case. One phenomenon they have experienced is multiple shootings in the matter of a day or couple of days, which does not allow for lab processing to be completed before having to go out to collect a new crime scene.

Risk Management Considerations:

- Continual internal and external process improvement evaluation is needed for crime labs.
- Working on accreditation renewal cycles has supported as a continual process for lab credibility.
- The volume of work handled by lab employees needs to be monitored to make sure that employee stress/burn-out does not occur.

Recommendations:

- **Add one (1) Quality Assurance Manager** to work on the accreditation process and make sure FSU methods and procedures meet national laboratory standards.
- Future hires in unit should be civilian employees due to the turnover of sworn staff.
- Due to space requirements, this unit needs to either relocate or take over space on their current floor. Space for lab staff and equipment is completely used.

Section 9.92 – Technology Unit

The Technology Unit has:

- The organizational structure shown in Figure 9.92(1);
- Seven (7) year personnel history from 2013-2019 shown in Table 9.92(1);

The Technology Unit Commander reports to the Deputy Chief of Support Services and Administration.

Figure 9.92(1) – Technology Unit

Table 9.92(1)

Personnel Type	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Commander	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Sergeants	2	3	3	3	3	3	3
Officers	6	3	3	3	3	4	5
Crime Analysts	1	1	2	2	2	3	3-4
Technology Specialists	6	3	3	3	3	3	2
Video Technicians	0	0	0	0	2	4	5
Office Assistant	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Total Staff	**17**	**12**	**13**	**13**	**15**	**19**	**21**

Data/Observations:

- The Technology Unit has experienced several iterations over time. Prior to 2009, the entire staff was employed directly by the Saint Paul Police Department. Until 2007, a Commander had been

assigned to manage the Technology Unit, however that a civilian manager was hired and managed the unit until 2009. In 2009, a citywide technology consolidation occurred and the SPPD's civilian manager and about 50% of the staff were moved to the City's OTC offices at City Hall. The consolidation left many gaps in service, in concert with growth in Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) responsibilities, In-Car Cameras, and many other IT concerns not being addressed with the speed or priority necessary for the SPPD. As a result, the SPPD installed a Technology Unit Commander in 2009 and began moving Police Officers and Sergeants into technology roles.

Currently, the Technology Unit staff is comprised of the following areas of responsibility:

- o **Crime Analysis:** This group is led by a Sergeant and four (4) civilian analysts. The analysts have a significant level of training and experience in developing and analyzing data. Their main jobs in the unit focus on creating reports for the administrative team, developing data set reports and analysis for unit commanders, and special projects about SPPD efficiency and effectiveness.
- o **Video Management Unit:** This group is led by one (1) Sergeant and staffed with five (5) Video Technicians. This unit is responsible for managing the in-car camera and body worn camera systems and the back-end storage requirements of these systems as stipulated in SPPD policy.
- o **CCTV:** The group is led by a Sergeant and staffed with three (3) Officers. Two (2) Officers serve on Tour II and one (1) on Tour III. They manage the SPPD's mobile CCTV camera platforms, monitor CCTV cameras in the Real Time Information Center that is co-managed by the Ramsey County Sheriff's Office, and create password packets and grant permissions for new staff and staff transferring from one unit to another.
- o **Office Assistant IV & Special Projects Sergeant:** These two staff members work on an assorted number of technology projects that include management of current systems, creating new computer management packages our of existing software platforms, programming, and other surge capacity duties as needed by the SPPD.
- o **Service Technicians:** These are three (3) technician positions paid for by OTC to provide technical assistance for the Helpdesk function, install new computers, and provide continuing maintenance to our systems.
- Currently, there is a good relationship and shared project management responsibilities with OTC for large projects or areas where significant expertise is needed in SPPD technology needs.
- OTC provides three (3) on-site service technicians who provide service for desktop, laptop, and many other maintenance and new installations needs for the SPPD.
- The unit meets monthly, or more often if needed, in a project management meeting with OTC to discuss projects and SPPD needs. These meetings are essential to good communication about mutual expectations and responsibilities.

- On-site Service Technicians add a lot of value for their responsiveness and knowledge of systems they install, maintain, and replace.
- The Technology Unit commander is assigned from our law enforcement trained cadre of command staff and brings no specific technology related expertise to the position.
- The Sergeants and Officers bring varying levels of technical experience to the unit. However, most of their knowledge is self-taught and none have a formal technical education that predated their law enforcement careers.
- The four (4) civilian analysts within the unit have significant experience. A lot of their time currently gets co-mingled with many different types of SPPD document preparation, external data requests, and intelligence analysis. The "mixed bag" approach that their jobs created inefficiencies with time.
- The crime analysts true "intelligence & analysis" function would be better leveraged if some of them were tied directly to key Major Crimes division units of the SPPD.

Risk Management Considerations:

- Having a high functioning teams in-place in the Technology Unit and OTC to maintain and build systems that protect the City's network and sensitive databases is a continual concern and real threat to the community.
- Security of data systems is a high priority given the sensitive nature of the data we possess on behalf of victims.
- The high number of videos the SPPD must store, and the reliance on them for evidence and accountability, makes the video management function of technology unit extremely important to work well.

Recommendations:

- The current unit needs significant restructuring to reduce per employee costs and to bring more staff with formal technological training into the unit.
- Eliminate the Commander position in the Technology Unit. This is a management position that should be staffed with a civilian manager with a technology management/project management background. The Commander position should be redeployed to another role in the organization.
- Eliminate three (3) Sergeants within the Technology Unit and replace them with civilian subject matter experts within the fields of crime analysis, CCTV, and project management/programming. Current Sergeants should be redeployed to investigations or police operations.
- Eliminate all three (3) Officer positions within CCTV. Replace them with service technicians or video technicians. The Officer positions should be redeployed to police operations.
- Retain the one (1) Sergeant in Video Management due to the continual interface with the SPPD's sworn staff on the maintenance and accountability regarding BWC's and ICC's.

- Reassign two (2) crime analysts from the Technology Unit to the Intelligence Unit (recommendation of new unit in Major Crimes section of this study) to focus their work solely on criminal intelligence analysis.
- Retain two (2) crime analysts to perform data mining and prepare documents requested by SPPD units, command staff, and external partners.

Section 9.93 - Building Maintenance Unit

The Building Maintenance Unit has:

- The organizational structure shown in Figure 9.93(1);
- Seven (7) year personnel history from 2013-2019 shown in Table 9.93(1);

The Building Maintenance Supervisor reports to the Deputy Chief of Support Services and Administration.

Figure 9.93(1) – Building Maintenance Unit

Table 9.93(1)

Personnel Type	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Building Maintenance Supervisor	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Engineer III	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Custodian/Engineer II	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Maintenance Mechanic	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Custodian II	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Total Staff	**10**	**10**	**10**	**10**	**10**	**10**	**10**

Data/Observations:

- The Building Maintenance staff are responsible for fifteen (15) different buildings for maintenance and repair in Saint Paul and Maplewood; locations are:
    - 367 Grove Street – Headquarters
    - 388 N. Hamline-West District
    - 722 Payne Ave. – East District
    - 1820 S. Edgcumbe – Traffic and Pedestrian Safety
    - 1900 Rice Street – Canine Unit
    - 2621 Linwood Ave. – Outdoor Range
    - 830 Barge Channel Road – Impound Lot
    - Address not disclosed – Employee Assistance Program
    - 1544 Timberlake – ACOP Unit
    - 401 N. Robert St. - DTB
    - Address not disclosed – ODU
    - 388 13th St. – 911 Garage
    - 600 Lafayette - Rowan Training Center
    - Address not disclosed – Narcotics/Vice Unit
    - West Energy Park Drive – Radio Shop
- The total square feet maintained by the staff is 275,601 square feet.
- The total building footprint has grown in recent years. However, no increase in staffing has occurred with this growth of 58,400 square feet since 2017.
- Staff is divided into two major shifts of work; days and afternoons.
- Staff have an on-call function for overnight problems that need immediate attention.
- With two recently added buildings and no additional staff, overtime must be used to cover the shifts needed to maintain the buildings.
- There are four (4) Custodian/Engineer II's and four (4) Custodian II's to perform the cleaning duties; which means that the average custodian maintains over 34,000 square feet of space. This is in juxtaposition to the Saint Paul School District which has an average custodial square footage of 24,000 square feet.
- Staff perform interior cleaning, outdoor lawn maintenance, snow removal, maintenance repairs, furniture installation, movement of large items, filter maintenance, and facilitating contractor installations and construction projects.
- Building Maintenance does not have regular funding sources to replace furniture, carpet, or other types of floor in the SPPD's aging buildings.
- The Capital Improvement Budget process (CIB), which is a city-wide process to apply for capital project funds, has been a good source for replacing lighting to new LED standards and other mechanical systems.

Risk Management Considerations:

- The age of many of the SPPD buildings create continual maintenance needs and increasing associated costs.
- Safety of staff in handling materials, especially infrequent items, creates the need for perpetual vigilance on worker-safety education and procedures.
- Need for staffing due the amount of SPPD building space creates a continuous gap in needs for renewal and maintenance of facilities which are used 24-hours per day.

Recommendations:

- **Add two (2) Custodian/Engineer II positions** to reduce the maintenance footprint per custodian. New positions should be added as Custodian/Engineer II's to expand the unit's staffing to perform minor mechanical work.
- Expand budget through additional line items necessary to perform needed improvements to SPPD buildings.
- Maintain employee status for maintenance staff as they have an enhanced sense of ownership in their work that will not be present by a contract maintenance service.
- Hire an architect to perform an assessment of all SPPD workspace to increase efficiency of its use and to make recommendations on future projects.

Community Engagement Division Data Analysis 2019

Section 10.0 - Introduction

The scope of this section of the study is to accomplish the following:

- **Describe unit and staff workloads**
- **Describe unit organization**
- **Describe unit staffing levels**
- **Identify workflow and structural problems**
- **Identify recommendations for process, workflow, and staffing issues or further research needed**

This chapter covers the Saint Paul Police Department's Community Engagement Division which was formed in March 2019. The Division is led by a Deputy Chief, Executive Officer, and Office Assistant. The administrative team is responsible for the management of the division as shown below in Figure 100.01   The establishment of this division executive team was done without additional fiscal impact to the Department.

The Figure 10.01 shows the division organization flow chart.

Figure 10.01

Section 10.1 – Special Operations Unit-Community Engagement Division

The Special Operations Unit has:

- The organizational structure shown in Figure 10.11;
- A current personnel table shown in Table 10.11:

Due to the reorganization of Special Operations in March 2019, a chart showing unit history will not be shown as it is not relevant to current organizational structure.

The Special Operations Unit Commander reports to the Deputy Chief of Community Engagement.

Figure 10.11

Table 10.11

Personnel Type	2019
Commander	1
Sergeant	3.2
Officer	0
Civilian	0
Total Staff	**4.2**

The focus of the Special Operations Unit is Departmental preparedness, pre-event planning, and event management for the Saint Paul Police Department. This unit was established by Chief Axtell in 2016. This unit works under the federal Emergency Management model for much of its work with other city departments and other jurisdictions. This model is being integrated into the special event planning of the SPPD under the guidance and training of this unit.

Data/Observations:

- The following are the major areas of work performed by SOU on a regular basis:
  - Risk assessments of all city events
  - Social media data mining for potential impacts on city events
  - Intelligence bulletins issued to entire agency
  - Situational assessment and reporting for pre-planning intelligence for all city events
  - SPPD readiness for disaster events
  - All-Contingencies planning for large venues and events
  - Mobile Field Force leadership, planning, training, and organization
  - Bicycle Response Team leadership, planning, training, and organization
  - Training on Emergency Management topics
  - Working with ECC on major events
  - Management & Training of 40mm Less Lethal program
  - Management & Training of crowd control less lethal munitions program
  - Management & Training of Pepperball program
  - Management of SPPD Everbridge communication system
  - Review and approval of all special event permits city wide
- SOU has the most direct relationship of any unit in SPPD with City of Saint Paul Emergency Management, has a very good working relationship with this city department, and both units are interwoven as a team in the planning and execution of events.
- In the summer of 2019, Saint Paul Emergency Management funded approximately 16 Mass Casualty Bags for the Saint Paul Police SOU. These bags are an excellent improvement to preparedness planning for large event locations.
- The number of civic protests has grown since 2016 and Saint Paul is a focal point/prime location to carry out protests as the city is the state capital.
- City government and business groups have built new stadiums and attracted new festivals in recent years; causing the need for more event planning.
- Events around the country with mass casualties from violence and accidents have created the need for more and better planning around public events in Saint Paul.
- Staff monitor many marches, minor protest events, and meet with civic protest leaders on top of all the formal project management done by each member of the unit.
- The added duties of monitoring events put a strain on each member of the unit, causing overtime, very long hours, and weekend work that is beyond what should be expected of such a small group of specialized staff.
- The 0.5 FTE time that one (1) Sergeant in the unit has to develop intelligence is not enough personnel to manage the amount of monitoring that should occur.
- A major original focus of the unit was Mobile Field Force (MFF) operations.
- The SOU Commander is the command staff leader of Mobile Field Force.
- There are 100 officers and sergeants on the SPPD that are assigned to Mobile Field Force; all members volunteer for this collateral duty. All Officers are trained for MFF during their initial new officer academy.
- 60-70% of MFF team members are interested in continuing to be part of the team.
- In the last 18 months, no focus has been put on MFF operations training as a group due to the staffing strains of the agency; no team-wide training has occurred during this period.
- MFF training needs to be done on the following topics:
  - Fit testing of gas masks for all members

- - o Training on hand tossed munitions
    - o Field movement drills
    - o Field drills on specialized scenarios
    - o Classroom training on MFF changing methodology
- The Bicycle Response Team (BRT) function of MFF is often used and is effective during protests or large city events due to their maneuverability in crowded locations.
- SOU has taken on the Pepperball Less Lethal platform in the last 12-18 months and is training all the patrol districts in its use.
- Pepperball Less Lethal program was assigned to be developed by SOU due to the heavy amount of other program commitments being handled by the Training Unit could not be accomplished by the Training staff.
- Due to lack of assigned staff, the SOU Commander pays overtime to sworn staff who are assigned to other units, to monitor some events due the high volume of events that are occurring in the city.
- There is a very small budget for SOU materials and overtime; currently not enough to meet basic needs of their function.
- MFF team is in need new gear and fully-funded budget line items to have a meaningful maintenance plan.
- BRT team needs new bicycles and a fully-funded budget line items to have a meaningful maintenance plan.
- Presently, SOU is only able to work event to event due their workload; and unable to put in the time to develop the larger framework that they need to for city-wide event planning and training.
- The Pepperball less-lethal program was started by Special Operations due to the Training Unit being overtaxed with other projects at the time the program was initiated.

Risk Management Considerations:

- The City of Saint Paul shoulders considerable liability with a wide range of planned special events/festivals, marches, and protests that can occur within the city.
- SOU function addresses the need for specialized professionals in pre-event planning, Emergency Management functions, Mobile Field Force, and permitting to mitigate municipal liability.
- There is a community and inter-governmental expectation that the SPPD has a substantial capability in Mobile Field Force operations.
- There is a community and inter-government expectation that the SPPD can develop enough intelligence/data about potential threats and then make plans to mitigate them during events.
- MFF operations have considerable risk for litigation against the City.

Recommendations:

- **Add one full-time civilian analyst** to SOU to increase the monitoring of social media and other intelligence information streams that need to be sifted through on a 24 hour cycle by this unit.
- **Add one Office Assistant** to the Event Permit section of SOU.

- Tie-in intelligence analysis function of SOU to the recommended Intelligence Unit; this can be a very synergistic relationship to increase overall SPPD situational awareness of threats to attendees of events across the city.
- Develop a maintenance plan and budget for SOU for BRT bicycles, MFF equipment, and less lethal munitions replacement.
- Move the training function for the Pepperball less-lethal platform to the Training Unit.
- Re-establish regular training cycles for Mobile Field Force and the Bicycle Response Team.

Section 10.2 – Community Partnerships Unit-Community Engagement Division

The Community Engagement Unit has:

- The organizational structure shown in Figure 10.21;
- A current personnel table shown in Table 10.21;

Due to the reorganization of parts of the SPPD in March 2019, which included all elements of what the Community Partnerships Unit is now. A chart showing unit staffing history will not be shown as it is not relevant to current organizational structure.

The Community Partnerships Unit Commander reports to the Deputy Chief of Community Engagement.

Figure 10.21

Table 10.21

Personnel Type	2019
Commander	1
Sergeant	3
Officer	18
Civilian	5
Total Staff	**27**

Responsibilities by sub-unit of the Community Partnerships Unit:

- **ACOP** sub-unit is led by a Sergeant with nine (9) Officers and three (3) civilian Community Liaison Officers (CLO's):
  - 29-year partnership with Saint Paul Public Housing Authority (PHA); this is a flagship program of the SPPD and is deemed as successful by both the SPPD and PHA.
  - PHA was recently awarded a $2 million per year multiyear federal grant for a Crime Free Multi-Housing program.
  - ACOP is a program funded by PHA through a contractual relationship with the Saint Paul Police Department.
- **Volunteer Services** sub-unit is led by a **Sergeant** with one **Officer** reporting to them. They are currently housed in the SPPD's headquarters building. Their combined duties are as follows:
  - Chaplain program coordinator (SPPD averages 10 chaplains) **(Sergeant)**
  - Police Band **(Sergeant)**
  - Honor Guard **(Sergeant)**
  - Crime Prevention Officers (2 civilian employees - both at different locations) **(Sergeant)**
  - Managing internship program **(Officer)**
  - Police Reserve Unit (about 70 volunteers with 30 regularly active members) **(Officer)**
- **School Resource Officer Program** sub-unit is led by a Sergeant with seven (7) School Resource Officers (SRO's) and one (1) School Patrol Officer.
  - SRO's are a school-based police presence in large Saint Paul school facilities.
  - SRO's are funded through a contractual relationship with the Saint Paul Public Schools.
  - The main role of SRO's is to build positive relationships in the school environment and be a preventive presence in schools per School Board policy; and only used in enforcement role as last resort. (role has changed from previous enforcement model)
  - School Patrol Officer covers schedule openings for SRO's, manages school crossing program, provides safety education in schools, and handles bus arm violations reported.

Data/Observations:

- The unit is made up of staff located in several locations; locations include SPPD Headquarters, Western District, Eastern District, McDonough Homes, and seven (7) schools.
- One of the challenges for the unit commander and staff is the dispersed nature of work locations.
- The unit has several very diverse lines of work within each sub-unit. Data/Observations is broken down by sub-unit.

Volunteer Services

- Volunteer Services serves hundreds of special events in the city in some capacity (e.g.; providing police band, honor guard, chaplains, and/or reserve officers)

- Volunteer Services interacts with many different volunteers. Many of these volunteers serve our agency with 100's of hours of their time each year.
- Volunteer Services supports our volunteer police band. This unit has no budget and operates based on budget dollars not used elsewhere in SPPD line items. Finding storage, uniform and instrument funding, and managing the unit costs staff time.
- Volunteer Services' Officer position does the interviews, backgrounds, and manages the scheduling of all college interns who work in the SPPD.
- Mission of the Reserve Officers is to assist the Officers of the SPPD.
- Volunteer Services' Officer position manages the training, scheduling, and supervision of the volunteer Reserve Officers in the SPPD; including field supervision at events.
- Volunteer Services' Officer has no redundancy or backup to their position for supervision of Reserve Officers at events.
- The Sergeant and Officer in Volunteer Services have a lot of interaction with Special Operations, special event commanders, and permitting in the preparation for staffing events with volunteers.
- Reserve Officer program is funded by outside donations; no departmental budget line item is used for consistency in funding.
- Honor Guard has no line item budget. It is funded through other line items not used. No consistent funding.

Crime Prevention

- Crime Prevention Officers are working at two different locations making supervision more difficult.
- Two (2) Crime Prevention Officers serve all three (3) Patrol Districts and the city's 17-District Councils, which are neighborhood -based interest groups funded by the City.
- Storage for supplies and equipment for Volunteer Services is inadequate due to space restrictions at SPPD headquarters.

School Resource Officers

- School Resource Officer (SRO) program is currently operating without a contract (October 2019) due to the Saint Paul School Board not creating a binding contract for the 2019-2020 school year. There are disparate views on the role or need for SRO's by the Saint Paul School Board.
- With the change in focus to prevention and relationship building, the SRO's have undergone high levels of training in conflict resolution and relationship/rapport building.
- The number of arrests by SRO's in the past couple of years has greatly decreased due to most disciplinary responsibility and intervention being completed by school staff.

ACOP

- ACOP program is perceived by managers within the SPPD to be working very well within its scope and mission.
- ACOP program has a high level of satisfaction from staff working in ACOP and from PHA.

Risk Management Considerations:

- Proper level of supervision of volunteers should be consistently evaluated as circumstances and volunteer missions change.
- Currently, there is no back up or support for Officer in charge of the Reserve Unit during special event periods.
- Training programs for volunteers should be continually evaluated ensure all volunteers are trained in areas they are being asked to do work on behalf of the SPPD.
- The SRO program resides in a school environment with governance from a school administration and school board. It is important to ensure that SPPD policy and the policies of district school administration and the school board are all in alignment. If alignment/agreement is not present, this puts undue risk on the SPPD for its work in the Saint Paul public school system. If there is a lack of alignment, the Department should consider whether it is prudent to continue to serve in this capacity in public schools.
- The dispersed locations of Community Partnerships Unit staff create potential communication problems and a lack of consistent support and supervision by the unit Commander and Sergeants.
- Lack of line item funding for some unit functions creates budget stressors for unit staff.

Recommendations:

- **Add one (1) Office Assistant** to manage day to day office functions. This is a unit with wide ranging functions and dispersed locations. This position will create continuity and assist staff.
- All Sergeants and as many staff should be co-located with the unit Commander in one location to further ensure proper unit communication and supervision.
- Establish adequate onsite storage for Volunteer Services.
- Co-locate civilian Crime Prevention Specialists with their supervisor to ensure greater collaboration.
- **Add one (1) civilian Crime Prevention Specialist**. This will allow for one dedicated Crime Prevention Specialist per Patrol District to have undivided attention to the needs of a smaller area of the city that is accomplished in coordination with the sworn staff of one patrol district.
- Establish a method of sworn staff support for the Officer in charge of the Reserve Unit in Volunteer Services during special event periods.
- Continue to administratively support the ACOP program and relationship with PHA.

- Remove SRO's from schools during any period where no contract has been ratified by the school district.
- Consider elimination of the Police Band due to cost and administrative burden.

Section 10.3 – Youth Programming and Outreach Unit - Community Engagement Division

The Youth Programming and Outreach (YOPO) Unit has:

- The organizational structure shown in Figure 10.31:
- A current personnel table shown in Table 10.31:

Due to the reorganization of parts of the SPPD in March 2019, which included all elements of what now constitutes the Youth Programming and Outreach Unit. A chart showing unit staffing history will not be shown as it is not relevant to current organizational structure.

The YOPO Unit Commander reports to the Deputy Chief of Community Engagement.

Figure 10.31

Table 10.31

Personnel Type	2019
Commander	1
Sergeant	4
Officer	3
Civilian	6
Total Staff	**14**

Responsibilities by sub-unit of the YOPO Unit:

- **Police Athletic League (PAL)** sub-unit is led by a Sergeant with one (1)) Officers:
    - o Coordinate partnerships to create and sustain PAL program with youth.
    - o Engages city parks and recreation and Department staff as coaches and mentors for youth participating in the program.
- LECPA Program (Law Enforcement Career Path Academy) sub-unit is led by two (2) Sergeants with one (1) Officer:
    - o Runs LECPA program with a current roster of 40 student participants who working in service learning environment, going to school for law enforcement 2-year degree and completion of state licensing requirements for pre-employment as a police officer.
- **Community Outreach/Safe Summer Nights** sub-unit is led by one (1) Sergeant and one (1) Officer:
    - o Manage the Safe Summer Nights program for the Saint Paul Police Department. **(Sergeant)**
    - o Coordinate and plan the Junior Police Academy for students. **(Sergeant)**
    - o Develop and manage the Cops & Kids Christmas gift partnership. **(Sergeant)**
    - o Manage the Stuff the Sleigh program for Children's Hospital. **(Sergeant)**
    - o Coordinate the Back-Pack Giveaway program for K-12 student. **(Sergeant)**
    - o Other outreach programming as assigned. **(Sergeant)**
    - o Deliver AVID program content in Saint Paul Public Schools. **(Sergeant/Officer)**
    - o Manage and lead the Explorers scouting program. **(Officer)**
    - o Coordinate the Ride Along program for community members. **(Officer)**
- **Community Engagement Specialists:**
    - o There are four positions who are hired to be experts within the Department in connecting community member and resources to the SPPD.

- **Grant Specialist:**
  - This one position is intended to manage and work on SPPD compliance many grants across the agency.
  - Seek new granting opportunities for existing programs.
  - Work with administration on how strategic planning can be complimented by grant opportunities.

Data/Observations:

- The Youth Programming and Outreach Unit has a large footprint in the SPPD efforts towards connection with communities of color for the future diversification of its workforce.
- LECPA, PAL, and Explorers are currently all operating on grant funding.
- The PAL program has popularity within the community and presents a positive message for the youth that become involved.
- The PAL program has outstretched its ability to serve expectations. Officers are recruited from the SPPD to help with program, but without direct compensation, the number of Officers available is low in number.
- PAL currently has no line item budget, it must rely on grants. Previous budget line items have been eliminated.
- LECPA program was instituted in 2016 and receives all its funding from multiple grant sources; currently 35 different grant fund streams.
- LECPA is a service-learning program that has 40 local area post-high school students working in the SPPD.
- LECPA program partners with Community Action Partnerships, AmeriCorps, and Century College for program content assistance and partial funding.
- Employment background investigations for LECPA students:
  - There are Levels I through Level IV with the SPPD background system.
  - LECPA program originally had students enter the program at a Level I background for employment.
  - This proved to be problematic when a higher level of backgrounding was necessary for further employment within the agency, with some students not passing further backgrounds levels or having behavioral issues presenting with current employment.
  - New LECPA students will have to pass a Level III background to enter program.
  - Higher level backgrounds will assist in solving students failing future background processes.
- LECPA program is currently reorganizing the student time within the SPPD to make a more structured curriculum for their service learning.
- A current program goal LECPA staff is measuring student success in the program and separating those who are performing poorly before too much time and resources are expended.
- The Community Engagement Specialist (CES) positions have been in place for over two (2) years.

- The Community Engagement Specialists are not subject matter experts in policing issues but excel at accessing community leaders and members and bridging communication between segments of the community with the SPPD.

- A departmental should be concerned and watch for potential gaps in community connections that may exist with different age groups or sub-sections of community if SPPD Community Engagement Specialists are relied upon too heavily for community relationships.

- Work is being done at this time to create more structure and consistency in managing the direction and goals of the Community Engagement Specialists, so their work dovetails with the strategic goals of the SPPD on a regular basis.

- The Community Outreach Sergeant and Officer deal with a multitude of programs that are designed to give direct benefit of the SPPD's position towards adults and youth at disadvantage in our community. This work provides an added value to a government agency that often deals with people in disadvantaged communities from a position of enforcement.

- Community Outreach's work in the AVID program in Saint Paul Schools reaches a student audience that is 85% diverse and makes them aware of law enforcement/public service as a viable career path for them.

- A full-time Grant Coordinator has been an excellent addition to the administrative staffing of the SPPD. The grant opportunities to the work of the YOPO Unit is an example of the work that is being done as a result of this position and would not likely have occurred without it.

Risk Management Considerations:

- Dependency on grant money sustaining the program work of the YOPO unit places these very important external community relationships and staff diversity growth opportunities in a very tenuous position if grant funds are no longer available as the source of funding.

- The LECPA student/ police staff ratio must be watched to ensure quality control in the advising and supervision of LECPA student workers.

- Consider the actual communication chain between the LECPA recruitment process, LECPA student in-program time window, and job opportunities as they near the end of their student program. There is a potential to lose quality candidates to other SPPDs if SPPD does not have post-program opportunities for LECPA students we want to recruit for civilian or sworn positions.

Recommendations:

- **Create budget line items for all Youth Programming and Outreach programs. This recommendation is not to displace grant funding, but to create a budgetary imprint of what it takes to run these programs in the absence of grant funding.** The strategy would be to create the line items that would be escrowed and returned to the City's general fund if grant funding is available. However, if grant funding is not available, there is a budgetary infrastructure in place

to fund these very important programs that reflect the values of the community the SPPD serves.

- **Add (1) grant coordinator.** YOPO Unit programming needs about 75% of the time of the current SPPD grant coordinator to manage the 35 grant streams for just LECPA and the other grants in order to comply with the term, conditions, and accounting for these major grant funding streams. A second grant writer should be hired to work on other granting opportunities for departmental needs, initiatives, and innovation grants.

Section 10.4 – Traffic and Pedestrian Safety Unit/Parking Enforcement - Community Engagement Division

The Traffic and Pedestrian Safety Unit (TPSU) has:

- The organizational structure shown in Figure 10.41;
- A current personnel table shown in Table 10.41;
- Six (6) year caseloads and activity from 2013-2018 shown in Table 10.42;

Due to the reorganization of parts of the SPPD in March 2019, which included all elements of TPSU. A chart showing unit staffing history will not be shown as it is not relevant to current organizational structure.

The TPSU Commander reports to the Deputy Chief of Community Engagement.

Figure 10.41

Table 10.41 Traffic and Pedestrian Safety Personnel Table

Personnel Type	2019
Commander	1
Sergeant	4
Officer	10
Civilian PEO's	15
Clerk	1
Total Staff	**31**

Table 10.42 - Traffic Investigations

Traffic and Ped. Safety	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Total # of Cases	9304	8973	8519	8966	7315	7970
# of Cases Per Investigator	**2326**	**2243**	**2129**	**2241**	**2438**	**2656**
Avg. Case Time (days) Closed Cases	**4**	**5**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**10**
Recommended Range of Cases Per Investigator Per Year	**2281-3650**	**1825-2920**	**3041-4866**	**2281-3650**	**1825-2920**	**912-1460**
Cleared by Arrest	5782	5104	4981	5198	4111	4488
Declined	27	25	26	29	17	27
Noted	1840	2751	2481	2702	2160	2264
Other/Unk.	705	2	3	4	1	11
Unfounded	5	5	5	1	1	1
Recovered Property	0	1	6	1	0	2
Exceptional Clearance	4	3	3	3	9	1
Pended	934	1075	1000	1017	1013	1138
TOT Other Agency	7	7	14	11	3	38
Adults Booked for Crime	1358	1052	999	704	737	898
Adults Cited for Crime	3761	3249	3316	2593	1230	875
Juvenile Arrested Not Booked	11	5	14	UNK	6	4
Juvenile Booked at JDC	7	1	6	4	7	3

Data/Observations:

- TPSU was historically part of a larger unit previous organized as Citywide Services. In March 2019, this unit was significantly reduced in size when the Motorcycle and Mounted Units were disbanded due to concerns over SPPD liability for injury to sworn staff in the units and increasing demand for police service. The disbanded units were redeployed to Patrol Operations to increase staffing.
- TPSU has changed its focus from standard speed related violations enforcement to distracted driving and pedestrian safety related driver education and conduct violations.
- TPSU has a Parking Enforcement Officer (PEO) program which is a recruitment program for law enforcement students and a full-time position in the SPPD. This program works to assist the students in preparation (over a maximum 4 year period) towards completion of their law enforcement program and provides a 30-40 hour per week job as a Parking Enforcement Officer.
- Parking enforcement is a significant issue in Saint Paul and receives a lot of interface with other portions of city government.
- Currently, the Sergeant supervising the PEO's has a 20% share of their time assigned to the Special Operations Unit to assist in traffic management planning and special event planning.
- Historically, Traffic Investigations had four (4) sergeants assigned to investigate traffic crashes. This was reduced to three (3) Sergeant Investigators in 2017 and was reduced to two (2) Sergeant Investigators in August of 2019.

Risk Management Considerations:

- It is very important to the recruitment efforts of the SPPD to have an effective Sergeant supervisor for the Parking Enforcement program for retention of good candidates for future employment as sworn officers.
- Case volume for Traffic Investigations must be monitored to ensure proper follow-up is achievable.
- Traffic enforcement tolerances vary across Saint Paul and no single type of enforcement should be neglected.

Recommendations:

- Eliminate the shared responsibilities of the Sergeant supervising the Parking Enforcement program.
- **Add one (1) sergeant investigator** to reduce the number new cases per year each investigator must carry.

Section 10.5 – C.O.A.S.T. Unit - Community Engagement Division

The Community Outreach and Stabilization Unit (COAST) has:

- The organizational structure shown in Figure 10.51;
- Three (3) year personnel history from 2017-2019 shown in Table 10.51;

The COAST Unit Sergeant reports to the Deputy Chief of Community Engagement.

Figure 10.51

Figure 10.51

Personnel Type	2017	2018	2019
Sergeant	1	1	1
Officer	0	3	7
Total Staff	**1**	**4**	**8**

Data/Observations:

- The COAST Unit was originally established for managing information, training, developing grant opportunities, and working with external mental health organizations regarding people experiencing mental health crises in Saint Paul. The original unit name was the "Mental Health Unit." It was originally built around one (1) Sergeant.
- In 2018, three (3) Officers were added to the unit.
- One Officer position has been responsible for the development of a case management infrastructure for the Officers and embedded social workers in the unit for field work with persons in crisis. Additionally, this Officer position also oversees the Recovery Access Program that deals with connecting people struggling with addiction, that the unit is aware of, with pathways to recovery support.
- In 2018, two (2) social workers, financially supported by outside social service agencies, were added to the unit. The unit uses the term "embedded social workers" for these social worker positions who work along-side Officers in the unit. Together, they go out into the community to

work with residents who have been identified as having long-term mental health issues and have had interactions with Saint Paul Police Officers.

- In 2019, four (4) Officers were added to the unit.
- One (1) Officer added in 2019 is responsible for homeless outreach. This Officer position had previously been assigned to a different unit and working on homeless outreach prior to be assigned to COAST.
- In 2019, the unit name changed to Community Outreach and Stabilization Unit (COAST) to better reflect their work.
- In 2019, two (2) additional embedded social workers were added from community mental health organizations and are being paid for out of a grant received by the SPPD.
- The unit currently has Officers working on Day and Afternoon shift. These Officers work with embedded social workers work on in-home visits of persons who have had SPPD contact due to past mental health crises and assist on in-progress calls where persons with mental health crises are the reason for the initial call to police. Their job on-scene is to assist district Patrol Officers with their skills, training, and resources.
- An unintended consequence of Officers working with district Patrol Officers has been that Officers utilize the COAST Officers as peer counselors for the stress they feel in their jobs, thus serving in a role of peer counseling outside of our formal peer counseling program in EAP.

Risk Management Considerations:

- The issue of mental health crisis and law enforcement response is a community topic of concern.
- Lack of continued innovation in this area will open any law enforcement agency to criticism and litigation.
- Continuing agency-wide training in CIT and related topics, to keep sworn staff training relevant to the latest protocols and techniques in dealing with persons-in-crisis, is a community expectation.

Recommendations:

- Continue to utilize the existing programming of the unit.
- Rename unit Behavior Services with the sub-unit categories of COAST and EAP Services.
- Consolidate the following functions under one command:
  - COAST
  - Autism Outreach
  - EAP
  - Peer Counseling
- **Add one (1) Commander** to administer this larger unit.
- **Add one (1) Sergeant** to supervise the afternoon shift COAST Officers and embedded social workers.
- The two (2) COAST Sergeants should be cross-trained to support the EAP Director for on-call/vacation relief.
- **Add one (1) Officer** position to the unit to move the Autism Outreach Officer in West Patrol to COAST.

- **Add one (1) Office Assistant** to perform the unit coordination and manage the substantial confidential paperwork associated with this work.

End of Report

Section 11.0 - Study Author

Jack Serier is the primary researcher and author of this study. Jack currently holds the rank of Police Commander at the Saint Paul Police Department and has served as a law enforcement officer for 29 years. He previously served in the Stillwater and Eagan departments and rose to the rank of Commander at Saint Paul before working as an administrator at the Ramsey County Sheriff's Office and serving as Sheriff of Ramsey County.

Jack holds a B.A. from Hamline University and earned master's degree and a doctoral degree in Leadership, Policy and Administration from the University of Saint Thomas. He is also a graduate of the FBI National Academy in Quantico, Virginia.

Commander Serier continues to teach ethics and leadership as an assistant professor at Saint Mary's University, adjunct faculty at the University of Saint Thomas, and as an instructor for the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension's management program. He also serves on the board of the Northeast Youth and Family Services and the President's Council for Northern Star Scouting. Jack is an Eagle Scout and served in Scouting as an adult leader for many years.

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Section 13.0 - Glossary

Records Management System (RMS) statistical description from six (6) year RMS Case Data Charts

Investigative Unit Name	
Total # of Cases	Total number of criminal cases investigated by the unit
# of Cases Per Investigator	Numerical value determined by the following equation:
	Total # of Cases/# of Sergeant Investigators = # of Cases Per Investigator
Avg. Case Time (days) Closed Cases	Number of days it took for a case to be closed by the investigative unit with one of the following dispositions: Cleared by Arrest, Declined, Noted, Other/Unk.,Unfounded, Recovered Property, Exceptionally Cleared, Pended, TOT other Agency
Cleared by Arrest	Investigative case closed by a suspect being charged/arrested for crime
Declined	Investigative case closed by being declined for charging suspect with a crime by the City/County Attorney's Office
Noted	Investigative case closed after review by unit investigators with no further action needed; an informational report with no criminal arrest
Other/Unk.	Investigative case closed due to determination that no crime was committed or a mitigating circumstance
Unfounded	Investigative case closed due to no crime having occurred
Recovered Property	Investigative case closed, no new crime occurred, but property was recovered during incident
Exceptional Clearance	Investigative case closed, not charged due to in-extremis circumstance
Pended	Investigative case closed due to no further action/follow-up identifying a suspect or enough probable cause to make an arrest in the crime
TOT Other Agency	Investigative case closed because it was transferred to another law enforcement agency with jurisdiction in the case
Total Booked for Crime	Total number of cases in the year where a suspect was physically arrested and taken into custody for a crime
Cited for Crime	Total number of people charged by citation-not taken into physical custody (typically a misdemeanor crime)
Juvenile Arrested Not Booked	Total number of juvenile persons charged for a crime, but never taken into custody
Juvenile Booked at JDC	Total number of juvenile persons arrested, taken into custody, and charged for a crime at the Juvenile Detention Center (JDC)

Section 14.0 - Staffing Level Charts/Additions to Staffing Levels

Current Unit Levels	# of FTE's	Moved FTE (current FTE's)	Add New/Subtract FTE's	Recommended Units and FTE's	
Office of the Chief				**Office of the Chief**	
Chief of Police	1		0	Chief of Police	1
Assistant Chief	1		0	Assistant Chief	1
Senior Commander	1		0	Senior Commander	1
Commander	1		0	Commander	1
Sergeant	5		0	Sergeant	5
Officer	4		0	Officer	4
Civilian PIO	1		new 1	Civilian PIO	2
Office Manager	1		0	Office Manager	1
Office Assistant	2		0	Office Assistant	2
Total	**17**			**Total**	**18**
Patrol Operations Admin.				**Patrol Operations Admin.**	
Deputy Chief	1		0	Deputy Chief	1
Sergeant	1		0	Sergeant	1
Secretary	1		0	Secretary	1
Total	**3**		**0**	**Total**	**3**
Patrol Divisions Operations - Eastern District				**Patrol Operations**	
Sr. Commander	1		0	Sr. Commanders	1
Commander	2		0	Commanders	2
Sergeant	10		0	Sergeants	10
Inv. Sergeant	2	Add from Burglary (2)	new 2	Inv. Sergeants	6
Officer	87		new 11	Officers	98
Office Assistant	1		0	Office Assistants	1
Total	**103**			**Total**	**118**

Current Unit Levels	# of FTE's	Moved FTE (current FTE's)	Add New/Subtract FTE's	Recommended Units and FTE's	
Patrol Divisions Operations - Central District				**Patrol Operations**	
Sr. Commander	1		0	Sr. Commanders	1
Commander	3		0	Commanders	3
Sergeant	12		0	Sergeants	12
Inv. Sergeant	2	Add from Burglary (2)	2	Inv. Sergeants	6
Officer	93		new 11	Officers	104
Office Assistant	1		0	Office Assistants	1
Total	**112**			**Total**	**127**
Patrol Divisions Operations - Western District				**Patrol Operations**	
Sr. Commander	1		0	Sr. Commanders	1
Commander	2		0	Commanders	2
Sergeant	10			Sergeants	16
Inv. Sergeant	3	Add from Burglary (2)	new 3	Inv. Sergeants	8
Officer	84		new 11	Officers	95
Office Assistant	1		0	Office Assistants	1
Total	**101**			**Total**	**123**
Ordinance Disposal Unit (ODU)				**Ordinance Disposal Unit (ODU)**	
Sergeant	1			Sergeant	1
	0		new 1	Officer	1
Total	**1**			**Total**	**2**
Canine Unit				**Canine Unit**	
Commander	1			Commander	1
Sergeant	2			Sergeant	2
Officer	18			Officer	18
Office Assistant	0			Office Assistant/Analyst	0
Total	**21**			**Total**	**21**

Current Unit Levels	# of FTE's	Moved FTE (current FTE's)	Add New/Subtract FTE's	Recommended Units and FTE's	
FORCE Unit				**FORCE Unit**	
Inv. Sergeant	1	Move to Gangs (1)	-1	Inv. Sergeant	0
Officer	9	Move to: Gangs (4)/Intel (3)/POR (1)/Rob-Kid. (1)	-9	Officer	0
Total	**10**		**Total -6**	**Total**	**0**
Watch Commander				**Watch Commander**	
Commander	2		0	Commander	2
Total	**2**			**Total**	**2**
Major Crimes Admin.				**Patrol Operations Admin.**	
Deputy Chief	1		0	Deputy Chief	1
Sergeant	0.5		0	Sergeant	1
Secretary	1		0	Secretary	1
Total	**3**		**0**	**Total**	**3**
Strategic Criminal Intelligence & Investigations (SCI&I)				**(SCI&I)**	
Senior Commander	0	Add from Homicide (1)	0	Senior Commander	1
Total	**0**			**Total**	**1**
Robbery/Homicide				**Homicide**	
Senior Commander	1	move to Strat. Criminal Intel & Invest. (SCI&I)	-1	Senior Commander	0
Commander	0		1	Commander	1
Inv. Sergeant	11	Move to Cold Case Homicide (1)	-1	Inv. Sergeant	10
Officer	1		0	Officer	1
Office Assistant	1		0	Office Assistant	1
Total	**14**			**Total**	**13**

Current Unit Levels	# of FTE's	Moved FTE (current FTE's)	Add New/Subtract FTE's		Recommended Units and FTE's	
Special Investigations			**Currently w/in Rob. Hom.**		**Special Investigations**	
Commander	0				Commander	0
Inv. Sergeant	4	Move to Rob./Kidnap(2)/Move to FSU(2)		-4	Inv. Sergeant	0
Officer	2	Move to Sex Crimes/POR(1)/ Move to Juvenile(1)		-2	Officer	0
Office Assistant/Analyst	0				Office Assistant/Analyst	0
Total	**0**	6			**Total**	**0**
Cold Case Homicide			**Currently w/in Rob. Hom.**		**Cold Case Homicide**	
Commander	0			0	Commander	0
Inv. Sergeant	0	Add from Homicide (1)	new	1	Inv. Sergeant	2
Officer	0			0	Officer	0
Office Assistant	0			0	Office Assistant	0
Total	**0**			**0**	**Total**	**2**
Robbery/Kidnapping			**Currently w/in Rob. Hom.**		**Robbery/Kidnapping**	
Commander	0			0	Commander	0
Inv. Sergeant	0		new	4	Inv. Sergeant	4
Officer	0	Add from FORCE (1)		0	Officer	1
Office Assistant	0			0	Office Assistant	0
Total	**0**			**5**	**Total**	**6**
Violent Crimes Against Persons			**Unit not in existence**		**Violent Crimes Against Persons**	
Commander	0		new	1	Commander	1
Inv. Sergeant	0		new	6	Inv. Sergeant	6
Officer	0		new	1	Officer	1
Office Assistant	0		new	1	Office Assistant	1
Total	**0**				**Total**	**9**

Current Unit Levels	# of FTE's	Moved FTE (current FTE's)	Add New/Subtract FTE's		Recommended Units and FTE's	
Intelligence Unit			Unit not in existence		**Intelligence Unit**	
Commander	0	Add from Technology Unit (1)			Commander	1
Inv. Sergeant	0	Add from Technology Unit (3)		0	Inv. Sergeant	3
Officer	0	Add from FORCE (3)/Add from Technology (3)		0	Officer	6
Civilian Analyst	0	Add from Technology (2)	new	1	Civilian Analyst	3
Civ. CCTV Technician	0		new	6	Civ. CCTV Technician	6
Office Assistant	0			1	Office Assistant	1
Total	**0**				**Total**	**20**
Sex Crimes Unit					**Sex Crimes**	
Commander	1			0	Commander	1
Inv. Sergeant	8		new	8	Inv. Sergeant	16
Officer/POR	1	Add from SIU (1)/ Add from FORCE (1)		0	Officer	3
Office Assistant	1			0	Office Assistant	1
Total	**11**		Total 10		**Total**	**21**
Child Abuse Unit			Unit not in existence		**Child Abuse Unit**	
Commander	0		new	1	Commander	1
Inv. Sergeant	0	Add from ICAC/TFO Unit (1)/ Add from Prop Rm(1)	new	3	Inv. Sergeant	5
Officer	0			0	Officer	0
Office Assistant	0		new	1	Office Assistant	1
Total	**0**				**Total**	**7**

Current Unit Levels	# of FTE's	Moved FTE (current FTE's)	Add New/Subtract FTE's	Recommended Units and FTE's	
Family Violence				**Family Violence**	
Commander	1		0	Commander	1
Inv. Sergeant	7		new 1	Inv. Sergeant	8
Officer	2		0	Officer	2
Office Assistant	1		0	Office Assistant	1
Total	**11**			**Total**	**12**
CAPROP (Auto Theft/Burglary/Fraud & Forgery/Arson/APS				**Burglary**	
Commander	1		0	Commander	1
Inv. Sergeant	15	Move Burg. Inv. to West (2)/Central(2)/East(2)	(Add to Auto Theft) 2	Inv. Sergeant	11
Officer	2		0	Officer	2
Civilian Analyst	1		0	Civilian Analyst	1
Office Assistant	1		0	Office Assistant	1
Total	**20**			**Total**	**16**
Safe Streets/TFO				**Safe Streets/TFO**	
Commander	1		0	Commander	1
Inv. Sergeant	3	Move ICAC (1) to Child Abuse	-1	Inv. Sergeant	2
Officer	8		0	Officer	8
Office Assistant	0		0	Office Assistant	0
Total	**12**			**Total**	**11**
Gang Unit				**Gang Unit**	
Commander	1		0	Commander	1
Inv. Sergeant	7	Add from FORCE (1)	new 1	Inv. Sergeant	9
Officer	16	Add from FORCE (4)	0	Officer	20
Office Assistant	1		0	Office Assistant	1
Total	**25**			**Total**	**31**

Current Unit Levels	# of FTE's	Moved FTE (current FTE's)	Add New/Subtract FTE's		Recommended Units and FTE's	
Juvenile Unit					**Juvenile Unit**	
Commander	1			0	Commander	1
Inv. Sergeant	7			0	Inv. Sergeant	7
Officer-Missing Persons	1	Add from SIU (1)	new	1	Officer	3
Office Assistant	1			0	Office Assistant	1
Total	**10**				**Total**	**12**
Narcotics/Vice					**Narcotics/Vice**	
Commander	1			0	Commander	1
Inv. Sergeant	6			0	Inv. Sergeant	6
Officer	14			0	Officer	14
Civilian Analyst	1			0	Civilian Analyst	1
Office Assistant	1			0	Office Assistant	1
Total	**23**				**Total**	**23**
Support Services Admin.					**Support Services Admin.**	
Deputy Chief	1			0	Deputy Chief	1
Sergeant	1			0	Sergeant	1
Secretary	0.5			0	Secretary	1
Total	**3**			**0**	**Total**	**3**
Employee Assistance Program (EAP)					**Employee Assistance Program (EAP)**	
Sergeant	1			0	Sergeant	1
Total	**1**				**Total**	**1**

Current Unit Levels	# of FTE's	Moved FTE (current FTE's)	Add New/Subtract FTE's		Recommended Units and FTE's	
Fleet/Radio Shop					Fleet/Radio Shop	
Sergeant	1	Move to Traffic Investigations(1)		-1	Sergeant	0
Civilian Fleet Manager	0		new	1	Civilian Fleet Manager	1
Civilian Supervisor	1			0	Civilian Supervisor	1
Civ. Radio Technicians	5			0	Civ. Radio Technicians	5
Office Assistant	1			0	Office Assistant	1
Total	**8**				**Total**	**8**
Training Unit					**Training Unit**	
Commander	1			0	Commander	1
Sergeant	6		new	1	Sergeant	7
Officer	7		new	3	Officer	10
Office Assistant	1		new	1	Office Assistant	2
Total	**15**				**Total**	**20**

Current Unit Levels	# of FTE's	Moved FTE (current FTE's)	Add New/Subtract FTE's		Recommended Units and FTE's	
Property & Evidence Unit					**Property & Evidence Unit**	
Civilian Manager	0		new	1	Civilian Manager	1
Sergeant	1	Move to Child Abuse Unit (1)		-1	Sergeants	0
Property Clerk	4.5			0	Property Clerk	4.5
Photo Lab Technicians	1			0		1
Total	**6.5**				**Total**	**6.5**

Current Unit Levels	# of FTE's	Moved FTE (current FTE's)	Add New/Subtract FTE's	Recommended Units and FTE's	
Records Unit				**Records Unit**	
Commander	**1**		**0**	Commander	**1**
Civilian Manager	1		0	Civilian Manager	1
Review Officer	5		new 1	Review Officer	6
Office Assistants II & III	11.2		0	Office Assistant II & III	11.2
Total	**18.2**			**Total**	**19.2**
Impound Lot				**Impound Lot**	
Civilian Manager	1		0	Civilian Manager	1
PM Supervisor	1		0	PM Supervisor	1
Property Clerk	6		0	Property Clerk	6
PT Property Clerk (.5)	3		0	PT Property Clerk (.5)	3
Office Assistant	1		0	Office Assistant	1
Total	**12**			**Total**	**12**
Human Resource Unit				**Human Resource Unit**	
HR Consultant	1		**0**	HR Consultant	1
Backgrounds-Officer	3		**0**	Backgrounds-Officer	3
Office Assistant III & IV	2		new 0.5	Office Assistant	2.5
Total	**6**			**Total**	**6.5**

Current Unit Levels	# of FTE's	Moved FTE (current FTE's)	Add New/Subtract FTE's	Recommended Units and FTE's	
Forensic Science Unit				**Forensic Science Unit**	
Civilian Lab Director	1		0	Civilian Lab Director	1
Quality Assurance Mgr.	0		new 1	Quality Assurance Mgr.	1
Inv. Sergeant	2	Add from SIU (2)	0	Sergeants	4
Officers	6		0	Officers	6
Forensic Scientist III	1	(currently vacant)	0	Forensic Scientist III	1
Forensic Scientist II	1		0	Forensic Scientist II	1
Forensic Scientist I	3		0	Forensic Scientist I	3
Office Assistant	1		0	Office Assistant	1
Total	**15**			**Total**	**18**
Technology Unit (Technology/Video Mgmt./CCTV)				**Technology Unit**	
Commander	1	Move to Intelligence (1)	-1		0
Civilian Manager	0		new 1		1
Sergeant	4	Move to Intelligence Unit (3)	-3		1
Officer	3	Move Intelligence Unit (3)	-3	Officer	0
Civilian Project Manager	0		new 1		1
Video Technician	5		0	Video Technician	5
Service Technician	3		0	Service Technician	3
Civilian Analyst	4		-2	Civilian Analyst	2
Office Assistant	1		0	Office Assistant	1
Total	**21**			**Total**	**17**

Current Unit Levels	# of FTE's	Moved FTE (current FTE's)	Add New/Subtract FTE's	Recommended Units and FTE's	
Building Maintenance Unit				**Building Maintenance Unit**	
Building Maint. Sup.	1		0	Building Maint. Sup.	1
Engineer III	1		0	Engineer III	1
Maint. Mechanic	1		0	Maint. Mechanic	1
Custodian Engineer II	4		new 2	Custodian Engineer II	6
Custodian II	4			Custodian II	4
Total	**11**			**Total**	**13**
Accounting Unit				**Accounting Unit**	
Accountant IV	1		**0**	Accountant IV	1
Accountant I	1		**0**	Accountant I	1
Account Clerk II	1		**0**	Account Clerk II	1
Total	**3**			**Total**	**3**
Community Engagement Admin.				**Community Engagement Admin.**	
Deputy Chief	1		0	Deputy Chief	1
Sergeant	1		0	Sergeant	1
Office Assistant	1		0	Office Assistant	1
Total	**3**		**0**	**Total**	**3**
Special Operations Unit				**Special Operations Unit**	
Commander	1			Commander	1
Sergeant	3			Sergeant	3
Officer	0			Officer	
Civilian Analyst	0		new 1	Civilian Analyst	1
Office Assistant	0		new 1	Office Assistant	1
Total	**4**			**Total**	**6**

Current Unit Levels	# of FTE's	Moved FTE (current FTE's)	Add New/Subtract FTE's		Recommended Units and FTE's	
Community Partnerships Unit					**Community Partnerships Unit**	
Commander	1			0	Commander	1
Sergeant	3			0	Sergeant	3
Officer	18			0	Officer	18
Crime Prev. Specialists	2		new	1	Crime Prev. Specialists	3
CLO's	3			0	CLO's	3
Office Assistant	0		new	1	Office Assistant	1
Total	**27**				**Total**	**29**
Youth Programming & Outreach Unit					**Youth Programming & Outreach Unit**	
Commander	1			0	Commander	1
Sergeant	4			0	Sergeant	4
Officer	3			0	Officer	3
Crime Engage. Specialists	4			0		4
Grant Specialist	1		new	1	Grant Specialist	2
Office Assistant	1			0	Office Assistant	1
Total	**14**				**Total**	**15**
Traffic & Pedestrian Safety Unit					**Traffic & Pedestrian Safety Unit**	
Commander	1			0	Commander	1
Inv. Sergeant	2	Add from Fleet (1)		0	Inv. Sergeant	3
Sergeant	2			0	Sergeant	2
Officer	10			0	Officer	10
Civ. Parking Enf. Officers	15			0		15
Office Assistant	1			0	Office Assistant	1
Total	**31**				**Total**	**32**
COAST Unit					**COAST Unit**	
Commander	0		new	1	Commander	1
Sergeant	1		new	1	Sergeant	2
Officer	7			0	Officer	7
Civ. Analyst	1			0	Civ. Analyst	1
Office Assistant	0		new	1	Office Assistant	1

Total	9			Total	12
Current Personnel Positions				**Recommended Personnel Investments**	
Accountant IV	1			Accountant IV	0
Accountant I	1			Accountant I	0
Account Clerk I	1			Account Clerk I	0
Assistant Chief	1			Assistant Chief	0
Building Maint. Superv.	1			Building Maint. Superv.	0
Chief of Police	1			Chief of Police	0
Civ. Service Technicians	3			Civ. Service Technicians	0
Civ. Video Technicians	5			Civ. Video Technicians	6
Civilian Analyst	6			Civilian Analyst	2
Civilian Crime Prev. Specialist	2			Civilian Crime Prev. Specialist	1
Civilian Grant Specialist	1			Civilian Grant Specialist	1
Civilian Lab Director	1			Civilian Lab Director	0
Civilian PIO	1			Civilian PIO	1
Civilian Fleet Manager	1			Civilian Fleet Manager	1
Civilian Project Manager	0			Civilian Project Manager	1
Civilian Unit Supervisor	2			Civilian Unit Supervisor	0
Civilian Unit Manager	2			Civilian Unit Manager	2
Commander	25			Commander	4
Community Engagement Specialists	4			Community Engagement Specialists	0
Community Liaison Officer	3			Community Liaison Officer	0
Custodian Engineer II	4			Custodian Engineer II	2
Custodian II	4			Custodian II	0
Deputy Chief	4			Deputy Chief	0
Engineer III	1			Engineer III	0

Position	FTE			Position	FTE
Forensic Scientist I	3			Forensic Scientist I	0
Forensic Scientist II	1			Forensic Scientist II	0
Forensic Scientist III	1			Forensic Scientist III	0
Human Resource Consultant	1			Human Resource Consultant	0
Investigative Sergeants	80			Investigative Sergeants	33
Maint. Mechanic	1			Maint. Mechanic	0
Office Assistant	34.2			Office Assistant	6.5
Office Manager	1			Office Manager	0
Officers	399			Officers	39
Parking Enf. Officer	15			Parking Enf. Officer	0
Photo Lab Technician	1			Photo Lab Technician	0
Property Clerk	13.5			Property Clerk	0
Quality Assurance Manager	0			Quality Assurance Manager	1
Radio Technician	5			Radio Technician	0
Review Officer	5			Review Officer	1
Secretary	3			Secretary	0
Senior Commander	5			Senior Commander	0
Sergeant	70			Sergeant	2
Total FTE's: 713.7				**Total FTE's: 103.5**	